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ABSTRACT 
Concerns have long been raised about the conduct and accountability of charitable organisations, 
particularly the adequacy of reporting and oversight mechanisms. Consequently, charities and the 
institutions that monitor the sector are under increasing pressure to demonstrate their legitimacy. This 
thesis focuses on the ways in which risk is operationalised by the Scottish Charity Regulator and 
experienced by charities. In particular, it examines the nature, extent, determinants and outcomes of 
four types of risk: complaints concerning charity conduct, regulatory action in response to a 
complaint, financial vulnerability, and triggering accountability concerns. The thesis begins with a 
detailed review of the overlapping literatures of risk, regulation and charity theory, and the 
development of a contextual framework for guiding the empirical work. The thesis draws on 
contemporary large-scale administrative social science data derived from the regulator, supported by 
modest use of primary social survey and qualitative data. Findings from the four empirical chapters 
provide evidence that the risks explored in this research are uncommon for individual charities but are 
a persistent feature of the sector as a whole, and vary in predictable ways across certain organisational 
characteristics. The results also reveal the concern of charities with financial risks, their willingness to 
demonstrate transparency regarding their actions (particularly in response to complaints), and the 
perceived lack of regulatory burden. The thesis makes an original contribution in the form of new 
empirical knowledge about the charity sector, in particular through the use of large-scale 
administrative social science data to ‘peer under the hood’ and shine a light on aspects of charity 
behaviour that are often overlooked. The thesis concludes with a reflection on the key findings and 
comments on potential areas for future research.  
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Chapter One – Risk and Resilience in Scottish Charities 
 
Source: xkcd. (n.d.) Increased Risk.  
Retrieved January 10, 2017, from http://xkcd.com /1252/  
1.1. Introduction 
Charities in Scotland are operating in dynamic organisational, political and social environments. The 
funding landscape has shifted in recent years, with more focus on temporary, project-specific support 
rather than strategic, core funding from government (Kiviniemi, 2008). This reflects changes in the 
compact between the state and the charity sector: charities are often seen as an extension of the public 
sector in terms of service delivery, rather than providers of supplementary services (Cornforth, 2011; 
Deakin, 2001; Panel on the Independence of the Voluntary Sector, 2014). These developments in the 
charity sector have occurred against the backdrop of increasing public scrutiny and accountability of 
institutions (Power, 2009; Rothstein, Huber & Gaskell, 2006). Consequently, charities and the 
institutions tasked with their oversight are under increasing pressure to demonstrate their legitimacy; 
the recent spate of parliamentary inquiries into charity legislation and regulation (2013), fundraising 
(2016) and sustainability (2017) instantiates this claim. Charities’ capacity to be resilient in the face of 
these challenges is crucial to ensuring they continue to deliver public benefit, meet the needs of 
beneficiaries and remain accountable to relevant stakeholders. 
Risk is an everyday part of charitable activity and is defined as follows: “[risk refers to] uncertainty 
about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that 
humans value.” (Aven & Renn, 2009, p. 2) Charity trustees are responsible for managing risk to 
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ensure that their charities achieve their objectives and protect the organisation’s funds and assets. A 
number of recent and historical scandals serve to highlight the salience of this topic. The demise of a 
large London-based children’s charity in 2015 – Kids Company – raised concerns nationally about the 
financial stability of the sector; this high-profile case of mismanagement was portrayed as emblematic 
of poor financial and governance practices by charities in general (BBC News, 2015; NAO, 2015). 
The creation of a fundraising regulator for England and Wales in 2016 was linked to the plight of 
Olive Cooke, a pensioner that took her own life in 2015; it soon came to light that she experienced 
persistent and often unwelcome solicitation for donations from numerous charities prior to her death 
(Fundraising Standards Board, 2016).  
It was two cases of financial misconduct – at Moonbeams and Breast Cancer Research – that acted as 
the catalyst for the establishment of a dedicated Scottish charity regulator; both of these organisations 
were found to have misappropriated millions of pounds that should have been spent pursuing 
charitable purposes (Lambert, 2010). Prior to 2006, the Scottish charitable sector was very lightly 
regulated by the UK Inland Revenue, and there was significant support from the sector itself for 
clearer statutory regulation (Dunn, 2016).  
This thesis focuses on the ways in which risk is operationalised by the regulator and experienced by 
charities. In particular, it empirically examines the nature, extent, determinants and outcomes of four 
main types of risk: complaints concerning charity conduct, regulatory action in response to a 
complaint, financial vulnerability, and triggering accountability concerns. We assess the extent to 
which existing (or new) charity data could be used to measure risk and predict negative outcomes; we 
also explore the extent to which these measures are an accurate reflection of the qualitative experience 
of risk within charities. We begin by defining the charity sector in Scotland, followed by a delineation 
of the regulatory regime under which charitable organisations operate. The chapter concludes with an 
outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1.2. Defining the Scottish Charity Sector 
Despite their distinct identity in terms of legislation and public consciousness, charities embody 
characteristics from a wider domain of voluntary activity known – in the UK and most of Europe – as 
the third sector. Charities constitute a recognisable and significant proportion of the third sector in 
Scotland and the UK, and are also often referred to as the ‘regulated voluntary sector’. Originally 
conceptualised as a ‘third way’ for delivering goods and services (as distinct from the public and 
private sectors), the term encapsulates a plurality of organisational types and values (Anheier & 
Salamon, 2006). The third sector has been described as ‘a loose and baggy monster’ and remains a 
contentious area of academic inquiry (Kendall & Knapp, 1995; Morgan, 2010). Various definitions 
and conceptualisations of the term have been proposed. Alcock (2010) argues that the third sector has 
been constructed from policy and practice discourses, and is a strategic unity of organisations rather 
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than operational. Others, such as Evers and Laville (2004) contend that the sector is essentially an 
aggregation of distinct fields and organisations (see Figure 1.1).  
Figure 1.1. Locating the third sector in the organisational landscape 
 
Note: Source: Evers & Laville (2004). The Third Sector in Europe. 
In keeping with its heterogeneous nature and varying definitions, Evers & Laville’s diagram positions 
the third sector as an amorphous entity, not distinct from other domains but overlapping them. 
Consequently, the sector contains a plurality of organisational types that are differentiated by their 
founding origins, funding resources and functions (Kiviniemi, 2008). “Generally, they do not like to 
consider themselves as ‘third sector organizations’. They prefer to be identified more closely with 
their particular character: i.e. we are a charity or voluntary organization or we have service provision 
or advocacy functions.” (Jenei & Kuti, 2008, p. 12) Despite the heterogeneous nature of the sector, 
some common organisational characteristics can be identified (Jenei & Kuti, 2008; Kiviniemi, 2008): 
voluntary participation; motivations for establishment; non-distribution of surplus; private 
organisations acting in the public interest; autonomous and formal. 
In Scotland, the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR) has responsibility for implementing 
The Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 (The Act), and ensuring that charities and 
their trustees comply with the law. One of the challenges for the regulator is ensuring that their action 
is appropriate, and that they balance enforcement of The Act against placing an undue burden on 
charitable organisations. A charity is defined (under statute) as an organisation that is listed on the 
Charity Register maintained by OSCR; unlike in England and Wales, all charities are required to 
register with OSCR and thus the Charity Register is a complete accounting of these organisations in 
Scotland. At time of writing, there are 24,058 charities active in Scotland, working across numerous 
geographies, beneficiary groups and charitable purposes. To register, an organisation must 
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demonstrate that it passes the charity test: it must have only charitable purposes as defined by the Act; 
the organisation must or intend to provide some form of public benefit; it must not allow its assets to 
be used for non-charitable purposes; it cannot be governed or directed by government Ministers; and 
it cannot be a political party (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, n.d). Organisations derive 
significant benefits from holding charity status, mainly relating to fundraising and attracting 
volunteers (Meijer, 2009; Morgan, 2010; 2012). There are also considerable tax advantages associated 
with being a charity: they do not have to pay income or capital gains tax, are entitled to business rates 
relief of up-to 100 percent, are exempt from value added tax (VAT) on applicable goods and services, 
can claim Gift Aid on donations made by tax-paying individuals, and individuals and corporations can 
claim relief on their donations or bequests to charities (Morgan & Fletcher, 2013). 
1.3. Charity Regulation in Scotland 
Charities are subject to regulation by OSCR, which was established in 2003 as an Executive Agency 
and took up its full powers when the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005 came into 
force in April 2006. Its responsibilities include the following: keep a public register of charities in 
Scotland; determine whether an organisation can be a charity; encourage, assist and monitor 
compliance with the Act; identify and investigate apparent misconduct and protect charity assets; give 
advice or make proposals to Scottish Ministers about charity regulation. OSCR’s vision is for charities 
that provide public benefit and the public can have confidence in, and defines its objectives as follows 
(Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2014): 
 Increase public confidence in charities through effective regulation. 
 Increase transparency and public accountability of charities. 
 Increase charity trustees’ compliance with the Act. 
 Establish and maintain OSCR as a trusted, effective and innovative regulator. 
 Minimise the burden of regulation on charities wherever possible, with particular emphasis on 
reducing multiple reporting. 
 Operate effectively and efficiently, demonstrating a commitment to the principles and 
practice of Best Value. 
In the early part of this decade OSCR began its transition towards a risk-based approach to regulation, 
examining charities “as a whole rather than charitable status alone, checking on all the issues we 
know can threaten charitable assets or a charity’s reputation and cause concern to the public.” (Office 
of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2012, p. 6) OSCR has named its approach targeted regulation in a 
clear recognition of their desire to target their regulatory activities in a proactive, proportionate and 
preventative manner. The risk framework underpinning OSCR’s transition to a risk-based regulator is 
considered in the concluding chapter, as it was developed during the latter stages of the PhD and thus 
did not inform the conduct of the empirical work. Nevertheless, it provides an informative lens 
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through which to examine the implications of the findings contained in this thesis. The animus of 
OSCR’s involvement in this research project was the need to evaluate the utility of its administrative 
data resources for targeting its regulatory actions and activities. Examples of OSCR’s regulatory 
functions, powers and monitoring activities are analysed in chapters four, five and six; the reporting 
requirements of charities to OSCR, and the data generated through this process, are described in 
Chapter Three.  
1.4. Thesis Outline 
The purpose of this research is to provide detailed empirical analyses investigating original areas of 
inquiry in the fields of charity risk and accountability. In addition, the thesis also aims to demonstrate 
the value of administrative social science data resources in producing original research outputs. In 
order to achieve these aims, the following research questions are posed: 
 Q1. What are the risk factors that lead to charities failing in some capacity; are there 
indicators that could be used as warning signs that OSCR could adopt or expand to identify 
risk? 
 Q2. To what extent do these indicators capture underlying risk in Scottish charities; do 
charities identified as risky by the regulator see themselves similarly?  
Given the multidimensional nature of risk a mixed methods approach is employed to understand this 
topic, incorporating proven data collection and analysis methods such as administrative data, 
statistical modelling (e.g. logistic regression), an online questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. 
The key findings and insights contained in the thesis reveal the pervasive but relatively minor nature 
(in terms of negative outcomes) of certain risks in the Scottish charity sector; however, this finding is 
tempered by concerns surrounding the validity of the measures we can construct using administrative 
data. Linking the key findings together, the thesis reveals much about the intersection of risk and 
regulation in the charity sector. Many of the risks examined in this thesis, especially the definitions 
and measures, are based upon the regulatory priorities of OSCR, and it is clear that there are gaps in 
what these data can tell us about the totality of risk in the sector. The central conclusion is the need for 
a comprehensive, multidimensional examination of risk in the charity sector that draws upon a variety 
of data resources. 
The thesis addresses gaps in the charity behaviour and accountability literature in a comprehensive 
manner, producing new empirical evidence on the nature, extent, determinants and outcomes of 
organisational misconduct in particular, and is structured as follows: 
Chapter Two situates the research in the overlapping literatures of risk, regulation and charity theory, 
and develops a contextual framework that guides the subsequent empirical work. 
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In Chapter Three, we describe the methodology underpinning the research. In particular, we outline 
and review the administrative data employed in the empirical analyses. 
Chapters Four to Seven summarise the empirical work and are presented as distinct pieces of research, 
each with their own literature, research questions and conclusions. In Chapter Four, we present the 
results of an analysis of public complaints and regulatory interventions into charities. We use 
descriptive statistics to highlight the nature and incidences of these events, and examine their potential 
determinants through statistical modelling. 
In Chapter Five, the focus is shifted to OSCR’s proactive attempts to identify risk in the sector, in 
particular financial vulnerability. Drawing on contributions to the charity accountability literature, we 
show trends over time in the distribution of these vulnerabilities and assess their association with 
undesired organisational outcomes. 
In Chapter Six, the focus is on the prevalence of financial vulnerability in the charity sector. Utilising 
common academic conceptualisations and measures, we explore the distribution and persistence of 
financial vulnerability, and once again consider whether it is linked with organisational demise and 
other outcomes. 
In Chapter Seven, we shift the focus to charities’ understanding and assessment of risk. We report the 
results of an online questionnaire and follow-up interviews that explored the values charities attach to 
risk management, their risk management behaviour and protocols, and the risks they identify as being 
significant to their operations.  
Chapter Eight concludes with a reflection on the key findings and contribution of the thesis to the 
field, the policy and practitioner implications of the research, and an outline of a research agenda.  
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Chapter Two – Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we summarise and critique the overlapping literatures of risk, regulation and charity 
theory. The chapter begins by drawing on multidisciplinary literature on the concept of risk, with a 
particular focus on sociological definitions and applications. This is followed by a critical discussion 
of economic and sociological theories of charity formation and behaviour. Next, we define regulation 
and explore some explanatory factors for its existence and application in certain contexts. This is 
followed by a review of risk-based regulation, a relatively recent development in the field; this section 
is concluded with a review of the charity regulation literature. We then explore the nature of risk in 
charitable organisations and consider whether it is different to other organisational forms.  Finally, we 
draw on the preceding literatures to construct a contextual framework for analysing the nature and 
understanding of risk in the charity sector, particularly from the perspective of charities themselves. 
Though the focus of the thesis is on charities as they were defined in the previous chapter, the term 
‘nonprofit’ will be adopted when discussing certain elements of the literature in recognition of the 
original authors’ usage of the term. 
2.2. Risk Theory 
The term risk is ubiquitous in modern society and is increasingly applied to the analysis and 
discussion of significant events such as climate change and financial crises (Alemanno, den Butter, 
Nijsen & Torriti, 2003). Though it is difficult to assign a concrete origin for either the word or 
concept, one of the first uses of the term was as a means to understand the uncertainty or danger of 
maritime explorations (Luhmann, 1996). Applications were soon found for the concept in the 
provision of insurance and other financial services. As probability theory became more sophisticated 
from the early eighteenth century onwards, the application of the concept spread rapidly, both within 
existing sectors and to new ones such as health care, environmental protection and crime (Taylor-
Gooby & Zinn, 2006). 
The concept of risk has received comprehensive treatment in multiple natural and social science 
disciplines, including economics, public health, environmental sciences and sociology to name a few 
(Riesch, 2012). Across these literatures, risk has traditionally been explored from one of three 
perspectives (Moller, 2012): 
 The scientist approach – risk is an objective phenomenon and can be measured in a systematic 
manner. The scientific method, in particular statistical and probabilistic techniques, can and 
should be employed to study risk. 
 The psychological approach – risk is a subjective concept that is perceived and interpreted by 
individuals. “The aim of the approach is to get a clear and distinct picture of how people 
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estimate risks and how they make choices in relation to them – in particular, what influences 
whether they deem a risk acceptable or not.” (Moller, 2012, p. 57). 
 The socio-cultural approach – taking a broader perspective than the psychological approach, 
the concept of risk is culturally mediated by, and in, certain social contexts. It is this 
perspective that has been utilised in much sociological research on risk. 
A challenge for any research utilising the concept of risk is to select or synthesise these differing 
perspectives in an epistemologically coherent and meaningful way. 
2.2.1. Definitions of risk 
Multiple definitions and classifications of risk abound in academic literature and everyday usage. Risk 
has been defined as an unwanted event that may or may not occur, the cause of said event, and as 
simply the probability of an unwanted event occurring (Moller, 2012). Perhaps the most common 
definition, and certainly one that is adopted frequently in an organisational setting, is risk as the 
expectation value of a harmful event that may or may not occur (Campbell, 2005). An unwanted event 
is assigned a probability (e.g. fifty percent or ‘highly likely’) and a severity of impact should that 
event occur (e.g. a monetary or health cost). Each of these components can be defined in quantitative 
or qualitative terms. The expectation value (also known as the magnitude) is simply the product of the 
probability and the severity of the risk. This conceptualisation of risk has been incorporated into 
decision-theory research (Jensen, 2012). 
In the sociology literature, risk is conceptualised in less technical terms. Rosa (1998, 2003) defines 
risk as a situation or event where something of human value (including humans themselves) is at stake 
and where the outcome is uncertain. In this definition, risk is a state of the world and is independent of 
perception and subjectivity. For example, a risk to human well-being is lung cancer; the cancer itself 
is the risk and there is uncertainty around its likelihood and consequences. Conceptualised in this 
manner, risk comprises of two dimensions: uncertainties about the occurrence of an event and its 
consequences, and the severity of the event occurring and its consequences. Probability and severity 
are used to understand the risk but are not part of the concept of risk itself. “The key point is, 
however, not that risk is identified by an event but that uncertainty replaces probabilistic quantities, 
and that specific consequences are replaced by a broader discussion of outcome stakes.” (Aven & 
Renn, 2009, p. 4) Though commonly referenced in the theoretical discourse on risk, Rosa’s definition 
suffers from its abstraction from modern applications of risk theory; that is, the operationalisation of 
risk as the probability of an event multiplied by its impact (Aven & Renn, 2009). Aven and Renn 
(2009) sought to amend Rosa’s conceptualisation of risk by bridging the gap between its theoretical 
rigour and the application of risk analysis. Their definition is as follows: “Risk refers to uncertainty 
about and severity of the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that 
humans value.” (Aven & Renn, 2009, p. 2)  
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Uncertainty and severity are retained as the core dimensions of the concept of risk, with probabilities 
often used to express uncertainties. While risk analysis using this definition is often applied to ‘real’ 
events, the concept of risk is no longer a state of the world as it is not independent of the assessor 
(Aven & Renn, 2009). Taylor-Gooby and Zinn (2006) argue that this definition reconciles realist and 
constructivist approaches to risk, as well as bridging the divide between theoretical contributions and 
organisational applications of the concept; for these reasons, the definition will be adopted for the 
purposes of this study. 
It should be noted that the concepts of uncertainty and risk are not always so neatly synthesised. 
Contributions to the decision-theory literature in particular have often dealt with these concepts 
separately (see Jensen, 2012). Knight’s (1921) well-known definition of risk grounds it in a decision-
making framework, arguing that a risk is the fact that a decision is made under conditions of known 
probabilities. Hence, if the probabilities are unknown a decision maker is dealing with uncertainty and 
not risk. Stirling (2007) draws on Knight’s work and defines risk as a category in the classification of 
uncertainty: risk is a situation where the probability of an outcome and the severity of its impact are 
unproblematic in their measurement (i.e. they are known).  As this research has adopted a definition 
of risk that includes uncertainty as one of its core dimensions, it is important to attempt to classify 
what uncertainty refers to. Riesch (2012) presents five levels of uncertainty ‘objects’, which he argues 
are applicable to many of the disciplinary treatments of risk: uncertainty about the outcome; 
uncertainty about the parameters of a risk analysis model (i.e. the empirical data that feeds into the 
analysis); uncertainty about the model itself – there may be other models that measure the risk more 
appropriately; uncertainty about identified inadequacies of the model (e.g. methodological rigour and 
inherent limitations of the model; and uncertainty about unidentified inadequacies – aspects of the risk 
analysis object that are not knowable at the current time (in former United States Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld’s parlance, these are ‘unknown unknowns’). 
2.2.2. Risk analysis 
We now focus on the process of analysing risk in a variety of settings. Amendola (2002, p. 18) 
provides a succinct description of the operationalisation of risk analysis: 
Early deliberations on risk advocated a three-stage approach: establish the probability and 
magnitude of the hazards respecting the inherent scientific uncertainties (a technical process), 
evaluate the benefits and costs (a social process), and set priorities in such a way that the 
greatest social benefits are achieved at the lowest cost. In this perspective, the risk assessment 
phase was strictly separated from the management. 
Risk analysis is often still conceptualised in this manner, utilising the broad categories of risk 
assessment and risk management to capture the varied processes and stakeholders involved. Risk 
assessment is traditionally the domain of scientific contributions, where the probabilities and impact 
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are estimated; the output of this stage is then incorporated into the decision-making process regarding 
the acceptance or rejection of the risk (Moller, 2012). The core conceptual and technical concerns at 
the assessment stage are the identification, measurement and evaluation of risk; the policy response to 
these risks is then developed and implemented in the management stage. The ideas, concepts and tools 
of risk analysis are no longer confined to traditional areas of application:  
…there now seems to be no limit to the range of adverse outcomes that are explicitly 
conceived as risks to be managed, be they operational risks, security risks, legal risks, 
reputational risks and ethical risks to name just a few. (Huber & Rothstein, 2013, p. 651) 
Power (2004) terms this framing of problems or issues in terms of risk ‘the risk management of 
everything’. 
A robust and universally-applicable measure of risk is difficult to develop. Assigning a probability 
can often be a matter of judgement rather than mathematical certainty, and severity is also difficult to 
measure in a meaningful and comparable manner (Moller, 2012). As well as dealing with probability 
and severity, Taylor (2012) highlights a number of salient issues with the measurement of risk, 
including: not knowing what you do not know (unknown unknowns); misspecification and 
misapplication of the model used to analyse risk; determining appropriate thresholds for acceptable 
levels of risk; the inadequacy of single measures of risk; and inability to reduce risk analysis to a 
purely objective, technical exercise (i.e. it still requires an element of judgement to capture factors 
outside the model). Determining what constitutes an acceptable risk is a particularly important 
consideration. A technical risk assessment may reveal a quantitatively-derived level of risk that 
should be tolerated for a particular activity: for example in 2015 the European Food Safety Authority 
set a safe threshold (known as the Tolerable Daily Intake) for the amount of nickel present in food and 
drinking water. However, those tasked with managing the risk may be dissuaded from adopting this 
level due to pressure from stakeholders that are affected by the consequences of the risk (Hansson, 
2004). This is especially relevant in light of the increasing prominence of risk in modern society and 
the fact that risks are often global, involuntary and inequitable in their distribution. 
Sociological studies of risk have traditionally focused on the interrelationship between risk and 
technological development, and the inadequacy of various institutions in managing risk and 
uncertainty in society (Taylor-Gooby & Zinn, 2006). In Beck’s (1992) influential contribution to the 
literature, the author argues that risk is no longer conceptualised as a matter of fate or an unavoidable 
consequence of material and technological progress; it is no longer constrained by temporal or spatial 
boundaries, and affects greater numbers of people. Hutter (2006, p. 208) echoes the argument of Beck 
and describes the characteristics of risk in modern western societies:  
First, they [risks] are manufactured as opposed to natural. Second, they transcend social and 
national barriers and may be global in their effects. And third, these modern risks are closely 
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but ambivalently associated with science which is seen as responsible for the creation and 
definition of modern risks but is also seen to have failed to control these risks, thus leading to 
the emergence of a risk society characterized by global risk situations. 
Beck’s contribution lacks empirical confirmation but it nonetheless highlights a crucial issue in risk 
research and analysis: the importance of understanding the perception of risk by those affected by it. 
People are concerned with the impact of scientific and technological developments on their lives, 
society and environment. This increased awareness of risk in modern society has implications for 
those tasked with risk analysis and management. As a result of the incongruity between expert and lay 
understandings of risk, its management is becoming increasingly contentious; this is especially true in 
the event of large-scale and dangerous incidents (Renn, 1998). 
2.3. Charity Theory 
One of the most parsimonious and utilised definitions of a nonprofit was proposed by Hansmann 
(1980; 1996); he defines a nonprofit organisation as one that is not free to distribute profit to its 
owners, board or managers. Termed the ‘nondistribution constraint’, it acts as a clear distinction from 
for-profit firms and affects many facets of nonprofit organisations’ operations such as resource 
acquisition, governance, public perceptions and employee motivation (Steinberg, 2006). Salamon and 
Anheier (1997) take a narrower view of nonprofit distinctiveness and propose the Structural-
Operational definition, where nonprofits are defined by the following properties: organised; private 
(i.e. not part of the public sector); autonomous; non-compulsory (e.g. voluntary participation of 
trustees in governance); non-profit distributing. 
2.3.1. Charity formation 
The economic theories explaining the formation of nonprofit organisations rest on a number of 
theoretical pillars. Demand-side theories focus on the motivations of individuals to interact and 
contract with nonprofit organisations (Wallis, 2006). One of the first of these explanations, 
Weisbrod’s (1975) public goods theory, contends that nonprofits surface to fulfil unsatisfied needs for 
public goods.1 Heterogeneous demand for public goods, in terms of quantity and quality, cannot fully 
be satisfied by the state resulting in space in which nonprofits can arise to satisfy niche or overlooked 
needs. Therefore, nonprofit organisations form when private demand for public goods is unmet by the 
state. An example of such public goods provision is the existence of faith schools alongside public 
education institutions. While an important early theoretical contribution to this field, Hansmann 
(1987) elucidates some significant limitations of Weisbrod’s public goods theory: he contends that it 
does not explain why nonprofits rather than for-profits arise to satisfy unmet demand; and that 
nonprofits do not always seek to provide public goods (e.g. commercial nonprofits, charity shops for 
instance, often provide private or quasi-public goods). Weisbrod’s theory also narrowly defines the 
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scope of nonprofit relevance, conceptualising its existence only in terms of a response to the failure of 
the state to provide public goods (Anheier & Salamon, 2006). 
The second significant demand-side theory seeks to explain why there are non-market rather than 
market responses to public goods provision, in contrast to Weisbrod’s theory which seeks to explain 
why there is private provision of public goods (Anheier, 2005). Hansmann’s (1980) contract failure 
theory postulates that, owing to the nondistribution constraint, nonprofits address information 
asymmetries that exist between producers and consumers regarding the quantity, quality, and costs of 
goods and services. Where these asymmetries exist, for-profit firms have an incentive and opportunity 
to take advantage of consumers. In contrast, nonprofits are limited in the benefits they can grant to 
those that control the organisation (via the nondistribution constraint) and thus have less incentive to 
exploit information asymmetries (Hansmann, 1987). Steinberg (2006) elaborates on the means by 
which nonprofits address contract failure: the nondistribution constraint performs a sorting process, 
where entrepreneurs whose values are not aligned with the nonprofit sector do not enter it; many 
founders or managers of nonprofits are demand-side stakeholders (e.g. parents founding a nonprofit 
childcare facility); nonprofits are immune from ‘hostile’ takeovers, promoting stability; and spillover 
benefits to competitors (i.e. the presence of nonprofits incentivises for-profit organisations to become 
more trustworthy). In essence a nonprofit, through its organisational type, signals that it is trustworthy 
to consumers and donors. Contract failure theory is conceptualised as an agency problem, where the 
principal (e.g. donors) cannot easily assess or monitor agent performance.  
Reflecting on his earlier work, Hansmann (2003) comments on the limitations of contract failure 
theory. He stresses the theory be understood as the most convincing efficiency rationale for the 
selection of a nonprofit firm by demand-side stakeholders; that is, the nonprofit firm is more efficient 
at reducing information asymmetries between producers and consumers. Hansmann (2003) criticises 
assertions that the nondistribution constraint eliminates unethical or self-serving behaviour by those 
tasked with managing the firm, arguing that if this were the case an efficient economy would consist 
only of nonprofits. Hansmann’s theory is also limited in its applicability to the nonprofit sector as a 
whole, as it fails to fully account for the existence of commercial nonprofits i.e. organisations that 
derive a majority of their income from trading activities rather than donations. He also posits that 
regulators, not consumers, respond to these perceived information asymmetries (Hansmann, 2003). 
The second strand of economic theories of nonprofit formation takes account of supply-side factors 
(Ben-Ner & Van Hoomissen, 1989). Supply-side theories are concerned with nonprofit 
entrepreneurship and giving. Anheier (2005) argues that the following supply-side conditions must be 
in place for the creation of nonprofit organisations: entrepreneurs that are not motivated by profit; 
adequate funding; philanthropy; support from stakeholders; and production efficiency. Rose-
Ackerman (1996) posits that nonprofit organisations attract founders and leaders that are altruistically 
motivated, rather than purely driven by rent-seeking behaviour. This theory complements Hansmann’s 
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focus on the role of trust in nonprofit organisations and addresses his assumption that the motivations 
and values of board members and managers are aligned with those of the organisation. As Young 
(1983) contends, this sorting of altruistic entrepreneurs and leaders into the nonprofit sector signals 
that their organisations are trustworthy. Other supply-side theories focus on the motivations and 
incentives of individuals to give time, money and other resources to nonprofit organisations (see 
Andreoni, 1990). 
Economic theories by themselves do not possess sufficient explanatory power for the formation of 
nonprofits; while they provide explanations at the micro-level, they suffer from their failure to 
account for variation in cross-national nonprofit sectors (Salamon & Anheier, 1998). Sociological 
approaches have sought to address this gap by taking account of the social origins of nonprofit 
organisations. As Di Maggio and Anheier (1990, p. 153) attest, “the origins and behaviour of 
[nonprofit organisations] reflect not just incentive structures and utility functions, which economists 
emphasize, but also institutional structures and state policies.” Taking account of this broader view of 
nonprofit existence, Salamon and Anheier (1998) developed their social origins theory, which states 
that the nonprofit sector is best understood in the context of its social origins in each country (i.e. its 
social, political and economic realities). 
2.3.2. Charity behaviour 
Primarily in response to the nondistribution constraint, nonprofits rarely adopt profit maximisation as 
their primary animus; therefore, theories of nonprofit behaviour often seek to understand other 
maximands such as quality or quantity of service, budget performance or some other socially-optimal 
objective (Hansmann, 1987). The purpose of a nonprofit organisation, as expressed in its mission 
statement, is crucial in understanding its behaviour. Missions can be vague and intangible, resulting in 
low-specificity goals and impacting on the delineation of tasks and organisational structure (Anheier, 
2005). A nonprofit’s mission can also both constrain and enable activities, and thus is a crucial driver 
of behaviour. 
Nonprofits are theorised to have a comparative advantage over public and private institutions, mainly 
in terms of their ability to react to local needs, carry out demonstration projects that highlight gaps in 
service provision, provide fee-based services for ‘thin’ markets, and strengthen social cohesion in 
communities (Salamon, 1987). Sociological perspectives on behaviour have also claimed that 
nonprofits are sources of innovation and diversity in society, campaigning for and promoting social 
change in many cases, and developing innovative responses to the needs of marginalised groups in 
others (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Kramer, 1981). Nonprofit behaviour has also been studied from 
the perspective of their perceived and actual failures. Contributions to voluntary failure theory critique 
the nature of nonprofits in relation to the following organisational weaknesses: resource inadequacy; 
particularism of service or cause; paternalism; and amateurism (Anheier, 2005).2 Often these failures 
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are addressed by forming partnerships with state organisations, which can provide “a more stable 
stream of resources, set priorities through a democratic process, discourage paternalism by [for 
example] making access to care a right and not a privilege, and improve quality of care by setting 
benchmarks and quality standards.” (Anheier, 2005, p. 131) This symbiotic relationship between 
nonprofit organisations and the state has significant implications for oversight and monitoring. 
Nonprofit organisations monitor government provision (and underprovision) of services and 
undertake advocacy roles to ensure service delivery. In this way the nonprofit sector overcomes its 
resource insufficiency and particularism failures. In turn, the state contracts with nonprofits to deliver 
goods and services, and adopts a monitoring role in the operations of these organisations (Wolpert, 
2003). 
The nondistribution constraint, central as it is to issues of trust and reputation, only acts as a crude 
protection against the exploitation of stakeholders that interact with nonprofits (Hansmann, 1996; see 
also Ben-Ner & Gui, 2003). Reflecting on this concern, Burger and Owens (2010) contend that there 
are obvious ways for the individuals that govern nonprofits to circumvent the nondistribution 
constraint, for example through inflated salaries, bonuses and benefits. Consequently, the manner in 
which a nonprofit is governed and held accountable becomes important from the perspective of 
trustworthiness and public confidence (Steinberg, 2006). Other contributions from the economics 
literature contend that nonprofits have an inherent productive inefficiency as a result of the 
nondistribution constraint; the lack of managerial claim to the residual means there is no incentive to 
pursue a strategy of cost minimisation. Nonprofits have also been found to respond more slowly to 
increasing demand (and other market changes) than for-profits; this is perhaps best explained by the 
difficulties these firms have raising sufficient capital through debt, donations and retained earnings 
(Hansmann, 1987).  
Charity formation and behaviour theories do not claim to have universal explanatory power. Often 
they are better utilised as heuristic devices, guiding rather than leading scholarly investigations of 
these topics. In the context of the study of risk, the theories reviewed in the previous section possess 
important contributions and insights. Issues surrounding the role and salience of trust in understanding 
charity behaviour are important considerations for this research. Charity status, though it signals some 
degree of trustworthiness, is not sufficient by itself to guarantee behaviour that provides public 
benefit. It eliminates some incentives to exploit information asymmetries but only in a system where 
there is oversight of charity activity (Krashinsky, 2003). Hansmann (1987) corroborates Krashinksy’s 
concern, highlighting issues with a system of oversight consisting only of donor or patron monitoring 
of a nonprofit (e.g. difficult to detect managerial malfeasance, often do not have voting rights in the 
organisation, no market for organisational control). Their thinking converges on the need for effective 
monitoring and oversight to ensure charities provide public benefit and act in a trustworthy manner. 
Consequently, regulatory regimes were formed in recognition of the importance of protecting public 
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confidence in the charity sector. The role of a regulator in recognising and reducing risks relating to 
trust and confidence in the charity sector will be considered in depth in a later section.  
2.4. Regulation Theory 
Regulation is a multi-dimensional concept. In the academic literature, regulation has been understood 
as a specific set of commands, as deliberative state influence, and as all forms of social or economic 
interest (Baldwin, Cave & Lodge, 2012). The first assumption underpinning the need to regulate is 
that an agency is acting in the interests of a defined party (e.g. citizens, consumers or the 
environment). Traditionally, this assumption applied to state bodies seeking to act in the public’s 
interest; nowadays, regulation is also conducted by non-governmental agencies, and certain industries 
– including the charity sector in certain jurisdictions– employ self-regulation. Once a regulator has 
identified the party whose interests it seeks to protect, we can identify the ideological and technical 
reasons for regulating on their behalf. Technical reasons include responding to or anticipating market 
failure (e.g. prohibiting monopolies, dealing with externalities, and rationalisation and co-ordination 
of activities). Regulation also stems from human rights and social solidarity rationales, and these are 
not necessarily secondary to the market failure rationale. Despite its obvious negative connotations 
(e.g. as an activity that restricts and controls behaviour), regulation can also play a facilitative or 
enabling role in a sector (Baldwin et al., 2012). 
2.4.1. Reasons for regulation 
Regulation can arise, develop and decline in various ways (Baldwin et al., 2012). A multi-disciplinary 
approach to the study of regulation has resulted in the development of numerous theories that seek to 
explain regulation in some way. First, there are public interest theories. These utilise the assumption 
that regulation is based on some public, benevolent rationale (Hutter, 2006). Regulators focus on 
protecting the public interest, often to the detriment of sector, group or individual interests (see Ogus, 
2004).  Regulatory approaches based on this assumption require objective standards and expertise. 
Issues that have been identified with regulatory approaches based on the public interest rationale 
include how to define public interest (often no single definition); regulators acting in their own 
interests; and not achieving intended regulatory results. It is also difficult for the public to come 
together as one entity to influence regulation; it is this point in particular that has led to some of the 
other theories discussed below. 
Another well-developed set of explanations is known as interest group theory. Regulatory 
developments are driven by the particular interests of certain groups (Baldwin et al., 2012). Stigler 
(1971) argues that regulation is inherently about degrees of capture (i.e. the extent to which a 
regulator is influenced by the interests of a certain group). One branch of interest group theory focuses 
on economic determinism of regulation, which contends that regulation will be shaped in the interests 
of those who value it most (e.g. the interests of producers versus consumers in certain industries). 
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Interest groups, when driven by economic objectives, can also seek deregulation. A contemporary 
example in the charity sector is the call for deregulation of lotteries run by charities and other societies 
(Third Sector, 2014a). The economic theory of regulation is limited by its deterministic focus and fails 
to take into account other drivers such as ideology, altruism and social objectives. Interest group 
theories in general are inherently about self-interest and politics. Wider interest group theories see 
regulatory behaviour as a struggle for power and as a product of the relationships between different 
groups (Wilson, 1980). 
A third set of theories is concerned with the influence of ideas and paradigms (i.e. conceptions of how 
and why a regulator should act) on regulatory development. In essence, “the important contribution of 
the ‘ideas matter’ analysis is to suggest that the wider intellectual climate significantly shapes the type 
of regulatory instruments and institutions that are regarded as desirable.” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 50) 
Another facet of these theories is that the regulator’s worldview is of importance. For example, a 
regulator might consider stakeholders as trustworthy and regulate accordingly. Finally, a burgeoning 
literature deals with the role institutions play in the development of regulation. Those who propose 
institutional theories “do not necessarily agree on where preferences [for regulatory approaches] come 
from, but they do agree on the notion that institutional structure and arrangements, as well as social 
processes, significantly shape regulation.” (Baldwin et al., 2012, p. 53) 
2.4.2. Risk-based regulation 
As the term suggests, risk-based regulation is an approach that lies at the intersection of the risk and 
regulation literatures. It is defined as a particular strategy or set of strategies that regulators use to 
target their resources at those sites and activities that present threats to their ability to achieve their 
objectives (Black & Baldwin, 2012). Regulation in general can be seen as inherently about the control 
of risks (Baldwin et al., 2012; Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, 2001; Hutter, 2006; Sparrow, 2000). A 
regulatory approach can be defined by whether risk assessment and management are integrated or 
kept as distinct processes (Löfstedt & Vogel, 2001). Integration occurs when the three major 
stakeholders in the regulatory process - experts, policy makers and the public - all play a role in 
shaping regulation (Wendling, 2012). A regulatory approach that keeps these processes separate is 
more adversarial in nature: it is focused on setting standards using evidence provided during risk 
assessment and policy makers look after risk management through the development and 
implementation of legislation, policy and regulation. The fundamental premise of risk-based 
regulation is that regulatory decisions should stem from balancing the benefits and costs of a 
particular risk object (MacGillivray, Alcock & Busby, 2011). Risk is no longer just used as a concept 
for describing regulatory objects and institutional threats, it is now central to determining regulatory 
activities and responses; that is, it has become an organising principle with accompanying rules and 
activities (Rothstein et al., 2006; see also Lidskog & Sundqvist, 2012). Risk-based regulation has long 
been a feature of certain industries such as nuclear power, road safety and occupational hazards; 
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however, it is now being applied to an increasing number of policy domains as part of a ‘modernising 
government’ agenda (Rothstein et al., 2006). It is championed as an “apparently rational, objective, 
and transparent way of deploying limited regulatory resources” and offers insulation from claims of 
subjective or emotional responses to events by regulators, and the potential of a more equitable 
distribution of regulatory burden (Hutter, 2006, pp. 216-217). Concerns have been expressed 
regarding the normative ideal of risk-based regulation, positing that other competing regulatory logics 
or rationales – such as punitive, rehabilitative and restorative - are relevant (Baldwin & Black, 2007; 
MacGillivray et al., 2011). 
Trust is a salient component in the formation, behaviour and impact of regulatory regimes. Johnson, 
Jenkinson, Kendall and Bradshaw (1998, p. 310) argue that “All regulatory systems are to some 
extent dependent on trust. Evaluation, monitoring and inspection are time-consuming and costly and 
complete policing is undesirable.” In light of this, regulators seeking to effectively control risk in a 
system tend to exhibit one or more of the following principles (Majone, 2010). First, regulators can 
adopt a zero-tolerance policy to risk and simply prohibit actions, products or services that are deemed 
too risky. This blanket approach to risk-based regulation can stymie the development and 
dissemination of societally beneficial products and services. Second, regulators can accept that it is 
impossible or infeasible to completely eliminate risk, and so seek to reduce risk to its lowest possible 
level. Again, this approach can place too great a burden on those subject to regulation and reduce their 
capacity to produce or act. Third, regulators can abide by the significant risk doctrine, that is, the 
elimination of what are deemed significant risks. Identifying, measuring and managing significant 
risks places a greater analytical burden on the regulator as not all risks are to be treated in a uniform 
manner. What constitutes a significant risk or not can be a contentious issue and can leave the 
regulator susceptible to regulatory capture (i.e. the regulator advances the special interests of a select 
group of the sector it is charged with regulating). Finally, regulators can seek to balance costs and 
benefits before establishing regulatory standards. Standards should be chosen according to whether 
they provide greater benefits to the public than impose costs. The issue with this principle is that a 
cost-benefit analysis can often produce results that are contradictory to the regulator’s mandate.  
Many of the challenges that are inherent to a risk-based regulatory approach are drawn from those that 
plague risk analysis more generally. The first challenge for a regulator is defining or identifying a 
risk. Second, how should the regulator mediate the assessments of experts and the perceptions of the 
public (MacGillivray et al, 2011)? Third, should the regulator place an emphasis on anticipation or 
resilience (Baldwin et al, 2012)? Is it more productive to seek to reduce the probability of the event 
occurring or focus on mitigating the impact of the event? In practice both foci are valid but resource 
constraints, as well as concerns about uncertainty, can force a regulator to choose one or the other. 
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2.4.3. Uncertainty and regulation 
It is important to discuss the role of uncertainty in regulating risk. In a previous section we established 
that uncertainty is an inherent feature of a risk and is often expressed in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms. Uncertainty is inherent to most regulatory endeavours. It can stem from the sector 
subject to regulation, imperfect or incomplete information and shifting public attitudes. Partly as a 
response to this uncertainty, regulators of many sectors are turning to risk-based regulation. Riesch 
(2012) classifies the sources of uncertainty in risk analysis. He distinguishes between uncertainty 
present in the system under investigation (aleatoric), and uncertainty arising from incomplete 
information or knowledge (epistemic). Aleatoric uncertainty is present when we are uncertain whether 
an event will happen and its associated impact, owing to the probabilistic nature of the events 
themselves (e.g. will it rain tomorrow?). Epistemic uncertainty arises when we are unsure whether or 
not an event has occurred, and it is only our knowledge regarding the event that is uncertain (e.g. did 
it rain yesterday?). Epistemic uncertainty can arise when the quantity and quality of information is not 
very robust (Sahlin, 2012). A regulator’s tolerance for uncertainty can significantly alter the actions 
considered and taken during the risk management stage (Sahlin, 2012). A regulator that is uncertainty 
tolerant recognises the limitations of risk analysis and scientific evidence. In contrast, a regulator that 
is classed as uncertainty intolerant fails to give due consideration or importance to any uncertainty 
present in its activities and the activities of the sector it regulates (van Asselt &Vos, 2012). In 
response to uncertainty, many regulators (especially those operating at a European level) have 
invoked the precautionary principle: if unsure about the true nature, extent or impact of a risk, the 
activity, product or service should be prohibited, at least until further information regarding the 
potential harm is available (van Asselt & Vos, 2012). As stated previously, uncertainty is not equal or 
equivalent to risk, even though it is sometimes thought so by stakeholders interested in shaping 
regulation. For example, proponents of a particular activity can invoke uncertainty as evidence that 
there is nothing to worry about; detractors can use the same presence of uncertainty as a 
scaremongering tool, framing the activity as a ‘Pandora’s Box’ of unforeseen consequences. The 
distinction between aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty, and its applicability to the regulation of risk 
in the charity sector, will be discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
2.5. Risk, Regulation and Charities 
Our attention now focuses on the areas of overlap between the risk, regulation and charity literatures, 
beginning with an exploration of risk in an organisational context before homing in on charities 
specifically. Much of the for-profit literature on risk emphasises the role risk analysis can play in 
optimising decision-making and operations (Rothstein et al., 2006). Rational decision-making 
involves the maximisation of expected utility (Sahlin, 2012). “As such, risk management methods are 
widely promulgated as efficient, rational and universally applicable means for challenging 
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organisational practices in ways that manage their inevitable downsides without stifling 
entrepreneurialism.” (Huber & Rothstein, 2013, p. 652). Goble and Bier (2013) provide hypothetical 
examples of how risk analysis could be utilised by organisations as an information technology to 
support decision making: risk assessments act as repositories of information and a medium of 
communication, and can be used in an evaluative capacity to inform decisions; risk analysis creates 
the possibility of asynchronous sharing and discussion of information; and it can serve as a platform 
for the active discussion of risks and answer ‘what if’ questions on an ad hoc basis. They can also 
temper emotional and subjective responses to risk. Risk assessments are living documents and can 
help incrementally improve knowledge and decision making in an organisation; as a result, risk 
assessment can make the transition from strategic decision making to everyday operational procedures 
(Goble & Bier, 2013). Risk analysis can also be an effective tool for demonstrating accountability to 
relevant stakeholders (Rothstein et al., 2006). 
A risk analysis framework that has gained significant traction in for-profit organisations is Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM). Developed in 2004 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission (COSO) as a response to the high profile corporate scandals that occurred in 
the early 2000s, ERM is a “process…designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, 
and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
achievement of entity objectives.” (COSO, 2004, p. 2) The framework is comprised of eight 
components derived from key theoretical dimensions of risk including identification, measurement, 
tolerance and communication. Structured risk analysis frameworks such as ERM have been embraced 
by for-profit organisations due to their congruence with easily defined financial metrics and goals, 
enabling of effective monitoring by principals and promotion of competition (Power, 2009).  
A major criticism of ERM, and other highly formalised risk analysis frameworks, is its focus on rules-
based compliance (Power, 2009). Huber and Rothstein (2013) echo similar concerns, positing that risk 
analysis can become an exercise in organisational legitimacy and fail to challenge engrained 
behaviours. Organisations can become myopic in their application of risk analysis, relying on 
compliance and internal controls rather than creatively conceptualising and identifying new risks 
(Power, 2009). This can have the perverse effect of making organisations risk-averse (Huber & 
Rothstein, 2013). “While many risk and compliance people at the operational level prefer this less 
ambiguous and more rule-based world, it is also a rather dangerous generalised and standardized 
orientation for organizations, regulatory bodies and societies.” (Power, 2009, p. 852) As a 
consequence, much of the systemic risk in the sectors organisations operate in remains poorly 
understood or measured; there is a disconnect between risk management at the organisational level 
and the interconnectedness of the sector or society in which the organisations operate (Power, 2009). 
Finally, Goble and Bier (2013) consider the inherent limitations in the applicability of risk analysis for 
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organisations, arguing that the practice is extended to situations and domains when there is no need to 
do so, and efforts to challenge its supremacy as a decision-making tool are suppressed.  
2.5.1. Charity risk 
Charities exhibit some similar traits to for-profit organisations with respect to the nature and impact of 
risk, such as the effect of competition on organisational sustainability. Risk management frameworks 
are also broadly similar in principle to those adopted by for-profit enterprises. However, uncritically 
importing a for-profit perspective on risk fails to take account of the distinct nature of charities, 
especially with respect to the role of profit in the organisation, mission objectives, societal 
expectations, and accountability to a wide set of stakeholders (Chen & Bozeman, 2012). Despite these 
points of distinction, Young (2009) advocates for the adoption of risk management frameworks by 
charities, especially in relation to strategic decisions; a failure to do so could lead to a risk-averse 
culture that stymies the achievement of impact and public benefit by these organisations. The reverse 
may also occur, where charities expose themselves to unreasonable levels of risk for little benefit. 
Risk management is also important in the context of asset stewardship, demonstrating public 
accountability, attracting stakeholders such as trustees and volunteers, and aligning activities with 
organisational mission (Herman, Head, Fogarty & Jackson, 2004). 
The nature of risk in charities is broad and is derived from the panoply of operational areas and 
decisions inherent in running these organisations: “Financial, personnel, program and capital 
expenditure decisions all entail risk because they involve interactions with changing, complex, 
volatile or intrinsically stochastic economic, political and social environments.” (Young, 2009, p. 33) 
Contributions from the fields of economics and law have theorised that charities are poor bearers of 
risk, relative to owned enterprises (Hansmann, 1996). Property rights theory also reinforces the claim 
that risk will be more attractive in the market-driven private sector (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). 
Charities do not possess the ability to diversify financial risks through raising equity for instance, and 
tend not to invest in risky projects relative to private sector firms (as the reward for bearing risk is 
often profit). It is also contended that senior management in charitable organisations wield unusual 
control and autonomy in the absence of a single, dominant principal and therefore can indulge their 
personal tolerance for risk (Hansmann, 1996). Though risk avoidance and minimisation is often 
propagated through nonprofit management texts as the ‘ideal’ level of risk tolerance, organisations 
that adopt this strategy “will miss out on opportunities to strengthen the organization’s assets, to offer 
more meaningful services to individuals or a wider community, and to attract a steadily growing 
constituency of donors, supporters, and volunteers.” (Herman et al., 2004, p. 3)  
Young (2009) highlights three key concerns for charities in relation to the analysis of risk. First, 
developing accurate quantitative measures of the probability and impact of a risk is particularly 
challenging for mission-driven organisations. Second, determining an appropriate tolerance or 
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appetite for risk is made more difficult in the absence of a stock market or equivalent monitoring 
system. A charity’s tolerance for risk can be decided at three levels: individual, organisational and 
societal. We have already raised the issue of senior management autonomy and how it affects the 
appetite for risk, but individuals from other strata of the organisation can also bring their personal risk 
attitudes to bear on their work. At an organisational level, funders and regulators influence risk 
tolerance, as do the charity’s circumstances (e.g. its financial stability or capacity). At the societal 
level, public conceptions of what a charity is and should do can affect the risk-taking behaviour of 
these organisations; for example, charities must resolve tensions between the desire for social change 
that legitimises their existence and the conservative tendency to manage resources that are gifted. 
Finally, charities must provide a workable answer to the following question: who takes ownership for 
risk in the organisation? The impact of a risk is not only borne by those making the decision but also 
by other stakeholders. For example, a focus on reducing the impact of an organisational risk – by 
cutting expenditure to reduce financial vulnerability – could increase certain risks facing beneficiaries 
(e.g. removal of service provision). In such a scenario, the risk management strategy may conflict 
with a charity’s mission or objectives. 
The Charity Commission, which regulates charities in England and Wales, identified five core risk 
categories that charities may encounter (see Table 2.1). Many of the categories and specific types of 
risks are examined throughout the course of this thesis, in particular in Chapter Seven where the 
above table is be applied as a coding framework for analysing textual data on the most significant 
risks facing charities in Scotland. For now, we want to bring the reader’s attention to the 
interdependent relationship between many of these risks and how this must be acknowledged in the 
application of risk management approaches. For example, poor public perception and reputation may 
act as a cause or an effect of changing government policy or inadequate financial management. 
Finally, the locus of where these risks reside and impact the sector must be understood and delineated: 
the individual level e.g. risks to volunteers working with vulnerable groups; the organisational level 
e.g. risks to reputation or sustainability; the industrial or field level e.g. risks to the social care or 
housing market; and the societal level e.g. risks to service users, beneficiaries or tax payers (Brown & 
Osborne, 2013). 
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Table 2.1. Types of risks faced by charities 
Risk category Examples 
Governance risks Inappropriate organisational structure 
Trustee body lacks relevant skills or commitment 
Conflicts of interest 
Operational risks Lack of beneficiary welfare or safety 
Poor contract pricing 
Poor staff recruitment and training 
Doubt about security of assets 
Financial risks Inaccurate and/or insufficient financial information 
Inadequate reserves and cash flow 
Dependency on limited income sources 
Inadequate investment management policies 
Insufficient insurance cover 
External risks Poor public perception and reputation 
Demographic changes such as an increase in the size of 
beneficiary group 
Turbulent economic or political environment 
Changing government policy 
Compliance with law and 
regulation 
Acting in breach of trust 
Poor knowledge of the legal responsibilities of an employer 
Poor knowledge of regulatory requirements of particular 
activities (e.g. fund-raising, running of care facilities, operating 
vehicles) 
Note: Source: Charity Commission. (2013). Charities and Risk Management: A Guide for Trustees. 
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2.5.2. Charity regulation and accountability 
The growth and importance of the charity sector globally in recent years, particularly in terms of 
public service provision, has placed a spotlight on the role and effectiveness of regulation (Johnson, 
Jenkinson, Kendall, Bradshaw & Blackmore 1998; Rutherford, 2015). Regulators have an important 
role to play in promoting transparency and accountability, which in turn may have tangible 
reputational benefits for the sector (Cordery & Morgan, 2013; Philips, 2013). There are convincing 
rationales for the regulation of charities: the need to address perceived or actual transparency issues 
by reducing information asymmetry in the sector; the privileged tax exempt status of charities; the 
importance of public confidence to the health of the sector; the desire for competition among charities 
through transparency and open data initiatives; and to ensure an appropriate distribution of scarce 
resources (Cordery, 2013). Not all of the above rationales are present in every regulatory regime but 
the importance of protecting and facilitating public confidence in the sector cannot be overstated 
(Cordery & Morgan, 2013). One of the primary mechanisms through which regulators oversee the 
sector, and thus achieve their primary aim of protecting public confidence, is through the requirement 
of good accounting and reporting practices by charities (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011; Reheul, Van 
Caneghem & Verbruggen, 2014). 
The use of regulation to encourage and enhance accountability in the charity sector is not without 
consequences, intended or otherwise (Irvin, 2005). Corry (2010, p.11) argues that charities cannot be 
regulated without imposing some cost on organisations and the sector as a whole: “Unlike the state 
and the market economy, it is something that can scarcely be subjected to detailed planning or 
regulated without it losing some of its…qualities such as voluntary participation, value-based 
motivation, and independence from more institutionalized power structures.” In his analysis of 
philanthropic foundations in the US, Frumkin (1998) argues that a regulatory development (Tax 
Reform Act of 1969) led to the emergence of highly staffed bureaucratic foundations, which in turn 
had two significant consequences for the sector: increased isomorphism and the dominance of a short-
term, targeted form of funding. Neely (2011, p. 123) also examined the effectiveness of nonprofit 
regulation in the US and found that the Nonprofit Integrity Act (NIA) of 2004 had the “effect of 
increasing accounting fees, while providing limited improvement in financial reporting quality in the 
first year of implementing the Act.” Hyndman and McDonnell (2009; see also Cordery, 2013) posit 
that charities may become more accountable to the regulator at the expense of their donors and 
beneficiaries. Onerous reporting requirements can force charities to divert time and resources away 
from achieving objectives (Szper & Prakash, 2011) and discourage innovation (Johnson et al., 1998). 
In order to address these undesirable implications there have been calls for a differentiated approach 
to regulation and the rejection of a narrow conceptualization of accountability that privileges external 
oversight (Cordery, Sim & van Zijl, 2015; Ebrahim, 2003). 
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2.6. Researching Risk in the Charity Sector 
To conclude this chapter, we draw on the rich contribution of the reviewed literatures to produce a 
contextual framework for guiding this research. A scholarly inquiry of risk in the charity sector must 
consider concepts, theories, methodologies and findings from sociology, social policy, economics, 
law and management to name a few. There are several factors that could contribute to risk within 
charities, including governance, management, staffing, volunteers, funding, government policy and 
dependencies on other organisations. This is but a brief list of potential factors and highlights one of 
the salient challenges of conducting research in this area: without a suitable framework for 
contextualising and structuring these factors, it is difficult to produce a coherent and credible analysis 
of risk in the charity sector. Some of these factors are well understood in isolation. For instance, there 
is a large literature on the governance of charities, exploring factors that contribute to these 
organisations being well run (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009). Financial risks have also been 
considered in some detail, including methodologies and measures for analysing financial vulnerability 
(see Dayson, 2013 for an overview). However, given the large-scale, broad topic under investigation 
in this thesis, an attempt must be made to unify the different aspects of risk in a single contextual 
framework, one that considers a multitude of factors, perspectives and concepts.  
What should a framework for analysing risk in the charity sector contain? First, it is important to be 
aware of core epistemological, theoretical and methodological concerns highlighted in the various 
literatures on risk, regulation and charities. From a risk theory perspective, it is crucial that research 
should consider the role of risk as an organising idea for decision-making. Of particular concern is the 
way in which internal stakeholders define the relevance and utility of risk to the decision-making 
process; this is what Gieryn (1999) terms ‘boundary-work’. This concept captures situations where 
“for a variety of reasons, experts try to define what is and is not their remit, often with respect to 
competing or complementary fields of expertise.” (Mikes, 2011, p. 227) For example, some charities 
may define the boundaries of risk management as relating to only strategic concerns or those objects 
that can be accurately measured; other organisations may make the mistake of overreaching in their 
application of risk to situations for which reliable measures do not exist (Mikes, 2011). The influence 
of risk analysis in demonstrating organisational legitimacy is also a key concern for research in this 
field. This is particularly salient in the context of increasing demands for accountability by charitable 
organisations. Finally, the framework should be sensitive to the broader environment in which 
charities operate, such as regulatory, reporting and legislative requirements; of particular concern is 
the potential incongruity between regulatory, public and charity conceptualisations of risk. 
Anheier (2005) highlights the different levels of analysis researchers can focus on when studying 
charities: Organisational, which is primarily concerned with the internal control and direction of 
charities; Industrial, which recognises the different industries and markets that charities operate in, 
such as education, care and housing; and Societal/Economic, which includes the role of regulators and 
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other stakeholders in explaining the behaviour of charities, as well as societal expectations of these 
organisations. With respect to Anheier’s framework described above, and the core concepts outlined 
previously in this section, the following is a contextual framework for the study of risk in the charity 
sector (see Figure 2.1). At the organisational level, research should consider charities’ characteristics, 
preferences and behaviour with respect to risk. In particular, there are five elements that will be 
examined in this research. The first is the nature and extent of incidents experienced and perpetrated 
by charities, including allegations of misconduct. The second is the ways in which charities 
understand and perceive risk, with due consideration of the potential for varied and ‘fuzzy’ 
conceptualisations (Sjöberg, 2012). The third is the value and importance charities place on risk and 
its role in the organisation, in particular the boundary work that may be conducted by those tasked 
with managing risk. Attention should be paid to core risk components such as risk tolerance or 
appetite, ownership and measurement. The fourth element is the behaviour of charities in response to 
risk; is risk an organising concept for charities, both in terms of its strategic objectives and daily 
operations? In particular, research should seek to understand how decisions are made in relation to 
risk management strategies such as risk reduction and mitigation. The fifth element is the suite of 
risks that charities face in the course of their operations i.e. what are the most relevant and significant 
risks facing charities? 
Taking account of meso-level factors –such as the industries or fields in which charities operate – can 
help explain some of the variation occurring at the organisational level. The heterogeneous nature of 
the sector necessitates the use of a classification system to properly understand and contextualise risk 
factors especially. Delineating the framework in this way also acknowledges the distinct 
circumstances charities find themselves in across different industries; for example, organisations 
operating in the social services industry in the UK may also be subject to regulatory oversight and 
monitoring from the appropriate care regulator. 
Finally, attention should be paid to the wider environment in which charities operate. Particular focus 
should be placed on the content of the regulatory and legislative rules and standards that charities 
must adhere to. The influence of the public’s conception and expectations of charities should also be 
captured. The ability of the regulator to communicate the benefits of engaging with risk can “also 
have a powerful and useful effect on reducing risks in and of themselves. In fact, risk communication 
can help to reduce risk even without a direct link to risk management” (Goble & Bier, 2013, p. 1948) 
The role of the regulator in terms of managing their own institutional risks should also be a 
consideration when examining risk in the sector. 
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Figure 2.1. Contextual framework for researching risk in the charity sector 
Organisation (micro) 
What is the nature of risk in 
charities? 
 Incidents/concerns 
and outcomes 
 Understanding 
 Values 
 Behaviour 
 Significant risks 
Industry (meso) 
Does the nature of risk vary across 
organisational characteristics? 
 Financial resources 
 Field of operations e.g. 
Culture and recreation, Social 
services 
 Geographical location 
 Beneficiary groups served 
 Charitable purposes pursued 
Society (macro) 
 Public scrutiny 
 Accountability 
 Legislation 
 Policy environment 
 Societal risks (e.g. lower levels 
of donations) 
 Availability and value of data 
about charities 
 Regulator: 
o Reporting requirements 
o Powers and activities 
o Institutional risks 
o Risk-based approach 
What are the macro-environmental factors that influence and contextualise 
findings at the micro and meso level? 
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Chapter Three – Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
It is clear from the preceding chapter that there is a dearth of research into risk in the charity sector, in 
particular the kind of empirical work that feeds into the construction of an evidence base that can be 
leveraged by practitioners and policy makers alike. Research of this nature derives its salience from 
three wider developments. First, charities in the UK are subject to intense public, political and media 
scrutiny (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2016; Public Administration and Constitutional 
Affairs Committee, 2016). Operating in this climate presents a risk to charities in the form of 
declining levels of public trust and confidence, both of which are acknowledged as being crucial to 
the long-term success of the sector (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013a; Cordery & Morgan, 2013; Keating 
& Frumkin, 2003; Morgan, 2012).  Concurrently, the sector suffers from a contamination problem, 
whereby the reputations of legitimate, ethical charities are tarnished by the misbehaviour – perceived 
or otherwise – of other charitable organisations (Burger & Owens, 2010; Ortmann & Schlesinger 
1997). Tremblay-Boire, Prakash and Gugerty (2016) attribute the generation of these negative 
reputational externalities to the information asymmetries that exist between charities and their 
stakeholders. In response to this informational gap, the same authors argue that credible charities have 
an incentive to differentiate themselves from less credible ones in order to capitalise on the associated 
reputational gains. Second, as briefly described in the opening chapter, UK charity regulatory regimes 
are currently in a state of flux. OSCR and the Charity Commission for England and Wales (CCEW) 
are transitioning to a regulatory approach that is informed by risk assessment and analysis. Central to 
this aim is the availability of reliable and valid indicators of a suite of risks that threaten charitable 
assets and damage public confidence in the sector. Third, the availability of large-scale administrative 
data about the charity sector – facilitated by projects such as the Scottish Network for Third Sector 
Data, the Scottish Civil Society Data Partnership and various streams of work by the Third Sector 
Research Centre – offers the potential to examine risk, behaviour and accountability in novel, 
comprehensive ways. 3 
In this chapter we provide a thorough account of the underpinning logic of our academic inquiry: the 
research design. A properly designed study ensures that the evidence collected enables us to answer 
our research questions in a credible and unambiguous manner (de Vaus, 2001). First, the research 
questions are stated once again, followed by a discussion of the mixed methods approach employed in 
this study. We then outline and justify the data collection and analysis methods employed in our 
empirical work. The chapter concludes with a comprehensive description of the data utilised in this 
research, with particular emphasis on the data management activities undertaken to produce a 
statistically usable dataset. 
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3.2. Research Questions 
Social research should be concerned with answering research questions that have well-defined 
objectives (Blaikie, 2009). In light of the contextual framework developed in the previous chapter, the 
following research questions are posed: 
 Q1. What are the risk factors that lead to charities failing in some capacity; are there 
indicators that could be used as warning signs that OSCR could adopt or expand to identify 
risk? 
 Q2. To what extent do these indicators capture underlying risk in Scottish charities; do 
charities identified as risky by the regulator see themselves similarly?  
The first question aims to address the extent to which the Scottish Charity Register, annual returns and 
other administrative data held by OSCR can be used to identify factors associated with a suite of risks 
affecting charities (e.g. charity misconduct, financial vulnerability), particularly in the context of risk-
based regulation of the sector.4 Though the data utilised in answering this question has organisations 
as the units of analysis, the analytical approach is informed by the Society and Industry levels of the 
contextual framework. The objective of the second question is to examine the relevance of OSCR’s 
approach to, and data on, risk with charities’ own identification and conceptualisation of the topic. 
How do charities understand and perceive the risks they face? What are the most significant risks 
affecting their ability to deliver public benefit? To answer this question we draw mainly on the 
Organisation level of the framework. 
3.3. Methodology 
The methodology adopted for this research is a mixed methods design.  The mixed methods approach 
is conceptualized as “research in which the investigator collects and analyses data, integrates the 
findings, and draws inferences using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods in a 
single study or a program of inquiry.” (Tashakkori & Creswell, 2007, p. 4) The mixed methods 
approach is common in applied social research as it is pragmatic and problem-oriented, allowing the 
researcher to choose the methods most appropriate for answering the research questions. 
There are some significant methodological challenges to be addressed throughout the course of mixed 
methods research. The priority and sequence of methods must be delineated, and consideration must 
also be given to the proficiency of the researcher with regards to multiple methods. Perhaps most 
importantly, the researcher must identify how findings from quantitative and qualitative methods are 
integrated in a meaningful way (Alexander, Thomas, Cronin, Fielding & Moran-Ellis, 2008; Creswell, 
2009; Ivankova, Creswell & Stick, 2006). There are also epistemological concerns with combining 
quantitative and qualitative methods, as the former is usually associated with positivism and the latter 
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with interpretivism. However, methods themselves, though often associated with one epistemology or 
the other, are not inherently tied to epistemologies (Bryman, 2009). 
Taking account of these concerns, a mixed methods approach is adopted as the methodological 
framework for this research. Analysing risk using different methods is congruent with core elements 
of risk theory outlined previously, in particular the issue of competing approaches to risk analysis 
(quantitative and qualitative) and different conceptualisations of the term (Bryman, 2009). 
Furthermore, utilising a multiplicity of methods can improve the validity and reliability of research, as 
the weaknesses of one method can be counterbalanced by the strengths of others (Denzin, 1978). 
Figure 3.1 outlines the major components of the mixed methods design of this research. There are two 
streams of inquiry: examining what administrative data derived from OSCR can tell us about risk in 
the charity sector; and the nature, understanding and perception of risk by charities. To examine the 
first stream, we conduct a minor qualitative phase of research to understand the data held by OSCR; 
we are particularly interested in the relevance and application of the data to OSCR’s regulatory 
functions. Information was collected mainly through informal discussions with and field visits to 
OSCR, and from numerous documents produced by the organisation. This phase is followed by a 
rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the administrative data derived from OSCR. The second 
stream begins with a major quantitative phase of research: an online questionnaire of charities. This is 
followed by a minor qualitative phase of interviews with charities, which are combined with other 
sources of information to produce a small number of case studies. Findings from the other major 
quantitative phase are also used to inform the development of the case studies, mainly in the form of 
indicators used to identify risky charities for further study. The research streams are unified in our 
attempts to answer the research questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, with the findings 
from each phase critiqued separately and, more importantly, in combination. The specific sampling, 
data management and analysis techniques employed in each of these phases will be covered in depth 
later on in the chapter. For now, our attention turns to the panoply of methods applied under this 
methodology. 
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Figure 3.1. Overview of mixed methods study design 
 
Note: qual: Qualitative approach. QUAN: Quantitative approach. The use of upper or lower case 
signifies the priority or importance of the approach to the overall study. 
3.4. Methods 
In keeping with the mixed methods research design, we employ a range of methods in the empirical 
analyses. We begin by describing our approach to statistical modelling, which is primarily based on 
logistic regression. This is followed by a discussion of the survey and case study approaches utilised 
in Chapter Seven. 
qual –understanding OSCR 
data and risk-based 
regulation 
Developing 
interview questions 
and sampling frame 
QUAN – OSCR 
administrative data 
Integration of 
findings 
Discussion 
Implications 
Future research
QUAN – survey of 
charities
qual – case studies of 
charities
Contextual and 
sampling information 
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3.4.1. Statistical modelling 
Statistical modelling is a powerful analytical tool for exploring causal and correlational relationships 
amongst two or more variables. There are a number of steps in the model building process. First, a 
key outcome is identified; for clarity, this outcome is labelled as the dependent variable in subsequent 
analyses in this thesis. There may be patterns of variation in the values of this outcome that are 
interesting. The next step is to identify a number of factors that may be related to the outcome; these 
are known as the independent or explanatory variables. The task of identifying and including 
explanatory factors is known as the model fitting strategy, and it is vitally important for sociological 
research. Lambert and Gayle (2009) advocate a model fitting strategy that is theory driven and 
implemented incrementally; adopting this approach acts as a restraint against incorporating extraneous 
variables in your model. We then wish to explore whether the patterns of variation for the outcome 
are related to the patterns of variation in the values of our explanatory factors. This relationship 
between dependent and independent variables is often modelled using a linear regression equation of 
the form: 
ܻ݅ ൌ ߚܺ݅ ൅ ߝ݅      (3.1) 
where ܻ݅	represents the outcome of interest for the ith case, ߚ captures the effect of the independent 
variables Xi on ܻ݅, and ߝ݅ is a measure of model fit for the ith case (i.e. the difference between the 
actual and predicted values for ܻ݅). 
The goal of regression is to select the best fitting and most parsimonious yet reasonable model to 
describe the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). As Long and Freese (2001, p. 99) caution: 
The challenge of interpretation is to find a summary of the way in which changes in the 
independent variables are associated with changes in the outcome that best reflect the key 
substantive processes without overwhelming yourself or your readers with distracting detail. 
Regression techniques have become a common and integral part of many analyses of dependent and 
independent variables, regardless of discipline (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). In essence, regression 
techniques are most useful for exploring the average, joint relative effects of several correlated 
explanatory factors on an outcome (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Logistic Regression 
Logistic regression is used when the functional form of the dependent variable is categorical; in the 
case of the statistical modelling conducted in this research, the outcomes of interest are dichotomous 
(e.g. investigated or not). In contrast to linear regression where the result is interpreted as the 
predicted value of the outcome, logistic regression calculates the predicted probability of a particular 
category occurring (Cramer, 2003; Long & Freese, 2001). Applying linear regression to model a non-
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metric outcome can lead to systematically biased coefficient estimates: the probability of the outcome 
can only take values between zero and one but the linear predictor ߚܺ can take any real value, 
meaning the predicted value of ܻ	might not be in the correct range (see Harrell, 2015 for arguments in 
favour of linear regression for dichotomous outcomes). This issue is corrected by employing a link 
function that transforms the probability to log odds, which can be modelled linearly. Thus, logistic 
regression is a technique that is used to determine, from a set of independent variables, the log odds 
that an individual will be in a particular category of a variable (Treiman, 2009): 
 ݈݋݃݅ݐሺܻ݅ሻ ൌ log	 ఉ௑௜ଵିఉ௑௜ ൅ ߝ݅     (3.2) 
ܻ݅ ൌ ୣ୶୮	ሺఉ௑௜ሻଵାୣ୶୮	ሺఉ௑௜ሻ ൅ ߝ݅     (3.3) 
where ܻ݅	represents latent underlying probability of the ith case experiencing the outcome, ߚ captures 
the effect of the independent variables Xi on ܻ݅, and ߝ݅ is a measure of model fit for the ith case (i.e. 
the difference between the actual and predicted values for ܻ݅). 
The coefficients of the independent variables should be interpreted as the effect that a change in the 
independent variables has on the log odds of the dependent variable taking the value 1 (Lambert & 
Gayle, 2009). For metric variables, the coefficient refers to the effect a one unit change has on the log 
odds; for categorical variables, the coefficient captures the effect of a move from the reference 
category to a particular category of the independent variable (Allison, 1999; Connolly, Playford, 
Gayle & Dibben, 2016; Lambert & Gayle, 2009). 
It is possible to fit a ‘saturated’ model, one that satisfies the conditional expectation function (CEF) 
perfectly. For example, a regression model with two independent variables would be saturated if it 
contained the main effects of each variable, an interaction term capturing the product of these 
variables, and an intercept (constant). However, this strategy can lead to unimportant, irrelevant or 
unrealistic interpretations of interaction terms in particular (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
In Chapter Five and Six, the data underpinning the analyses are longitudinal (panel) in nature and are 
subjected to alternative descriptive and inferential approaches. Panel data contain observations on 
multiple phenomena over multiple time periods, thus they possess both a cross-sectional and time 
series component (Andreβ, Golsch & Schmidt, 2013). Panel data contain n cases (e.g., individuals) 
over t time periods and are often structured in long format (each observation is represented by a 
unique combination of n x t). Panel data allow analysts to control for unobserved heterogeneity; that 
is, those “state-and time-invariant variables… a time-series study or a cross-section study cannot.” 
(Baltagi, 2008, p. 6). It is this property of panel data that is valuable to researchers as it allows them to 
answer questions pertaining to the nature of change: who changed and when? How many were there? 
Why did they change?  
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This research utilises a short panel, where the same cases have observations for at least one time 
period and the number of cases is large compared to the number of time periods (Park, 2011). Due to 
the nature of panel data regular regression techniques are often inappropriate as some of the 
assumptions of linear regression are violated, leading to omitted variable bias in particular. Fixed 
effects (FE) models assume that there is unobserved heterogeneity and this effect does not vary over 
time (i.e. it is ‘fixed’) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). Consequently, the unobserved effect is assumed to 
be correlated with the explanatory variables in the model. A random effects (RE) model diverges from 
a FE one in that it assumes the unobserved effect is not correlated with the explanatory variables and 
instead is drawn from a distribution; thus it is included in the error term in the model. An RE model is 
applied in Chapter Six, the justification for which is outlined there also. 
Sequence analysis (SQA) is applied across Chapter Five and Six as a descriptive method for panel 
data. SQA is at the intersection of qualitative and quantitative approaches; exploratory in nature, it 
offers thick description of a case’s transition between values (or states) of a categorical variable over 
time (Abbott, 1990; Aisenbrey & Fasang, 2010). For example, do charities transition between 
different states of financial vulnerability; if so, how often do they transition? It is an approach that 
originated in biology and was incorporated into sociological studies of ‘the life course’ (Aisenbrey & 
Fasang, 2010; Shanahan & Macmillan, 2007). One of SQA’s core visualisation tools, the sequence 
index plot, is employed in this research. Sequence index plots represent the individual sequences of 
cases in your analysis and allow you to detect patterns, unknown structures and characteristics in your 
data. They contain a large degree of information content and thus are prone to issues surrounding the 
identification of ‘important’ sequences, deceptive comparisons of unequal groups and selecting a 
meaningful order for the Y axis (BrzinskyFay, 2014; Offerhaus, 2015).   
Regression assumptions and potential issues 
The size of the sample is of considerable importance to the estimation of regression coefficients. The 
sample must be large enough in order to detect important effects: small samples suffer from low 
power and often result in poor approximations of significance statistics (e.g. coefficients that are not 
statistically significantly different from zero). On the other hand, large sample sizes can reveal trivial 
(i.e. small or uninteresting) effects that are statistically significant (Allison, 1999). Therefore having a 
good model fitting strategy and theoretical framework can support sensible and productive 
interpretations of regression coefficients. 
Regression is based on the assumption that the independent variables are correlated to some degree; if 
they are not then regression is unnecessary, and systematic exploration of the bivariate relationships is 
appropriate (though inefficient). That said, high levels of correlation – known as multicollinearity – 
can lead to identification issues in the model; that is, it is difficult to interpret which variables are 
substantively associated with the outcome and which are spurious. A consequence of multicollinearity 
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is a lack of statistical significance (due to large standard errors) and erroneously concluding that 
neither variable has an effect when one of them probably does (Allison, 1999; Tarling, 2008). 
A logistic regression model should also meet the following assumptions in order to be considered 
unbiased and valid: the true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the independent 
variables; the outcome has a binomial distribution; only and all relevant independent variables are 
included; the independent variables are measured without error; the residual or error term associated 
with each observation is not correlated with that of any other observation; the variance of the residual 
or error term should be constant (homoscedastic); and the residual or error term should be normally 
distributed (Allison, 1999; UCLA, n.d.). 
3.4.2. Survey 
The survey is a common data collection instrument in social and nonprofit research (Bielefeld, 2006). 
Presser (1984, p. 95) defines a survey as “any data collection operation that gathers information from 
human respondents by means of a standardized questionnaire in which the interest is in aggregates 
rather than particular individuals.” It is a productive way of quantitatively capturing the 
characteristics, attitudes, behaviour and beliefs of individuals (Buckingham & Saunders, 2004; May, 
2011; Simmons, 2008). The survey method has four types of data collection procedures: structured 
interview; structured observation; self-completion questionnaires; and structured record review 
(Creswell, 2009). One of its core advantages in a mixed methods research design is it allows for the 
gathering of data about an extensive group; this can then be used to design a narrower, more intensive 
phase of qualitative data collection (Aldridge & Levine, 2001). A key stage in the design of a survey 
is the operationalisation of concepts into questions. The researcher must make a number of decisions 
regarding the subject and subsequent dimensions underpinning the questionnaire, the formulation of 
the questions, the response categories and any additional text such as the introduction or explanations 
(Saris & Gallhofer, 2007). 
Many of the advantages of using administrative data for social science research transform into 
challenges when collecting data through social surveys. One of the most important areas to address is 
nonresponse bias: this occurs when there are systematic reasons for the lack of participation in the 
survey by members of the sample. As a result, the sample of respondents is not representative of the 
wider sample with respect to one or more of the measures contained in the survey (de Vaus, 2002). 
Saris and Gallhofer (2007) identify a number of other salient concerns with the survey approach: 
questions may refer to time periods of which the respondents have questionable memory; ‘social 
desirability’ bias, where respondents may feel that they should give a socially acceptable answer to a 
question; the questions contain implicit assumptions about the knowledge of the respondents – this 
can arise when the question contains technical terms or abbreviations; and ‘double-barrelled’ requests 
for answers (i.e. covering two or more concepts or topics in a single question). Researchers should 
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also be aware of constructing questions that lead respondents to select a particular answer (e.g. do you 
think that risk management is important for charities?). A further issue with the survey approach is its 
atomistic nature; that is, it focuses on summing the responses of individuals and making claims about 
wider populations or groups (Aldridge & Levine, 2001). Specific to this research, how can we 
measure the risk behaviour or understanding of an entire sector using just the responses of individuals 
who are involved in some capacity in the running of charities? Finally, some have argued against the 
use of the method from an epistemological perspective, criticising it as being nothing more than fact-
grabbing and an exercise in abstracted empiricism (Mills, 1970). 
3.4.3. Case study 
The case study approach allows the researcher to carry out in-depth studies of the unit of analysis, 
providing a richness often lacking in other methods; it also acts as a means of triangulating the 
findings generated by complementary methods (Denzin, 1978; Yin, 2003). It is an idiographic 
approach, with its primary aim being to generate a good understanding of the case rather than the 
factor (de Vaus, 2001). Case studies are useful for when you want to capture detailed contextual 
information about a phenomenon (Yin, 2003). The approach facilitates the use of multiple data 
collection methods and sources, two of which are employed in this research: documentary analysis 
and semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews are chosen as the primary data collection 
method as they are suitable for complex and subtle explorations of opinions, insights, experiences and 
sensitive issues (Denscombe, 2007). The process involves the researcher posing a broad set of 
predetermined yet open-ended questions to the informant, who can provide factual or narrative 
information in response (Ayres, 2012). Semi-structured interviews are conducted flexibly, using a 
topic guide to explore areas of interest to the researcher. However, Spencer, Ritchie, and O’Connor 
(2003) stress that this method possesses limitations with regards to reliability and generalisability, as 
interviews take on a distinct, personal character as a result of their semi-structured nature. The case 
study approach provides a complementary perspective on the research topic and fits well with the 
findings generated through the quantitative methods; for example, the semi-structured interviews 
produce rich, contextual information on the set of well-identified concepts analysed in the survey. 
3.5. Research Data 
In this section we describe in detail the administrative data underpinning the empirical work in this 
thesis. There are two dimensions of the data management process that are given particular 
consideration: data provenance and data cleaning. The former is concerned with the origins of the 
administrative data (i.e. how it is collected and why, what it contains and subsequent implications for 
research purposes). A thorough understanding of the ‘biography’ of the data establishes the research 
potential of the dataset and allows the researcher to rule out unknown or unobserved systematic 
selection mechanisms that can lead to biases (Foster, Ghani, Jarmin, Kreuter, & Lane, 2016). The 
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latter refers to the process of repurposing charity administrative data for research purposes, where 
issues relating to duplicate records, confidential variables and missing values are addressed. 
3.5.1. Administrative data 
We now focus on the issues inherent in using administrative data for social science research. 
Administrative data are often referred to as by-product data and are generated or collected routinely 
by an organisation through discharging its functions; from a research perspective the data are ‘found’ 
rather than ‘made’ (Connolly et al., 2016). For example, this type of data is collected by government 
departments and other organisations for the purposes of registration, transaction and record keeping, 
usually during the delivery of a service (ADLS, n.d.). It is a taxon of big data and offers the 
opportunity to answer fundamental questions in the social sciences and contribute directly to the 
evidence base of the substantive topic in question (Connolly et al., 2016). Figure 3.2 summarises the 
essential characteristics of administrative data and distinguishes it from other common social science 
data resources. It is clear that the use of administrative data for social science research purposes is 
contingent on addressing its large, messy, unstructured and multidimensional nature. In particular, 
there is a considerable amount of effort required to repurpose the data for use in an academic inquiry. 
Figure 3.2. Characteristics of quantitative social science data resources 
 
Note: Source: Connolly et al. (2016). ‘The Role of Administrative Data in the Big Data Revolution in 
Social Science Research’. 
Benefits 
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The scope of administrative data is often considered the most powerful argument for its use in social 
science research: the sample size is usually large, and in many cases the dataset contains the entire 
population of interest (Fritschi, von Gunten & Hümbelin, 2014; Smith, Noble, Anttila, Gill, Zaidi, 
Wright, Dibben & Barnes, 2004; Wallgren & Wallgren, 2007). As a result, administrative datasets 
cover samples of individuals and time periods not normally achievable – financially or logistically – 
through survey methods (Connolly et al., 2016; Fritschi et al., 2014; ADLS, n.d.). An implication of 
complete coverage of a population is the ability to study subgroups and rare outcomes (Connolly et 
al., 2016). In comparison to surveys and censuses, the collection of administrative data does not place 
an additional burden on the respondent and can also provide information on individuals who would 
not normally respond to surveys (ADLS, n.d.). In a time where there are valid concerns surrounding 
nonresponse bias and ‘survey fatigue’ (de Vaus, 2002), the non-intrusive nature of administrative data 
should be considered a significant advantage for its use in social research (Smith et al., 2004). 
Administrative datasets are particularly amenable to longitudinal analysis, due to their substantial 
coverage of time periods and regular updating of records by the organisation collecting the data 
(Smith et al., 2004; Wallgren & Wallgren, 2007); in such circumstances it is possible to produce and 
examine cohorts in the population, tracking their characteristics and outcomes over time (Connolly et 
al., 2016). Administrative data are also amenable to policy evaluation and analysis, in part as they 
often capture information associated with the implementation, process and outcome of policies; for 
example, geographical variations in the implementation of a policy may be considered a natural 
experiment (Connolly et al., 2016). Finally, the potential for research cost savings and efficiencies 
should also not be overlooked, particularly in an era of restricted public spending. 
There are wider sociological benefits stemming from the use of administrative data for research 
purposes. The statistical analysis of administrative datasets can give insights into the activities, 
behaviour, attributes, sentiments and resources of social actors (Fritschi et al., 2014). Savage and 
Burrows (2007, p. 886) contend that there is a coming empirical crisis in Sociology: the survey 
method is no longer the only (or best) “point of access to social relations, but in the early 21st century 
social data is now so routinely gathered and disseminated, and in such myriad ways, that the role of 
sociologists in generating data is now unclear.” As such, alternative sources of data, in particular 
those from administrative sources, hold the promise of embracing descriptions and classifications of 
the social world that were previously unthinkable (Savage & Burrows, 2007). Finally, Webber (2009, 
p.176) notes that the use of administrative data can help avoid some of the problems inherent in 
traditional sociological methods “where self-reporting and smaller sample sizes make the salience of 
people’s responses uncertain.” 
Challenges 
Criticism of the use of administrative data for research purposes is traditionally founded on quality 
concerns. The data collection process rarely considers important ontological and epistemological 
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assumptions that are synonymous with conducting social science research; similarly, social survey 
quality concerns – accuracy, reliability and validity in particular – are often absent from 
administrative data collection methodologies (Connolly et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2004). 
Consequently, the researcher is dependent on the administrative system’s population, sample and 
variable definitions, which are liable to change as the data collection process is altered to adapt to the 
administrator’s new objectives (Smith et al, 2004; Wallgren & Wallgren, 2007). Connolly et al. 
(2016) stress the analytical challenges inherent in conducting social science research with 
administrative data. Some of these are indistinguishable from analyses using social surveys: 
administrative datasets with repeated measures on units over time will contain data that are not 
independent and identically distributed, thus compromising the calculation of statistical significance 
(Baltagi, 2008). The large sample size of these datasets can also lead to simplistic interpretation of 
statistical significance tests: small effect sizes will likely be statistically significant in large samples. 
In common with other quantitative data resources, measurement issues are a feature of administrative 
datasets. Measurement is defined as the process by which a number is assigned to the magnitude of a 
quantity, the measure is the number assigned and the measuring instrument is the rule or formula that 
determines the number (Bartholomew, 1996). As highlighted previously, administrators often adjust 
the measuring instrument to reflect changes in their function; for example, how unemployment is 
measured by successive governments. This often occurs in tandem with definitional changes to 
variables, further impacting the ability to conduct longitudinal analyses. Finally, if snapshots of the 
data are not recorded at fixed time points it may be impossible to conduct longitudinal analysis. 
Missing data remains a concern when working with administrative data (Fritschi et al., 2014). Perhaps 
most problematic is the ability to determine why the data are missing. Variables derived from 
administrative data may contain missing values due to non-response by the individual, data entry 
errors by the administrator, deletion of records, or issues surrounding the confidentiality of certain 
values. This has considerable implications for how the researcher should treat missing data with 
respect to data imputation and the interpretation of coefficients in a statistical model. A related issue is 
the code used by the administrator to indicate that an individual has missing values for a variable. 
This problem is exacerbated when combining two or more datasets from different administrative 
sources or departments, which may record missing values using different codes (or none at all). 
Researchers must also contend with errors in the data resulting from fraudulent reporting by entities 
(e.g. tax returns by self-employed individuals) and those tasked with data entry. 
There are generic issues that should be borne in mind. The use of administrative data for research 
purposes can give rise to unforeseen ethical and legal concerns (Connolly et al., 2016). Administrative 
datasets often contain sensitive micro-data (e.g. demographic or financial); information that entities 
would be reluctant to disclose via other data collection methods. The question must be asked whether 
these individuals have given their informed consent for their data to be used for research purposes. 
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Much depends on the initial ‘contract’ between the data collector and the individual, and whether 
additional uses and disclosure of their information has been discussed or agreed. Researchers should 
bear in mind that accessing administrative datasets can be an onerous and time-consuming 
undertaking. Often there are significant legal and confidentiality agreements that need to be in place 
prior to the researcher being given access to data; for example the Data Protection Act 1998 places 
limitations on the use of personal data about individuals. While some social science researchers will 
be familiar with such requirements (e.g. in the fields of public health and social welfare), many will 
not and need to have thought through the relevant ethical concerns relating to their use of the data. 
Finally, the use of administrative data for research purposes places a significant demand on the 
researcher in the form of intermediate data management and analysis skills. Administrative data is 
often in spreadsheet format (e.g. .csv or .xls), in a proprietary database format (e.g. MS Access) or in 
some other machine-readable format (e.g. .xml). The manipulation of such data requires researchers to 
possess considerable skills in the use of appropriate information technology and systems. Researchers 
should consider the merits of various statistical software packages for the process of data management 
and not just work in the package they are most familiar with. This issue is compounded by the lack of 
meta-data accompanying administrative datasets, leaving the researcher to invest considerable effort 
in understanding the ‘biography’ of the data – how it is generated and for what purpose (Connolly et 
al., 2016). 
3.5.2. Transforming administrative data for use in social science research 
The crucial task in using administrative data for academic research purposes is to transform the data 
so it is amenable to statistical analysis. The data should be processed in such a way that the final 
dataset looks (structurally) and behaves (statistically) like social survey data. Common steps in 
processing administrative data include: data cleaning; coding of variables; handling of missing cases 
and values; matching or linking with other datasets; and creating derived variables. The salient 
difference relates to the nature of the data collection stage. Survey data collection is informed and 
driven by statistical and research concerns. Administrative data, as previously discussed, is collected 
for other purposes. This places greater emphasis on consulting the metadata and guidance held by the 
administrative data collector in order for the dataset to be transformed to meet the needs of the 
researcher. 
Data provenance 
There are four main sources of charity administrative data utilised in this research:  
 Scottish Charity Register – is the public register, created and maintained by OSCR, of all 
organisations registered as Scottish charities. This includes charities registered by OSCR and 
those registered under different regimes such as UK Inland Revenue. 
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 Annual Returns – is a mandatory reporting requirement for all active Scottish charities (and 
some that are inactive but have charitable assets that require monitoring to ensure they are 
still used for charitable purposes). The annual return collects financial information about a 
charity and must be submitted, along with a set of accounts, within nine months of the end of 
an organisation’s accounting year. Charities with annual gross income of less than £25,000 
complete only the annual return, while charities with annual gross income of £25,000 or more 
also submit a supplementary monitoring form that captures more detailed financial 
information. 
 Investigations data – these are records captured by the Monitoring & Compliance team at 
OSCR of complaints and subsequent regulatory action against charities; Chapter Four deals 
primarily with these data. 
 Financial Exceptions data – these are records that capture instances of financial vulnerabilities 
and improprieties in charities’ annual returns; Chapter Six deals primarily with these data. 
Each of these datasets was acquired from OSCR at different times over the course of the research. The 
process was largely frictionless and always secure. A request for data would be lodged with the 
project partner at OSCR (sometimes during field visits, usually via email), who would then run the 
necessary query on the database or contact a colleague with responsibility for this information, 
resulting in the generation of a .csv file containing the cases and variables required by the researcher. 
The file would be password protected and transferred via cloud storage to the researcher, who then 
phoned the project partner to receive the password. Table 3.1 below provides further information on 
each of the four raw data resources (i.e. before any data processing has occurred), in particular their 
format, size and coverage (cases, variables and time periods). Thanks to OSCR’s use of a consistent 
unique identifier for charities – Scottish Charity Number – each of the datasets have the potential to 
be linked deterministically to each other. Given the importance of this number (and the wider data that 
are collected) for OSCR’s regulatory functions, data quality issues are uncommon but do impact the 
linkage process in a minor way. For example, Scottish Charity Number is recorded manually in the 
Investigations data, leading to 279 instances of the invalid value of SC000000, and thus no way of 
linking these observations with other datasets.5 The first two data resources act as the base datasets for 
the analyses, with the others used as a source of further information. The data are generally of high 
quality and often the most reliable and valid measures of interesting constructs that we have; the fields 
contained in these datasets have remained consistent in definition and recording over the time period. 
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Table 3.1. Charity administrative data properties 
Properties 
Scottish Charity 
Register Annual Returns Investigations 
Financial 
Exceptions 
Observations 44,888 165,310 2,666 31,182 
     
Charities 44,888 27,371 1,802 7,164 
     
Variables 45 95 15 11 
     
Size 204 MB 785 MB 1.2MB 5 MB 
     
File type .csv .csv .csv .csv 
     
Time period 2006-2014 2003-2014 2006-2014 2006-2015 
     
Format Cross section Panel Panel Panel 
     
Data linkage 
potential 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Administrative 
use 
Public register of all 
charities that are or 
have been active in 
Scotland 
Monitor use of 
charitable 
resources 
Investigate 
instances of 
charity 
misconduct and 
take necessary 
regulatory action 
Monitor use of 
charitable 
resources and 
identify financial 
vulnerabilities and 
improprieties 
     
Research use All analyses All analyses Chapter Four 
Chapter Seven 
Chapter Six 
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Data cleaning 
The raw data described above needed considerable processing in order to be suitable for research 
purposes. The data management process entails the following sequential steps: 
1. Converting raw data to Stata .dta files; 
2. Identify and remove invalid observations; 
3. Identify and remove invalid or unnecessary variables; 
4. Identify and remove problematic duplicate observations (i.e. two or more observations with 
the same values for all variables or values for one variable that should differ across 
observations); 
5. Identify and correct invalid values for variables (e.g. incorrect charity numbers, negative 
annual gross income); 
6. Converting text variables to numeric and recoding variables (e.g. collapsing categories of a 
variable); 
7. Creating derived variables; 
8. Data linkage. 
Certain data management tasks – such as the inclusion of observations in the statistical models, 
derived variables, data linkage and invalid values for independent and dependent variables – are best 
understood in the context of the topic under investigation and thus are described in the relevant 
analytical chapters. For now, we focus on the data management steps necessary to transform the 
administrative data into statistically usable datasets, regardless of the research topic. Table 3.2 below 
summarises the application of the data management process for each of our datasets. 
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Table 3.2. Data management process: charity administrative data 
Step 
Scottish Charity 
Register Annual Returns Investigations 
Financial 
Exceptions 
File conversion .dta .dta .dta .dta 
     
Invalid 
observations 
2 dummy records n/a n/a n/a 
     
Invalid or 
unnecessary 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Remove duplicate 
observations 
1,777 
observations with 
invalid duplicate 
legal name 
9,549 invalid 
duplicate 
observations 
8 invalid duplicate 
observations 
n/a 
     
Check missing 
values 
2 variables with 
100 percent 
missing values 
2 variables with 
100 percent 
missing values 
No variables with 
100 percent 
missing values 
No variables with 
100 percent 
missing values 
     
Invalid values Discussed in 
Chapter Four 
345 observations 
with invalid 
combinations of 
charity number 
and annual return 
year 
Discussed in 
Chapter Four 
740 observations 
     
Recode variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Create derived 
variables 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
The raw data contained in the Scottish Charity Register lists records for 44,888 organisations. For the 
purposes of analysis however, many of these charities must be removed. First, two Scottish Charity 
Numbers (SCN) correspond to dummy charities created by OSCR for the purposes of testing their 
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administrative systems (SC000036 and SC000107) and were dropped from the dataset. Second, a 
number of records had duplicate values for the legal name of the organisation (2,457); while many of 
these are valid duplicates (e.g. individual Church of Scotland charities), a large number of them had 
the value ‘Deleted’ (1,777). Charities with this legal name were dropped from the dataset as they 
correspond to organisations that were never recognised by UK Inland Revenue when they created the 
Charity Index – a precursor to the Scottish Charity Register – in 1992. Third, there were a large 
number of organisations that OSCR removed from the Index when they took over as the Registrar in 
April 2006. These charities never completed an annual return in the early years of OSCR’s regime and 
thus were removed from the Register. These organisations were easily identifiable as they had missing 
values for key administrative fields (e.g. constitutional form); this resulted in a further 12,371 
charities being removed from the dataset. The result of this data cleaning is a dataset containing 
30,738 valid Scottish charities. In the Annual Returns data 9,549 observations had duplicate values for 
every variable and were dropped from the dataset. As the data are in panel format (long), each 
observation should be uniquely identified by a combination of charity number and annual return year; 
however, 690 observations contained duplicate values for these key variables and 345 records were 
dropped.6 In the Investigations data 8 observations had duplicate values for every variable and were 
dropped from the dataset. The Financial Exceptions data contained issues with the presence of invalid 
duplicates. 740 records relating to charities with more than the valid maximum number of 
observations per year (32) were dropped from the dataset. A further 1,504 observations were dropped 
as they referred to obsolete financial exception codes (i.e. not recorded from 2012 and only applied to 
a small subset of the sector). 
3.5.3. Survey and case studies 
Data provenance 
The type of survey instrument used in this study is the self-completion questionnaire – see the 
appendices for a link where the questions can be accessed (p. 155). As it was not possible to send the 
survey to the population of charities active over the study period, the sample was restricted to those 
individuals that receive OSCR’s monthly newsletter (OSCR Reporter).7 At the time the survey was 
first sent by email by OSCR’s Communications team (09/06/2015), this included 6,355 individuals. 
However some of these recipients neither worked with or for Scottish charities (e.g. accountants and 
media workers), therefore the sample was further restricted to individuals listed as charity trustees 
(2,414), paid charity workers (1,074) and volunteers (612). This resulted in a final sample of 4,100 
individual subscribers to the newsletter. The final number of responses stood at 420, a response rate of 
10.2 percent of the newsletter subscribers; this accounts for roughly 1.8 percent of the population of 
Scottish charities at the time. As we lack data on their characteristics, we do not know if our sample is 
representative of the charities that subscribe to the newsletter. 
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The representativeness of our sample to the population of charities with regards to organisation size is 
described in Table 3.3 below.8 The survey sample is overrepresented with respect to larger charities 
and vice versa, and thus nonresponse bias is highly likely to be present in our sample. It is plausible 
that smaller organisations are less likely to subscribe to the newsletter or engage with OSCR in 
general except for complying with mandatory reporting requirements.  
Table 3.3. Representativeness of survey sample to population of Scottish charities 
 %  
Annual gross income Survey 
Scottish Charity 
Register Representativeness 
£0 0 3 Under 
£1 - £24,999 31 54 Under 
£25,000 - £99,999 20 20 Representative 
£100,000 - £499,999 25 13 Over 
£500,000 - £999,999 8 3 Over 
£1,000,000 - £9,999,999 13 5 Over 
£10,000,000 + 3 2 Over 
Total 100 
(N=420) 
100
(N=22,313)
 
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 100. Scottish 
Charity Register excludes charities for which there are no financial data (n=1,650). 
The survey was divided into five main sections and a concluding page. Section 1 contained the 
introductory questions which captured basic demographic data about the individuals and the charity 
they represent (i.e. the role of the individual in the charity; the size, sector and legal form of the 
organisation). Section 2 requested data about a charity’s understanding of risk, specifically what terms 
it associates with this concept. Section 3 focused on the value a charity ascribes to risk and in 
particular risk management, including whether it supports operations, strategic planning or 
demonstrating accountability. Section 4 explored the behaviour of a charity in response to risk, with a 
particular interest in risk management practices. Section 5 examined the types of risks faced by 
charities. The final section captured the organisation’s Scottish charity number and any other thoughts 
the individual had with regards to the survey (see the appendices for this chapter to view the survey 
questions). The sections and content of the questionnaire map to the dimensions contained in the 
organisation level of the contextual framework outlined in Chapter Two (Figure 2.3). Where possible, 
questions were derived (and slightly amended in some cases) from existing surveys of risk in the 
charity sector (Karlsson, 2012; Zurich, 2015). Therefore, the degree of reliability and validity of the 
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questions is dependent on the source material, as well as the predictive or explanatory power of our 
measures of the different dimensions of risk in future studies. 
An issue particular to our survey is the potential inability of the respondent to answer accurately about 
the organisation they are involved with – is it correct to say that a volunteer understands their 
charity’s formal and informal risk management procedures and tools? Therefore, it should be borne in 
mind that this study assumes that the answers the respondents give are congruent with those of the 
organisation as a whole. 
Data cleaning 
The data management process outlined in the previous section was also implemented for the survey 
data. There was very little data cleaning in comparison to the administrative data. No cases were 
dropped from the sample, and there were no duplicates and or concerns regarding excessive missing 
data. The one variable that did require substantial, largely manual cleaning was the one that captured a 
respondent’s Scottish Charity Number. As this was a free-text response, the following issues became 
apparent: respondent’s provided invalid values (e.g. SC071524, SC0123456 are invalid as Scottish 
Charity Number is sequential and there are only some 45,000 charities on the Register at time of 
writing); did not provide any value; or simply made a statement about their unwillingness to share this 
information. Out of 420 responses, 407 provided what appeared to be valid Scottish Charity Numbers. 
In order to examine our respondent’s investigation and regulatory intervention history, the survey 
responses were linked to Chapter Four’s data using the Scottish Charity Number: 339 of the 407 
responses with valid data for this variable were matched in this way.9 Responses to the free-text 
question in the survey – What are the three most significant risks facing your charity? – were coded 
using the Charity Commission’s risk categories (see Table 2.1 in Chapter Two). Where there was a 
case for a response to be categorised as more than one type of risk, a judgement was made and applied 
consistently to all other scenarios where this occurred. For example, one respondent listed the 
following as a significant risk: 
Coming to the end of government strategy focussing on our area of work, meaning future 
funding is likely to be reduced. 
This could be categorised as either an external risk (as there is a change in government policy) or a 
financial risk (as the charity is likely to suffer a reduction in funding from this stream of work). The 
decision was made to categorise as external as this represents the locus of the risk. 
The case studies were selected from the group of matched charities and efforts were made to include 
organisations of different sizes and regulatory histories (i.e. whether concerns about a charity’s 
conduct has been reported to OSCR in the past). 25 charities were contacted between 16 August 2016 
and 10 October 2016 to elicit their participation in a face-to-face semi-structured interview and three 
agreed to the request: a third sector interface (TSI), cancer support charity and housing support 
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organisation. The purpose of this data collection phase was to delve deeper into the concepts analysed 
in the survey and to explore whether charities felt burdened or encumbered by OSCR’s regulatory 
approach – see the appendices for this chapter for the topic guide used to structure the interviews. The 
PhD candidate conducted interviews with senior members of the organisation – two managing 
directors, a treasurer and long-standing volunteer – at the charities’ premises and lasted between 45 
and 63 minutes. Each interview transcript was listened to three times prior to uploading to NVivo for 
coding. The data were analysed using the framework approach advocated by Ritchie, Spencer and 
O’Connor (2003) and involved the following steps: drafting summary notes for each interview; 
developing a concept-driven, broad coding scheme derived from the topic guide; coding each 
transcript according to the scheme; collating codes under key themes; and interpretation and writing 
up of findings. Interview data were augmented with analysis of the organisations’ Trustee Annual 
Reports (TAR), a compulsory document submitted alongside the annual return and accounts that 
contains narrative information on governance, impact and provision of public benefit by the charity. 
Specifically, the reports were examined to see if they contained information on the risk management 
practices and policies of the organisations in question. Finally, all three sources of data – interviews, 
TARs and survey responses – were compared and contrasted to produce rounded, comprehensive 
accounts of the nature, understanding and impact of risk in these charities. 
The following four empirical chapters combine the methods and research data outlined here to 
produce answers to our research questions, beginning with an examination of the utility of 
administrative data to study misconduct in the Scottish charity sector. All four analyses draw on the 
contextual framework contained in Chapter Two (Figure 2.1) and are primarily focused on the 
Organisation level. 
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Chapter Four – The Nature and Extent of Misconduct 
 
Source: xkcd. (n.d.). Physicists. Retrieved January 10, 2017, from https://xkcd.com/793/ 
4.1. Introduction 
Drawing on Young’s (2009) contribution to the literature, we can expect charities to be subject to and 
experience a wide variety of risks, some of which may be related to organisational misconduct. We 
also highlighted the potential for different types of risks to be related (e.g. reputational damage and 
financial loss). Leveraging some of the administrative data described in the previous chapter, this 
analysis investigates the nature, extent and risk factors associated with regulatory investigations into 
alleged and actual charity misconduct. Given that fraud (particularly payroll and procurement) is 
estimated to cost the UK charity sector around £1.9 billion annually (PKF Littlejohn, 2016), research 
in this area carries considerable salience. Examining this topic allows researchers to ‘peer under the 
hood’ of the sector, shining a light on aspects of charity behaviour that are often overlooked. Research 
in this area also has the potential to develop the evidence base on charity misconduct and 
accountability, improve regulatory practice through the targeting of resources at serious incidences of 
misbehaviour, and dispel misperceptions around the conduct of these organisations (by providing 
context for media reports for example). This chapter represents the first systematic, UK study of 
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charity misconduct. Using the administrative data described in the previous chapter, we describe the 
nature and extent of alleged and actual misconduct by Scottish charities, and ask what organisational 
and financial factors are associated with this outcome? In doing so we begin to address the 
fundamental concern of the thesis: namely, what type and degree of risk is present in the Scottish 
charity sector? The chapter is structured as follows. First, we describe the misconduct monitoring 
programme administered by OSCR. This is followed by a review of the literatures on charity failure 
and fraud from where we derive suitable explanatory variables. We outline the data and methods 
specific to this research, before presenting our empirical results. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of this inquiry. 
4.2. Investigating Charity Misconduct 
One of OSCR’s main responsibilities is to identify and investigate apparent misconduct and protect 
charity assets. It operationalises this duty by opening an investigation (what they term an ‘inquiry’) 
into the actions of a charity suspected of misconduct and other misdemeanours. Concerns regarding a 
charity’s behaviour can originate from a wide variety of sources, including but not limited to members 
of the public, trustees, volunteers, other regulators, media reports and auditors. For example, one of 
the founders of the charity The Kiltwalk reported the organisation to OSCR on the grounds that he 
had concerns over the amount of funds raised by the organisation that are spent on meeting the needs 
of beneficiaries; OSCR concluded that “the actions of the charity trustees to have been wholly 
consistent with their general duties in charity law. We have not identified any matters of a regulatory 
nature that warrant any further action by OSCR at this time and have therefore closed our inquiry.” 
(Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2015, p. 1).  
The types of concerns OSCR investigates are as follows (Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 
2014): 
 Criminal activity such as money laundering, fraud, embezzlement and abuse of vulnerable 
beneficiaries. 
 Governance issues such as not acting in accordance with the charity’s constitution, lack of 
governing controls and trustee conflict of interest. 
 Compliance issues such as breaches of accounting regulations, failure to provide requested 
information and acting without consent from OSCR. 
 Misconduct issues such as misappropriation of funds, private benefit to trustees (e.g. 
inappropriate remuneration), and acting without reasonable care and diligence. 
 Misrepresentation issues such as an organisation that is not registered as a charity but has 
presented itself as one to the public. 
OSCR can only deal with concerns that relate to charity law – such as damage to charitable assets or 
beneficiaries, misconduct or misrepresentation – though it can refer cases to other bodies such as 
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when criminal activity is suspected. Upon receipt of a concern, the regulator will consider the 
following: whether it has a legal power to act; whether there is a risk to charitable assets (including 
beneficiaries), to the abuse of charitable status, and to the charity sector as a whole; whether the 
concern should be dealt with by another regulator or body; and the anticipated level of action 
required. Finally, the outcome (and date the case is closed) is recorded for each investigation. 
Outcomes are varied and often specific to each investigation but most can be related to three common 
categories: advice given; no action taken or necessary; and regulatory action taken. 
4.3. Literature 
The study of misconduct is part of the broader field of charity failure and success. Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004) identify two leading schools of thought in the study of organisational success and 
failure, which they label deterministic and voluntaristic. Population ecology theory is deterministic 
and focuses on organisational density, size and age as affecting the life chances of organisations, as 
well as a suite of environmental factors (such as regulation and the state of the economy). All of these 
variables are considered outside the control of the organisation. In contrast, the voluntaristic 
perspective sees “good strategic choices as the keys to organizational success. Particular emphasis is 
placed on organizational structure, the role and composition of the board, and how problems are 
perceived and solved.” (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004, p. 268)  
There are various conceptualisations of charity failure including resource reduction, market exit, and 
mortality (Helmig, Ingurfurth & Pinz, 2014). However, many of these constructs contain 
inconsistencies and contradictions. For example, organisational dissolution may indicate success 
rather than failure if a charity has achieved its mission (Helmig et al., 2014; see also Hager, 
Galaskiewicz, Bielefeld & Pins, 1996). There have been many factors posited as determinants or 
correlates of charity failure: organisation size and age (Freeman, Caroll & Hannan, 1983; Harrison & 
Laincz, 2008), governance issues (Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, 2010), regulation and a favourable 
policy environment (Hyndman & McDonnell, 2009), and financial performance (Greenlee & Trussel, 
2000). Factors such as the number of volunteers (McHargue, 2003), staff motivation (Packard, 2010), 
and management team diversity (Perkins & Fields, 2010) have also been posited as contributing to 
charity success or failure. 
The study of charity misconduct has tended to focus on instances of occupational fraud, of which 
there are two major types: fraud conducted against the organisation (e.g. misappropriation of cash by 
an employee) and fraud conducted by the organisation such as the deliberate misreporting of financial 
performance (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon & Keating, 2007). Previous research examined the nature of 
fraud in the charity sector, the organisations afflicted by this outcome, and the perpetrators of said 
fraud (Archambeault, Webber & Greenlee, 2015). Bradley (2014) conjectures that occupational fraud 
damages the organisation (through significant financial loss, reduced income from donations and 
 57 
 
potential fines), intended beneficiaries (through the diversion of funds away from services), and the 
reputation of charities in general. It is posited that the charity sector is particularly sensitive to the 
negative effects of fraud, especially asset misappropriation as these organisations often lack sufficient 
controls for detecting and dealing with this issue (Archambeault et al., 2015). Douglas and Mills 
(2000) proposed five reasons why this explanation might be the case: an atmosphere of trust 
surrounding the organisation; the difficulty in controlling certain revenue streams (e.g. cash 
donations); a lack of financial resources necessary to implement sufficient internal controls; a lack of 
business expertise in the organisation; and the reliance on volunteer boards. Marks and Ugo (2012) 
corroborate these assertions and also theorise that the type of charity is a relevant factor; for example, 
they argue that grant-making organisations might be more susceptible to financial fraud than 
commercial charities due to the higher risk of misappropriation. Empirical research by Greenlee et al. 
(2007) and Holtfreter (2008) tentatively supported the conjectures of Douglas and Mills, finding some 
evidence of financial misconduct in the US nonprofit sector. Krishnan, Yetman and Yetman (2006) 
examined the financial statements of US nonprofits and discovered that some of these organisations 
(38 of 101) reported an average of $7 million less in donations on their annual return than on their 
audited financial statements. 
However there are some significant limitations to previous studies. Research on charity success and 
failure has mainly focused on the most economically important subsectors; in a review of the 
literature, Helmig et al. (2014) found that four International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations 
groups (Health, Culture and Recreation, Social Services, and Education and Research) were the 
subject of the majority of studies in this field (102 of 147 reviewed articles).10 With respect to 
misconduct, the scope of the topic has been narrowly defined, with an understandable yet limited 
focus on occupational fraud and its relation to financial losses. Many of these previous studies have 
been hampered by small sample sizes, necessitating exploratory work over descriptive and 
explanatory analyses (Archambeault et al., 2015). Consequently, much of this exploratory work has 
focused on charity subsectors such as Human and Health Services, a category of US nonprofit activity 
(e.g. Gibelman & Gelman, 2001). Researchers have also struggled to acquire suitable data, with many 
studies relying on unrepresentative self-completion surveys conducted by third parties or analyses of 
print media reports of charity fraud (see Fremont-Smith & Kosaras, 2003; Gibelman & Gelman, 2001; 
Greenlee et al., 2007).11 Finally, extant research is US centric, with little academic focus on other 
geographies or charity sectors (Clifford & Mohan, 2016). 
4.4. Method 
This study examines two dimensions of charity misconduct that deserve greater attention: regulatory 
investigation and subsequent action. An investigation captures the opening of an inquiry by OSCR 
based on a reported concern regarding a charity’s conduct. Regulatory action is defined as any 
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intervention by OSCR as a result of an investigation, excluding giving advice to the organisation.12 
For example, reporting the charity to prosecutors or suspending trustees for financial mismanagement 
constitutes regulatory action by OSCR. This study overcomes many of the limitations outlined 
previously by linking three of our administrative data resources to provide a pooled cross-section of 
the Scottish charity sector containing 25,611 observations over the period 2006-2014: Scottish Charity 
Register, Investigations data, and Annual Returns data. Some additional data management work was 
conducted to ensure these linked data were suitable for analysing the topic at hand: for instance, there 
were 279 observations in the Investigations data with an invalid Scottish Charity Number 
(SC0000000) and thus could not be linked to the Scottish Charity Register. Table 4.1 summarises the 
steps in the sample selection process. 
Table 4.1. Charity misconduct dataset: sample selection process 
Sample selection Observations
Initial sample (Scottish Charity Register data) 30,738
   Removal of observations with recorded income 
‘zero’ (£0) 
1,952
   Removal of observations with missing data for 
income 
1,442
   Removal of observations with missing or invalid 
data for organisation age 
1,733
Final sample 25,611 charities
Note: the final sample size presented in this table is used for the descriptive analyses; the inferential 
analyses necessitate further reductions in the sample size due to the removal of observations which 
have missing values for any of the independent variables included in the statistical models.  
Contributing to the literature on charity failure and misconduct we address three research questions: 
1. What is the nature and extent of regulatory investigations in the Scottish charity sector? 
2. What are the risk factors associated with being investigated? 
3. Having been investigated, what factors account for variation in regulatory action being taken? 
4.4.1. Dependent and independent variables 
The outcome of being investigated by the regulator is measured using a dichotomous variable that has 
the value 1 if a charity has been investigated and 0 if not. The second dependent variable is also 
dichotomous and takes the value 1 if a charity has had regulatory action taken against it and 0 if not. 
Both dependent variables are modelled separately using binary logistic regression. Drawing on the 
reviewed literature, nine independent variables are operationalised in this study, of which three 
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function as controls. Size is a nominal categorical measure of a charity’s most recent annual gross 
income;13 Age is the natural log of the length of time an organisation has existed (i.e. year of most 
recent annual return minus year organisation was created); Grant is a binary indicator of whether a 
charity only disburses grants to other organisations rather than carrying out charitable activities itself 
or a combination of functions; and Parent is a binary indicator of whether a charity has a parent 
organisation (e.g. parish churches that are part of the Church of Scotland). Our three control variables 
are: Field is a nominal categorical measure of a charity’s ICNPO category (see Mohan & Barnard, 
2013 for how these categories were assigned); Geography is a nominal categorical measure of a 
charity’s geographical scope of operations; and Form is a nominal categorical measure of an 
organisation’s constitutional form (e.g. limited company). An additional two independent variables 
are included specifically for modelling regulatory action: actor making the complaint and type of 
complaint. The first variable, Public, is a dichotomous measure that takes the value 1 if a concern was 
raised by a member of the public and 0 if it was any other actor (see Table 4.2 for a list of these 
actors).14 Misconduct is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 for investigations into 
misconduct and 0 if it is an investigation into any of the other four concerns (e.g. criminal or 
misrepresentation). The reasons for the use of dichotomous measures rather than multinomial are as 
follows. In the case of the actor registering a concern, members of the public account for almost half 
of the investigations, with most of the other categories containing relatively few observations; from a 
statistical modelling perspective, this suggests that categories of this variable can appropriately be 
collapsed into fewer groups. In light of the importance of public confidence to the sector, we also felt 
it would be instructive to explore whether members of the public were better, relative to other 
stakeholders as a homogenous group, at identifying actual misconduct. For the type of concern raised, 
OSCR can record more than one concern per investigation (maximum of two); thus it was easier to 
construct dichotomous measures rather than treat these data as multiple response variables. 
4.5. Results 
The sample contains demographic, financial and investigations data on 25,611 charities. Of these 
20,053 are listed as Active on the Scottish Charity Register, with 4,246 having been removed and the 
remainder either not subject to further monitoring by OSCR or are non-submitting charities (i.e. they 
have failed to submit their annual return on time or at all). The vast majority of organisations are 
defined as Standard charities (96 percent) – the remainder are Cross Border charities or Registered 
Social Landlords. The mean and median charity has £856,803 and £12,251 in annual gross income 
respectively; the mean and median age in the sample is 24 years and 16 years. The majority of 
organisations (57 percent) operate across numerous geographies, with 43 percent confining their 
charitable activities to a local level. The three most common constitutional forms for Scottish charities 
are unincorporated associations (55 percent), companies (20 percent) and trusts (18 percent). Seventy 
nine percent of organisations were granted charitable status prior to the establishment of OSCR. 
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Eighteen percent of charities have a parent organisation while 33 percent disburse grants to 
individuals and organisations. Finally, there is a wide distribution of ICNPO classifications in the 
sector though there are more populous categories such as Social services (31 percent), Religion (16 
percent), Culture and recreation (15 percent), and Development and housing (11 percent). 
4.5.1. Describing investigations and regulatory action 
There have been 2,109 regulatory investigations of 1,566 Scottish charities: this represents six percent 
of the total number of organisations active during this period. The number of investigations increased 
steadily during OSCR’s early years and then plateaued at around 400 per year until 2013/14, when the 
figure has declined slightly. The majority of investigations (78 percent) concerned charities that were 
only investigated once in their history. The three most common types of investigations concern 
governance issues (16 percent), compliance (14 percent) and misconduct (8 percent). Only 13 percent 
of investigations resulted in regulatory action being taken against a charity, with the remaining 87 
percent resulting in advice being dispensed or no action necessary. Examining only those cases where 
regulatory action was taken, it is clear that serious intervention (i.e. the use of legislation to enforce 
changes at or to an organisation) is rare: 90 percent of regulatory actions are classed by OSCR as 
moderately serious, seven percent as least serious and three percent as most serious.15 This suggests 
that even in the minority of cases when OSCR takes regulatory action, very few of these actions are 
treated as very serious from its perspective. There is no statistical association between the number of 
times a charity has been investigated and whether regulatory action has been taken against it 
(Cramér’s V=.08, p<.001); even in cases where an organisation has been investigated five, six or 
seven times, regulatory action is uncommon.  
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For the 1,400 observations for which there are data, it is a member of the public that is most likely to 
contact OSCR with a concern about a charity (Table 4.2). Internal stakeholders of the charity account 
for 31 percent of all investigation initiators, though this disregards the strong possibility that many of 
those recorded as anonymous are involved in the running of the charity they have a concern about. 
Table 4.2. Actors that trigger regulatory investigations 
Actor N %
Member of the public 672 48
Charity member 229 16
Anonymous 137 10
Charity employee 110 8
Trustee 98 7
Other (e.g. funder, other regulator, auditor) 154 11
Total 1,400 100
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 
The concerns that prompt these actors to raise a complaint with OSCR are numerous and diverse, as 
seen in Table 4.3 below. The overriding concern is general governance, as well as associated issues 
such as the duties of trustees and adherence to the founding document. Financial misconduct also 
ranks highly, particularly the misappropriation of funds and suspicion of financial irregularity. There 
is a moderate association between the actor making the complaint and the underlying concerns 
(Cramer’s V=.227, p<.001). Compared to average, trustees were less likely to report concerns about 
general governance, external disputes and the misappropriation of funds for example.   
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Table 4.3. Concerns that trigger a regulatory investigation 
Concerns underpinning a complaint N %
General governance 518 29
Misappropriation of funds  124 7
Trustee duties 115 6
External dispute 106 6
Failure to follow founding document 102 6
Accounting irregularities 93 5
Service delivery 90 5
Section 23 non-compliance 88 5
Personal benefit to trustees 82 5
Internal dispute 68 4
Other (for example employment matters, 
fundraising issues) 
416 23
Total 1,802 100.00
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Individuals can provide a maximum of two 
reasons underpinning their complaint. 
Attention is now focused on two of the independent variables posited as associated with the outcome: 
organisation size and age. Table A4.1 and A4.2 and Figure A4.1 in the appendices provide a detailed 
summary of the distribution of different functional forms of charity size: annual gross income, the 
natural logarithm of annual gross income, and categorical bands derived from annual gross income. 
The distribution for the sample as a whole is substantially positively skewed due to the effect of 
outliers (i.e. those charities with very high incomes). Ninety five percent of charities in the sample 
earned almost three times less than the mean value of £856,810, a figure in stark contrast to the 
median income of £12,243. There are consistent differences in the distribution of annual gross income 
between investigated and non-investigated charities. Investigated organisations have considerably 
larger median and mean incomes compared to non-investigated charities and the sample as a whole; 
they also have greater values for each reported percentile. However, transforming gross income using 
the natural logarithm reveals that the distribution for the sector is approximately normal, with a small 
number of extreme values at each end of the income distribution. 
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With the exception of the natural logarithm transformation, there is clear income disparity in the 
Scottish charity sector. There is enormous variation and positive skewness for our original gross 
income measure, and a majority of organisations are in the lower income categories. However 
investigated charities tend to have larger values for each percentile of the metric forms of organisation 
size and for the categorical form, a greater percentage of charities are found in the higher income 
categories. This pattern can be more clearly seen in the distribution of investigated charities by 
categories of annual gross income (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4. Proportion of investigated charities by categories of annual gross income 
 
Number of charities 
Number of investigated 
charities
% of charities 
investigated
£1 - £24,999 15,684 483 3.08
£25,000 - £99,999 4,962 327 6.59
£100,000 - £499,999 3,039 356 11.71
£500,000 - £999,999 579 105 18.13
£1,000,000 - £9,999,999 993 183 18.43
£10m + 354 112 31.64
Total 25,611 1,566 6.11
 
The rate of investigation varies considerably by organisation size. Investigation rates for the smallest 
charities (£0 to £99,000 in income) were either at or slightly below average. The rate of investigations 
then increases as the size of the organisation becomes larger: medium-to-large charities (£100,000 to 
£10m +) exhibit an investigation rate of between 11 percent and 32 percent. This pattern suggests a 
strong association between organisation size and being investigated, which is confirmed by the 
appropriate association statistic (gamma=0.54, p<.001).16 
Our attention now turns to the association between organisation age and being investigated. Figure 
A4.2 in the appendices presents the distributions of two functional forms of age: original units and a 
logarithmic transformation to explore whether there is a nonlinear association with the outcome. The 
distribution is positively skewed, with a small number of older charities (50+ years) pulling the mean 
towards the higher end of the age scale; the natural logarithm measure of age has an approximately 
normal distribution. Figure 4.1 below compares the distribution of charity age across categories of 
investigation status. The distribution suggests that there is no association between a charity’s age and 
being subject to an investigation, though there is a slight difference in mean age – investigated 
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charities are four years younger. This is confirmed by the appropriate association statistic (Eta=.08, 
p<.01). 
Figure 4.1. Distribution of organisation age, by investigation status 
 
Previous studies of charity success and failure have suggested that age and size can be conflated 
(Baum, 1994, 1996; Hager & Galaskiewicz, 2000); thus it is necessary to ascertain whether these two 
variables are correlated and also if there is an interaction effect present. The low degree of correlation 
between age and our categorical measure of size in this study does not support the conflation 
argument (Eta=.16, p<.001) – a low degree of correlation is also found for other functional forms of 
size. Though age on its own does not seem to be associated with being investigated for the whole 
sample of charities, it is plausible that this may not be the case for different organisation sizes; that is, 
within a size category there may be differences in the ages of investigated and non-investigated 
charities. Tables 4.5 and 4.6 demonstrate there is an interaction between age and size: as charities get 
larger, the association between charity age and being investigated increases considerably (though the 
association is not statistically significant for all organisation sizes). Two-tailed independent-group t 
tests were conducted to test for statistically significant differences in the mean age of investigated and 
non-investigated charities. Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests were also 
conducted to compare differences in median scores. These tests gave the same significance results 
with the exception of £500,000 - £999,999 category, where there is no statistically significant 
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difference in median age. At all organisation sizes except the largest two, investigated charities are 
slightly younger than their counterparts; however, for the two largest organisation sizes investigated 
charities are substantially older than those not investigated (13 and 9 years older respectively). This 
interaction will be accounted for in the statistical modelling process. 
Table 4.5. Distribution of charity age over categories of organisation size, by investigation status 
 Not investigated  Investigated
Organisation size N Mean Median  N Mean Median
Mean 
difference
£1 - £24,999 15,201 22 15  483 16 12 -6***
£25,000 - £99,999 4,635 31 21  327 22 15 -9***
£100,000 - £499,999 2,683 30 19  356 21 15 -9***
£500,000 - £999,999 474 22 17  105 17 17 -5*
£1,000,000 - 
£9,999,999 
810 19 11  183 32 23 13***
£10m + 242 17 8  112 26 15 9**
Whole sample 24,045 24 16  1,566 20 14 4***
Note: Figures rounded to the nearest whole number. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Table 4.6. Correlation between charity age and investigation status, by organisation size 
Organisation size Correlation coefficient (Eta)
£1 - £24,999 .10
£25,000 - £99,999 .18
£100,000 - £499,999 .21
£500,000 - £999,999 .37
£1,000,000 - £9,999,999 .43***
£10m + .55**
Whole sample .08**
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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4.5.2. Modelling the risk of investigation and action 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate analysis, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below contain descriptive 
statistics for the independent variables included in the statistical models. The typical investigated 
charity appears to be slightly younger, less likely to discharge grants or have a parent organisation, 
bigger, more likely to be a company and considerably less likely to just operate at a local level. The 
typical charity subject to regulatory action appears to be slightly smaller, more likely to discharge 
grants, less likely to have been subject to a complaint by a member of the public, more likely to just 
operate at a local level and more likely to be investigated for misconduct concerns.17 
Table 4.7. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of being investigated 
 Not investigated 
(n=20,644)  
Investigated
(n=1,444)
Whole sample
(n=22,088)
Variable Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD
Age (log) 2.86 .91  2.72 .87 2.85 .91
Grant .34 .47  .27 .45 .34 .47
Parent .17 .38  .07 .26 .16 .37
£1 - £24,999 (%) 61 -  29 - 59 -
£10m + (%) 1 -  8 - 2 -
Company (%) 19 -  46 - 21 -
Unincorporated association 
(%) 
55 -  32 - 54 -
Operate locally (%) 46 -  25 - 45 -
Operate overseas (%) 12 -  14 - 12 -
Social services (%) 31 -  26 - 31 -
Culture and recreation (%) 15 -  14 - 15 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. The sample size is smaller compared to that 
reported in Table 4.1 as it only includes observations for which there are no missing values for any of 
the independent variables. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the 
purpose of brevity. 
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Table 4.8. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of regulatory action 
 No regulatory action 
(n=1,110) 
Regulatory action
(n=128)
Whole sample
(n=1,238)
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 2.73 .87 2.72 .73 2.73 .86
Grant .26 .44 .30 .46 .27 .44
Parent .07 .26 .05 .21 .07 .25
Public .48 .50 .41 .49 .48 .50
Misconduct .08 .28 .11 .31 .09 .28
£1 - £24,999 (%) 26 - 27 - 26 -
£10m + (%) 9 - 5 - 8 -
Company (%) 48 - 44 - 48 -
Unincorporated association 
(%) 
30 - 37 - 31 -
Operate locally (%) 23 - 30 - 23 -
Operate overseas (%) 13 - 10 - 13 -
Social services (%) 26 - 27 - 26 -
Culture and recreation (%) 14 - 13 - 14 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. The sample size is reduced as it only 
includes observations for which there are no missing values for any of the independent variables. 
Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
We model the probability of investigation using binary logistic regression as a function of 
organisation size, age, institutional form, field of operations and geographical base.  For the sub-
sample of organisations that were investigated, we then model the probability of regulatory action 
being taken based on the same characteristics plus the source and nature of the complaint made.18 We 
report the odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) rather than the log odds as they approximate the 
relative risk of each outcome occurring. This is appropriate not only for ease of interpretation but 
because the absolute chance of either outcome occurring is low (i.e. it is better to know which 
charities are more likely to be investigated relative to their peers). The category with the most 
observations is chosen as the base category for each nominal independent variable.  
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We present a palimpsest of the modelling process in this section. The appendices for this chapter 
describe the development of multiple models for each dependent variable (e.g. testing for interaction 
effects, examining multiple functional forms of organisation size) and the reader is encouraged to 
consult this material where appropriate. 
Table 4.9. Results of Logistic Regression on each outcome 
 Investigated Regulatory Action
 Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Size (base = £1 - £24,999)  
     £25,000 - £99,999 2.12*** .18 1.50 .39
     £100,000 - £499,999 3.12*** .28 .84 .25
     £500,000 - £999,999 4.36*** .59 1.37 .54
     £1,000,000 - £9,999,999 4.67*** .55 .38* .18
     £10m + 10.29*** 1.60 .82 .42
Age .95 .03 1.02 .13
Grant .77*** .06 1.20 .28
Parent .49*** .06 .51 .24
Public  .83 .17
Misconduct  1.36 .43
Controls Yes Yes
  
Observations 22,088 1,173
Log-likelihood -4738.40 -384.10
LR test (X2) 1192.03*** 40.41
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Constant is omitted. Additional independent variables 
included in the models but not reported above include Field, Form and Geography. *p < .05. **p < 
.01. ***p < .001. 
We first examine the effects of organisation age and size on the outcomes. The coefficient for age 
varies across the two outcomes: a one-unit increase in the log of age results in five percent decrease in 
the odds of being investigated, while there is two percent increase in the odds of regulatory action 
occurring. There appears to be a clear income gradient present in the first model: as organisation size 
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increases so do the odds of being investigated compared to the reference category. A more nuanced 
examination of the effect of organisation size is possible by comparing categories of this variable to 
each other and not just the base category. Drawing on suggestions by Firth (2003), Firth and Menezes 
(2004), and Gayle and Lambert (2007), we employ quasi-variance statistics to ascertain whether 
categories of organisation size were significantly different from each other and not just from the base 
or reference category. Unsurprisingly, the largest charities have significantly higher odds than all 
other categories of size; however it appears that the middle categories (charities with income between 
£100,000 and £1m) are not significantly different from each other and neither are organisations with 
annual gross income between £500,000 and £10m. 
Figure 4.2. Quasi-Variance log odds of being investigated 
 
The effect of size on the likelihood of regulatory action occurring is more opaque by comparison. 
There is no clear gradient, with some categories of size entailing higher odds of the outcome 
occurring and some lower. So while larger organisations have much higher chances of being 
investigated, organisation size does not make a discernible difference to the chance of subsequently 
being subject to regulatory action. 
Next we examine the effects of the remaining independent variables. There are statistically 
significantly lower odds of being investigated for charities that discharge grants or have a parent 
organisation, and significantly higher odds for charities registered as companies. With regards to 
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regulatory action, grant-making bodies and those suspected of misconduct have higher odds, charities 
with parent organisations and complaints raised by members of the public lower odds, and those 
operating on a wider geographical scale also have lower odds, although these coefficients are not 
statistically significant. 
4.5.3. Sensitivity analyses 
With regards to being investigated, we run separate regressions for charities registered in different 
eras (pre-and-post 2006 i.e. the establishment of OSCR) in order to control for the period at risk; that 
is, there may be an initial period in their existence where charities are not likely to be investigated as 
they have just been registered and thus not very identifiable or visible. Table 4.10 presents the results 
of this analysis. The direction of the effect of our two main independent variables – age and size – is 
similar to the main regression: for both cohorts, younger, larger charities have statistically 
significantly higher odds of being investigated.  
Table 4.10. Results of Logistic Regression on the outcome being investigated, by registration era 
 Pre 2006 2006-2013
 Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Size (base = £1 - £24,999)  
     £25,000 - £99,999 2.44*** .23 1.56** .27
     £100,000 - £499,999 3.74*** .39 2.05*** .39
     £500,000 - £999,999 5.89*** .90 1.87 .61
     £1,000,000 - £9,999,999 8.01*** 1.11 1.61 .40
     £10m + 18.98*** 3.99 4.96*** 1.31
Age .79*** .04 .71* .09
Grant .77** .07 .99 .13
Parent .53*** .07 .49* .15
Controls Yes Yes
  
Observations 17,487 4,586
Log-likelihood -3594.79 -384.10
LR test (X2) 1095.31*** 204.07***
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Constant is omitted. Additional independent variables 
included in the models but not reported above include Field, Form and Geography. *p < .05. **p < 
.01. ***p < .001. 
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We also explore the effect of different functional forms of organisation size, leaving the other 
variables unchanged. A one-unit increase in the log of annual gross income results in a significant 
increase in the odds of being investigated and a decrease in the odds of being subject to regulatory 
action. Finally, an interaction term between size and age was included in the model-building process. 
The correlation between age and being investigated is stronger for larger charities, though the 
interaction overall is not statistically significant and thus was not included in the final models. 
4.5.4. Regression diagnostics and goodness of fit 
Both of the models are subjected to a number of diagnostic and goodness-of-fit tests in order to 
examine their degree of fit with the data. The influence of outliers on the estimation of the regression 
coefficients is explored in Figure A4.3 and A4.4 in the appendices. The plots demonstrate that there 
are a number of observations where predicted and observed outcomes differ substantially: there are a 
number of charities that have very low predicted probabilities of experiencing an investigation or 
regulatory intervention even though they have been (residual > 2). However Figure A4.5 and A4.6 
show that there are no cases having an undue influence on the estimation of model coefficients; that 
is, by including observations with high deviance or Pearson residuals, the estimation of the 
coefficients are not very different from a model that does not include these observations. Therefore 
we can conclude that outliers, though existing in the data, do not need to be removed from the 
statistical models. 
We now turn our attention to the various tests that can help us determine whether our models are a 
good fit for the data. Depending on the model fit summary statistic chosen, the proportion of variance 
explained by the model ranges from .04 to .14; this indicates that there is a substantial proportion of 
the variance unaccounted for by the model and unlikely to be the result of stochastic influences. The 
simplest test is to compare the difference in the mean predicted probability of charities that do and do 
not experience the outcomes: better fitting models will increase this difference (Cramer, 2003). There 
are similar mean predicted probabilities for investigated (thirteen percent) and non-investigated 
charities (six percent), and charities that were and were not subjected to regulatory intervention 
(fourteen percent and ten percent respectively). A more detailed examination of the distance between 
expected and observed outcome frequencies is possible using the Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
test (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). This significance test indicates the extent to which a model 
provides a better fit for the data than a model with no predictors; the null hypothesis of this test is that 
there is no difference between the number of observed outcomes and the number predicted by the 
model (e.g. number of investigated charities versus the number predicted by the statistical model). A 
failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the model’s estimates fit the data at an acceptable 
level (Tarling, 2008). The results of the test indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected (p=.000) 
and that the models are not a good fit for the data. However, as Table 4.11 and 4.12 below 
demonstrate, small differences between observed and expected values can be statistically significant 
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in large samples. For instance, the numbers of actual and expected investigated charities are quite 
similar for each probability decile: for low probabilities the model overestimates the number of 
investigated organisations while at higher probabilities it tends to underestimate. The model is very 
good at estimating the number of charities that are not investigated; this is probably due to the small 
difference in the predicted probability of investigation for investigated and non-investigated charities. 
Readers should note that the use of deciles, though standard for this test, is arbitrary and model fit 
could vary depending on changes to the number of quantiles chosen. 
Table 4.11. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit table for outcome of being investigated 
  Investigated  Not investigated  
Decile Probability Actual Expected  Actual Expected Total
1 .0228 45 42.1  2164 2166.9 2209
2 .0253 35 55.6  2266 2245.4 2301
3 .0267 19 54.2  2097 2061.8 2116
4 .0325 61 66.8  2150 2144.2 2211
5 .0382 85 77.0  2130 2138.0 2215
6 .0464 103 94.4  2097 2105.6 2200
7 .0640 147 118.0  2062 2091.0 2209
8 .0936 173 167.7  2035 2040.3 2208
9 .1541 327 265.1  1882 1943.9 2209
10 .5694 448 502.2  1760 1705.8 2208
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Table 4.12. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit table for outcome of regulatory action 
  Action  No Action  
Group Probability Actual Expected  Actual Expected Total
1 .0441 5 4.1  113 113.9 118
2 .0637 7 6.3  110 110.7 117
3 .0771 9 8.2  108 108.8 117
4 .0875 10 9.7  108 108.3 118
5 .0983 13 10.8  104 106.2 117
6 .1133 10 12.1  107 104.9 117
7 .1273 12 14.1  106 103.9 118
8 .1481 11 16.0  106 101.0 117
9 .1765 16 18.7  101 98.3 117
10 .5341 35 27.9  82 89.1 117
 
4.5.5. Predicted probabilities 
The mean predicted probability – expressed in percentage form – of being investigated is 6.5 percent 
and the median 3.8 percent, closely matching the true proportion of investigated charities; the 
minimum and maximum values are one percent and 58 percent respectively. Figure 4.3 below 
displays the distribution of predicted probabilities across two independent variables: charity size and 
age. There appears to be a slight nonlinear association between the predicted probabilities and charity 
age: the probability of being investigated appears to decline as charities move up the age distribution. 
However the patterns are not strong for any category of size and reflect the findings from previous 
descriptive and explanatory work in this chapter. 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of predicted probabilities for being investigated, by charity size and age 
 
The mean predicted probability of regulatory action occurring is eleven percent and the median ten 
percent (the true proportions in the population are thirteen percent and zero percent respectively); the 
minimum and maximum values are one percent and 56 percent respectively. Figure 4.4 below 
displays the distribution of predicted probabilities across two independent variables: charity size and 
age. There appears to be a slight linear association between the predicted probabilities and charity 
age: older organisations have higher probabilities than younger ones for the larger size categories. 
However the patterns are not strong and reflect the findings from previous descriptive and explanatory 
work in this chapter. 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of predicted probabilities for regulatory action, by charity size and age 
 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
This study has investigated the nature, extent, and potential determinants of organisational misconduct 
in the Scottish charity sector. There is a pervading and persistent concern in the UK about the conduct 
of charities, and their ability and intention to provide public benefit, as evidenced by two recent 
parliamentary inquiries. The Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee concluded 
its inquiry into fundraising scandals in the charitable sector in 2015 and this was swiftly followed by 
the House of Lords Select Committee inquiry into strengthening the sector more broadly (the 
committee reported its findings in March 2017). Concurrently, there has been wider consternation 
about levels of public trust in the sector, with various reports and studies pointing to a substantial 
decline in recent years (Charity Commission, 2016; nfpSynergy, 2015). This is not universal however, 
with some studies pointing to fairly stable levels of trust in charities amongst the public in Scotland 
(Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, 2016). We argue that in this context it is more important 
than ever to understand which charities trigger complaints about their conduct, the concerns and 
organisations that merit regulatory intervention, and what form this takes (e.g. advice given or more 
serious action). 
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This research contributes to the nascent charity misconduct literature, and the wider study of failure 
and accountability in the sector, in a number of important ways. First, by describing the nature and 
extent of perceived and actual misconduct, this study provides the first systematic, comprehensive 
description of this phenomenon, producing an evidence base of use to the field, policy makers and 
practitioners. Second, the results of the multivariate analysis point to the factors associated with 
charity investigation and misconduct, showing the mismatch between those predicting complaints and 
those predicting regulatory action. This has considerable implications for charity regulators seeking to 
deploy their limited resources effectively and in a way that ultimately protects and enhances public 
confidence. As Fremont-Smith (2004) notes in her comprehensive account of charity governance, 
charity regulators (particularly in the US) often lack the funds to carry out their enforcement activities 
properly, and thus would stand to benefit from analyses that help them target their resources more 
efficiently. Finally, the descriptive and explanatory work combined offer a complementary 
perspective on the extant literature by focusing on public and regulatory accounts of misconduct 
rather than self-reported instances or media stories (e.g. Archambeault et al., 2015; Gibelman & 
Gelman, 2001).  
The findings suggest there is an element of predictability to the types of charities that are suspected of 
misconduct. The most prominent and consistent risk factor is the size of the organisation: as size 
increases the likelihood of being investigated increases sharply, even when controlling for other 
organisational characteristics. The largest charities, those with annual gross income of greater than 
£10m, are significantly likelier to be investigated compared to all other sizes.  However it is not yet 
clear that organisation size is a causal or explanatory factor in being investigated; it more plausibly 
acts as a proxy for the ‘true’ explanatory factor. This is supported by the disparity in the effect of 
organisation size between the likelihood of being investigated and the likelihood of that investigation 
leading to regulatory action. Our analysis suggests that organisation size is strongly predictive of 
complaints, but that those complaints are no more likely to lead to regulatory action in large charities 
than small ones. The triggering of an investigation could be perhaps best understood as a function of 
two other concepts: visibility and high stakes. Larger charities are more likely on average to deliver 
services to a greater number of beneficiaries, operate across a greater number of geographies, interact 
with the public on a greater scale (e.g. through fundraising campaigns) and involve more staff and 
volunteers than smaller organisations (de Andrés-Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez & Romero-Merino, 2015; 
Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). As a result they can be highly visible to many of the actors that initiate 
investigations (a negative consequence of having a recognisable brand perhaps). The degree to which 
actors perceive there is great deal at stake, in terms of the risk to charitable assets and beneficiaries, 
may also prompt complaints. Larger charities are often responsible for more valuable assets and 
services (in a monetary sense) compared to their smaller counterparts and this may spur an actor to 
report a complaint ‘just to be safe’, with little regard to the substance of the concern. It is more 
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difficult to theorise about the explanatory factors of actual misconduct occurring, mainly due to the 
absence of appropriate measures in the data. However two plausible dimensions to the phenomenon 
on the organisational side are opportunity and controls. The degree to which charities feel that there is 
an opportunity to conduct themselves in a way that is not compliant with public expectations and 
regulatory requirements may be a powerful predictor of organisational misconduct. Finally, the 
strength of appropriate governance and financial controls may reveal which charities are hosts for 
employee, and by extension, organisational misconduct. These dimensions have received some 
attention in the nonprofit occupational fraud literature (e.g. Rothschild, 2013). 
There are a number of limitations to this research that must be acknowledged. Organisation size and 
age traditionally function as control variables in many studies and are good examples of the kinds of 
measures inherent in administrative data. These datasets tend to contain coarser or proxy measures of 
social science concepts compared to the richness of social surveys and as such there are organisational 
characteristics which may be important in measuring risk that are not captured in the administrative 
data (Wallgren & Wallgren, 2007). We are working under the assumption that OSCR’s decision to 
take regulatory action is valid and thus we do not analyse their decision-making process; there are 
instances when they reverse their decision in light of new evidence or appeals from the charity (see 
Third Sector, 2014b). Finally, the investigations data utilised in this study should not be considered as 
a complete record of complaints and misconduct in the sector. Many actors may be unwilling for a 
number of reasons to raise their concerns with the regulator: for example, they may be unaware of to 
whom the complaint should be directed to or fearful of repercussions should they lodge their 
complaint (see Hogg, 2016). Rothschild’s (2013) study of misconduct reporting in the US nonprofit 
sector posits that whistle-blowers observe misconduct several times before eventually deciding to 
report this behaviour; the same study also found that whistle-blowers were subject to retaliation by the 
organisation in a majority of cases. On the organisational side, some charities may be particularly 
adept at masking their misconduct from those able and willing to raise concerns. Therefore the 
findings of this study should be considered in the context of other data sources covering this topic 
such as media investigations and parliamentary inquiries. 
Despite these limitations, the results of this analysis have considerable practical applications for 
stakeholders in the sector, particularly regulators and those with a monitoring function. OSCR aims to 
discharge its regulatory function in a progressive, proportionate and preventative manner, and the 
efficient and effective targeting of its resources is critical in achieving this. Utilising the predicted 
probabilities generated by the models to assign risk categories to charities and investigations could 
guide the allocation of scarce regulatory resources, and achieve Cordery, Sim and van Zijl’s (2015) 
call for a differentiated approach to charity regulation in this regard. Implementing such an approach 
requires regulators to be cognizant of the disconnect between complaints and misconduct. Our 
analysis shows that regulators have significant challenges in separating the ‘signal’ (complaints about 
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charities engaged in serious misconduct) from the ‘noise’ (complaints outside the remit of the 
regulator, or not leading to regulatory action). Discontent at all levels can have an impact on trust in 
the sector, and so the answer is not simply to try to reduce complaints.  Rather, better guidance for 
charities on handling complaints within their own governance structures could reduce the number of 
unresolved issues that make it to the regulator. Just as important is increasing the proportion of 
plausible or legitimate concerns that are reported to OSCR, and making sure that stakeholders with 
serious concerns about misconduct are able and willing to make complaints to the regulator. 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, administrative data can help us describe and understand 
fundamental risk issues in the Scottish charity sector. The types of concerns reported to OSCR are 
consistent with the claim that the type of risks faced by charities is broad, and the wide range of 
stakeholders that report reinforce the importance of public confidence to the perception of charities. 
This point is further substantiated by the clear disconnect between the number of concerns raised and 
the number that are acted on by OSCR. We have also explored the locus of risk in the sector, using a 
suite of organisational characteristics to pinpoint the type of charity that is most at risk of 
investigation and/or regulatory action. The relevance of this analysis to OSCR’s risk framework is 
discussed in the final chapter. For now our attention turns to a dataset derived from OSCR’s attempts 
to proactively identify risk in the sector, in particular how the regulator holds charities to account for 
their financial, governance and fundraising practices.  
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Chapter Five – Accountability Matters 
5.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter highlighted the value of analysing data on how OSCR responds and reacts to 
concerns raised by a variety of stakeholders. However, this empirical examination could only give a 
partial representation of risk in the sector; for example, we were not able to explore specific financial 
risks like liquidity or reserves issues, or inappropriate use of charitable assets. To address this gap we 
employ a different administrative dataset, one generated by OSCR’s proactive attempts to hold 
charities to account for an alternative, complementary set of behaviours to those analysed in Chapter 
Four. This chapter builds on the analysis contained in the previous chapter by exploring the degree of 
association between OSCR’s accountability measures and being subject to regulatory investigation 
and action. The following paragraphs outline the context of the empirical work presented in this 
chapter. 
Concerns have long been raised about the accountability of charitable organisations, particularly the 
adequacy of reporting and oversight mechanisms (Acar, Guo & Yang, 2008; Keating & Frumkin, 
2003; Saxton & Guo, 2011). As Brody (2002, p. 472) attests, the charity sector’s claims “to exist for 
the public good are no longer being taken on faith, and more people believe they have a stake in the 
accountability of nonprofits.” Researchers have ascribed the increasing interest in accountability to 
two prominent factors: the size and significance of the sector in many jurisdictions – particularly with 
respect to the level of public funding flowing to charities – and low barriers to entry (Connolly, 
Hyndman & McConville, 2013; Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). These developments have, they argue, 
resulted in greater potential for less trustworthy organisations to enter the sector.  
In response to calls for greater accountability “there have been several recent initiatives, both 
regulatory and voluntary, to encourage and promote UK charity accountability (accountability being 
the requirement to be answerable for one’s conduct and responsibilities) through information 
communication.” (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013a, p. 946) In Scotland, OSCR now publishes links to 
charity accounts on their website and organisations are encouraged to contact OSCR regarding what 
are known as ‘notifiable events’ (e.g. instances of theft or fraud). OSCR also implements a 
programme of accountability aimed at unearthing potential vulnerabilities and financial conduct issues 
in the sector. Examining this programme can help address some theoretical and empirical gaps in our 
understanding of charity risk and accountability: how is accountability conceptualised and 
operationalised by those overseeing the sector? What factors account for the variation in which 
organisations trigger accountability concerns? The chapter is structured as follows. The charity 
accountability and regulation literatures are synthesised to provide a conceptual framework for the 
research topic. This is followed by a description of OSCR’s efforts to monitor accountability 
concerns. A delineation of the data and methods is then provided, followed by the presentation of 
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empirical results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications 
of the study. 
5.2. Literature 
Bovens (2007, p. 452) defines accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum in which 
the actor is obliged to explain and justify his conduct; the forum can pose questions; pass judgment; 
and the actor may face consequences.” Romzek and Dubnick (1987) claim that accountability is 
fundamentally about the management of expectations on the part of the account-giver and account-
holder. Accountability is often posited as the solution to many of the problems in the public sector 
(Dubnick, 2011) and there are various normative reasons why accountability occurs: it addresses 
information asymmetry between a principal and an agent; it is way of containing agency losses; it can 
ensure that agents adhere to their mandate; and the agent feels it has a moral duty to discharge 
accountability (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016). It is a multidimensional concept and the literature as it 
relates to charities identifies two that are of particular importance: fiduciary accountability and 
performance accountability (Brody, 2002; Connolly & Hyndman, 2004; Goodin, 2003). Performance 
accountability itself has two dimensions which are worth delineating in the context of this study: 
process accountability (e.g. the administration of the charity, its decision-making framework) and 
substantive accountability (e.g. the outputs, outcomes, and impact of a charity with respect to its 
mission-driven goals and objectives) (Frumkin, 2006; Saxton & Guo, 2011). Andreaus and Costa 
(2014) bifurcate the substantive dimension further: mission-related performance and social-related 
performance (i.e. the impact of a charity’s activities on each of its stakeholders in terms of the implied 
or explicit social contract between them). A key aspect of social performance in the UK sector is the 
provision of public benefit. There is a symbiotic relationship between these dimensions: economic 
viability and efficiency are not ends in themselves but it is arguable that charities will find it difficult 
to achieve their mission in the absence of either; successful achievement of mission-related goals may 
also lead to viability and efficiency. Similarly, wider social or public benefit cannot be assumed a 
priori and is indelibly linked to the achievement of a charity’s mission-related goals and objectives; 
likewise the requirement to provide public benefit gives legitimacy to the organisation’s mission. 
Despite their public benefit requirement and production of beneficial externalities, “in recent years 
nonprofit organizations are required to prove that their public interest orientation still remains the 
case.” (Valentinov, 2011, p. 32) It is often argued that the continued success of the charity sector 
depends not only on its economic and social activities but also on its ability to demonstrate 
accountability and transparency, which in turn can protect and enhance public confidence (Connolly 
& Hyndman, 2013b; Cordery & Morgan, 2013; Keating & Frumkin, 2003; Morgan, 2012). 
Valentinov (2011) contends that charity accountability is contingent on addressing two major 
questions: accountability to whom; and accountability for what. With respect to the second question, 
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Taylor and Rosair (2000), Behn (2001), Brody (2002), Goodin (2003), and Connolly and Hyndman 
(2004) have made substantial contributions, with their work converging on the need for charities to 
discharge two dimensions of accountability: fiduciary and performance. Traditionally, charities have 
discharged accountability through the disclosure of financial information and efficiency metrics in 
annual accounts and reports submitted to the relevant oversight body. However, there are increasing 
calls for these organisations to discharge accountability through the provision of alternative, non-
financial narratives of performance (Britton, 2008; Connolly, Hyndman & McConville, 2013; Keating 
& Frumkin, 2003; Philips, 2013). Considerable research has also been conducted on to whom 
charities should be accountable. Prominent in the literature is work examining the manner and content 
of accountability to beneficiaries (Wellens & Jegers, 2016) and the public (Morgan & Fletcher, 2013), 
particularly in the context of voluntary disclosures of financial information (Saxton, Kuo & Ho, 
2012). 
Much of the empirical work in this field focuses on a specific aspect of charity accountability: 
transparency. This refers to the provision of information by a charity to one or more stakeholders, 
often without the expectation of facilitating dialogue and discussion about said information. Early 
contributions by Hyndman (1990, 1991) established a methodology and conceptual framework for 
research on charity transparency; the author examined the annual reports and reviews of the top 100 
fundraising charities in the UK and produced a checklist of 14 information types that charities either 
did or should provide to donors in order to discharge accountability. This work was revisited by 
Connolly and Hyndman (2013) in their mixed methods study of information disclosure by the top 100 
fundraising charities in the UK; they found that respondents felt donors and beneficiaries respectively 
are the stakeholders charities are most accountable to. The scholarly focus on charity accountability 
bifurcated in the early 2000s. One strand examined the discharge of financial information through 
compliance with the Statement of Recommended Practice (Connolly & Hyndman, 2000, 2001; 
Palmer et al., 2001); these studies found that accountability through financial disclosure had improved 
but was variable across different types of charities and jurisdictions (e.g. Ireland and Britain). The 
other strand analysed the nature and extent of financial and non-financial (narrative) information 
discharged by charities through their annual reports and reviews (Connolly & Dhanani, 2006, 2009; 
Connolly & Hyndman, 2003, 2004; Dhanani, 2009; Hyndman & McConville, 2015; Morgan & 
Fletcher, 2013; Yasmin, Haniffa & Hudaib, 2014). These studies consistently reveal that performance 
reporting has improved over time, larger charities are more likely than their smaller counterparts to 
discharge this type of information and there is a lack of transparency of judgement-based performance 
information (e.g. impact of the charity).  
Recent studies have shifted emphasis to uncovering the factors associated with a charity’s willingness 
to voluntarily disclose information through online media. Saxton and Guo (2011) posited that 
variation in the web-based accountability practices of charities was accounted for by a theoretical 
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model comprising four factors (eight variables): strategy (geographical scope of operations and 
unrestricted reserves), capacity (organisation size and age), governance (financial stewardship and 
board performance) and environment (regional poverty and organisational density). Eight hypotheses 
were derived from this model and tested on a sample of 117 community foundations in the U.S. Their 
findings suggest that governance and capacity are the most significant factors in accounting for 
variation in online accountability (i.e. disclosure of financial information via a website). Saxton, Kuo 
and Ho (2012) extended this model by employing alternative measures for some of the four factors 
and applying the framework to the population of not-for-profit hospitals in Taiwan (N=40). The 
authors found that “the larger the institution, the greater the financial leverage, the smaller the size of 
the board, and the higher the percentage of outside board members, the less likely it is that an 
institution will voluntarily disclose its financial information.” (Saxton et al., 2012, p. 1066) Tremblay-
Boire and Prakash (2015) also examine the determinants of online accountability by U.S. nonprofits 
but derive alternative explanatory factors from the literatures of organisational legitimacy and 
stakeholder theory; they posit that media exposure, sector, organisation size, and government funding 
are predictors of online information disclosure. Their results suggest that organisations subject to 
greater media exposure and who operate in the education, health or religious sectors are more likely to 
engage in online accountability, while larger nonprofits are less likely. In their study of Chinese 
foundations, Nie, Liu and Cheng (2016) employ variables derived from resource dependence and 
institutional theory perspectives to examine variation in voluntary disclosure. The authors find that – 
after controlling for organisation size, age, type and managerial capacity – “foundations with greater 
dependence on donations and restricted funds are more likely to disclose information to the public 
voluntarily as a means of satisfying resource providers.” (Nie et al., 2016, p. 2397) What unites this 
broad, multidisciplinary literature is the salience of accountability in the continuing success of 
charities. As Frumkin (2006, p. 9) contends: “It is impossible to be legitimate without being 
substantively accountable. It is impossible to be substantively accountable without credible measures 
of effectiveness.” The next section outlines the particular accountability mechanism through which 
OSCR identifies and monitors financial risks in the sector; though involuntary in nature, the 
mechanism draws upon much of the same information as the studies highlighted in this literature 
review.  
5.3. Monitoring Accountability Concerns 
In order to hold charities to account for certain aspects of their behaviour, OSCR implements what it 
calls a financial exceptions programme; this differs from its interventionist, enforcement activities 
(like those analysed in Chapter Four) in that the focus is on establishing standards and proactively 
identifying vulnerabilities (e.g. errors, transgressions and risks) in a charity’s financial profile. The 
programme examines 32 aspects of a charity’s financial status that may warrant further investigation 
and/or regulatory action; there is a particular focus on issues concerning fundraising, governance and 
 83 
 
compliance with regulation. The financial exceptions are grouped under six headings: large charity or 
major fundraiser; sudden growth or contraction; possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
(including fundraising issues); poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability; adequacy of governing 
board; and transactions with trustees – see Table A5.1 and A5.2 in the appendices for a detailed list of 
the exceptions in each group. Exceptions are triggered automatically during the submission of a 
charity’s annual accounts; if this occurs the organisation is immediately informed and offered the 
opportunity to provide an explanation. OSCR then decides whether this explanation is valid and, in 
tandem with a fuller review of the charity’s accounts and annual report, if the exception requires 
further investigation. The financial exceptions programme does not apply to charities with an annual 
gross income less than £25,000, Registered Social Landlords and Cross Border charities (these 
organisations are primarily subject to regulation by the Scottish Housing Regulator and the Charity 
Commission for England & Wales respectively). 
Despite the proliferation of credible work in this area, our understanding of the nature, extent, factors 
and outcomes of charity accountability is limited (Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Extant research is 
characterised by a focus on a dominant stakeholder to whom charities are accountable (donors); small, 
non-random samples drawn from subsections of the charity sector (e.g. community foundations, 
charities that derive the majority of their income from donations); a small number of accountability 
mechanisms (e.g. charity websites and reports); and homogeneity of research method (e.g. content 
analysis). In this context, we seek to advance the field by focusing on an instrumental form of upward 
accountability to the regulator in contrast to studies of accountability to donors, beneficiaries and the 
public (e.g. Morgan & Fletcher, 2013; Saxton, et al., 2012; Wellens & Jegers, 2016). Finally, our 
research makes a significant contribution to the evidence base on charities in the UK, particularly with 
respect to understanding the financial risks and concerns prevalent in the sector. 
5.4. Method 
This study overcomes many of the limitations outlined previously by linking three of our 
administrative data resources to provide a panel dataset of 21,322 observations on 5,124 charities over 
the period 2007-2013: Annual Returns data, Financial Exceptions data, and Investigations data. Some 
additional data management work was conducted to ensure these linked data were suitable for 
analysing the topic at hand. For instance, a limitation of the Annual Returns data is that detailed 
financial breakdowns are available for a subset of the sector; therefore, we include only charities that 
are required to complete the supplemental monitoring form and have an annual gross income of 
£250,000 (£100,000 prior to 2012). This results in the loss of some instances of financial exceptions 
being triggered, as charities with less than the specified income threshold are no longer included in the 
data (e.g. some instances of exceptions relating to fundraising and governance in smaller 
organisations are excluded). Table 5.1 summarises the steps in the sample selection process. 
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Table 5.1. Charity accountability dataset: sample selection process 
Sample selection Observations
Initial sample (Annual Returns data) 155,416 (28,093 charities)
   Removal of observations that did not provide a 
detailed financial breakdown in the supplementary 
monitoring form in a particular year – those with 
annual gross income less than £250,000 (£100,000 
prior to 2012) 
129,708
   Removal of observations not included in analysis 
period 
808
   Removal of observations listed as Cross Border or 
Registered Social Landlords 
4,231
Final sample 21,322 (5,124 charities)
Note: the final sample size presented in this table is used for the descriptive analyses; the inferential 
analyses necessitate further reductions in the sample size due to the removal of observations which 
have missing values for any of the independent variables included in the statistical models. 
Contributing to the literature on charity accountability we address three research questions: 
1. What is the nature and extent of OSCR-defined accountability concerns in the Scottish charity 
sector? 
2. What factors account for variation in the triggering of these concerns? 
3. Is there a link between accountability concerns and negative organisational outcomes? 
To answer these questions we employ factors derived from institutional theory that are common in 
studies of charity accountability to serve as the conceptual framework for the study. Organisation size, 
age, type, strategy and revenue concentration have all been found to be associated with variation in 
the accountability behaviour of charities (Saxton & Guo, 2011; Saxton et al., 2012; Tremblay-Boire & 
Prakash, 2015). The operationalisation of this framework is outlined in the following paragraphs. 
5.4.1. Dependent and independent variables 
For the descriptive analysis six binary indicator variables are examined – one for each of the 
exception groups: a value of 1 indicates that an observation experienced this exception and 0 if it did 
not. Tabulations and sequence analysis techniques are employed to analyse trends over time for the 
exception groups. For the multivariate analysis, two of the exception groups are employed as the 
dependent variables: (i) possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes and (ii) poor liquidity, 
low reserves, threats to viability. This is for statistical reasons as well as substantive: they are the most 
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common exception groups and therefore possess a suitable number of observations for inclusion in 
statistical modelling; and these groups are of most concern to the regulator due to their inherent 
association with financial vulnerability and impropriety, and therefore also with public confidence. 
For the regression models the reference category of the indicator variables is altered: a value of 1 
indicates that an observation experienced this exception and 0 represents an observation that never 
triggered an exception of any type. This alteration is necessary in order to create a homogenous 
reference group, as otherwise an observation with the value 0 could represent a charity that 
experienced a different exception or no exception at all. This data management step results in a 
reduction in the sample sizes of the models, but it enables us to compare charities that experience 
exceptions and those that do not. In order to leverage the longitudinal nature of the data, a random 
effects logistic regression model was specified.19 
Drawing on the reviewed literature, we operationalise seven independent variables for the statistical 
models: six organisational and one financial (see Table 5.2). As many of the exceptions are derived by 
computing ratios of numerous financial attributes, it would be unwise to include more financial 
variables for multicollinearity and causal reasons. Though theoretical models of the determinants of 
accountability exist (see Saxton & Guo, 2011; Saxton et al., 2012), they seek to explain voluntary 
disclosure by nonprofits and thus are not considered appropriate for this analysis; it is also not 
possible to employ these models as intended due to the absence of appropriate measures in the dataset 
(e.g. board size). 
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Table 5.2. Accountability: conceptual framework 
Factor Variable Operationalisation 
Financial Concentration Revenue concentration of a charity. Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) on a scale of 0-1; 0 is 
more concentrated, 1 is less. 
   
Organisational Size Natural log of annual gross income. 
 Age Natural log of the number of years a charity has 
existed. 
 Grant 1 = Disburses grants to other organisations 
0 = Carries out charitable activities itself or a 
combination of functions 
 Field International Classification of Non-profit 
Organisations (e.g. Social Services). 
Nominal variable with 12 categories. 
 Geography Geographical scope of a charity’s operations (e.g. 
Local). 
Nominal variable with 8 categories. 
 Form Constitutional form of a charity (e.g. Trust). 
Nominal variable with 9 categories. 
 
5.5. Results 
The median organisation in the sample does not receive any income from government funding or 
trading activities, spends £230,391 on conducting its charitable activities and £4,200 on governance 
costs, has £129,909 in unrestricted funds (reserves), and has been in existence for 21 years. In contrast 
the mean charity receives £1,039,762 and £135,133 in income from government funding and trading 
activities respectively, spends £2,044,046 on conducting its charitable activities and £17,306 on 
governance costs, has £2,056,464 in reserves, and has been in existence for 31 years. These figures 
point to a sector that is skewed by large, well-established charities that possess greater resources than 
their peers; the heterogeneous nature of the sector is a fact that readers should keep in mind during the 
presentation and discussion of the empirical analysis. 
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A little of over 60 percent of charities (42 percent of observations) in the sample triggered at least one 
financial exception over the period 2007-2013. For organisations that experienced an exception, it is 
likely that they will trigger more than one over the whole period: the mean number of exceptions is 9 
(SD 10) and the median is 8. However, charities that do experience exceptions tend to only trigger a 
small number per annum: the mean number of exceptions is 2 (SD 1) and the median is 1. 
5.5.1. Trends over time 
Table 5.3 displays the distribution of exception groups over time. A possible failure to apply funds for 
charitable purposes is the most common exception group: the majority of the 22 percent of 
observations that experienced this exception triggered concerns relating to the cost of raising funds 
and expenditure on charitable activities (exception codes 5 and 8 respectively). There is some 
evidence of financial vulnerability in the sector, with at least 13 percent of charities in any particular 
year triggering exception codes relating to poor liquidity, low reserves, and threats to viability; there 
is a more even distribution of exception codes in this category, with concerns relating to debtors and 
creditors (codes 13 and 14 respectively) being slightly more common than other exceptions. There 
appears to be no association between each type of exception and the year in which it occurred 
(gamma<0.1, p<.001): the proportion of charities triggering each exception group does not vary 
substantially over time or from the average for the whole period. The increases for 2012 and 2013 
across some of the exception groups are accounted for by a change in the denominator (i.e. a 
reduction in the number of organisations completing the detailed financial information section of the 
supplementary monitoring form).
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Table 5.3. Distribution of financial exceptions 2007-2013 
 % of charities
Type of exception  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall
Possible failure to apply funds 
for charitable purposes 
25 22 20 21 21 22 23 22
Poor liquidity, low reserves, 
threats to viability 
15 13 14 14 14 16 16 14
Transactions with trustees 10 10 10 10 9 12 10 10
Large charity or major 
fundraiser 
6 6 6 6 6 13 12 7
Sudden growth or contraction 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 2
Adequacy of governing board 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
Total 100 
(n=3,386)  
100 
(n=3,563)
100
(n=3,491)
100
(n=3,496)
100
(n=3,604)
100
(n=1,872)
100
(n=1,910)
100
(n=21,322)
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 100.
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Table 5.4 presents the distribution of the number of times a charity experienced each exception group, 
only for those organisations that triggered the respective exception at least once. The results suggest 
that there is some degree of repetition. For instance, twenty percent of charities that trigger concerns 
relating to a possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes do so in four or more years; similar 
distributions are found for the other exception groups besides sudden growth or contraction. In fact, a 
majority of charities that trigger a particular exception are likely to do so more than once, with the 
exception of sudden growth or contraction and adequacy of the governing board. 
Table 5.4. Distribution of the number of instances of exception groups 
 % of observations
Number of 
instances 
Large 
charity or 
major 
fundraiser 
Sudden 
growth or 
contraction 
Possible 
failure to 
apply funds 
for charitable 
purposes 
Poor 
liquidity, low 
reserves, 
threats to 
viability
Adequacy 
of 
governing 
board
Transactions 
with trustees
1 28 83 45 43 57 35
2 10 16 23 23 13 15
3 6 1 13 13 8 8
4 6 - 10 7 9 9
5 7 - 6 6 4 11
6 8 - 2 4 3 9
7 35 - 2 4 7 13
Total 100 
(n=1,876) 
100 
(n=336) 
100 
(n=5,054) 
100
(n=3,486)
100
(n=371)
100
(n=2,401)
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 100. 
For the sector as a whole it appears that exceptions persist over time. Adopting a repeated cross-
sectional perspective is limited however, as it does not reveal whether it is the same charities 
triggering these exceptions across the study period. In order to examine persistence and transitions we 
construct a balanced panel of charities (n=1,398): that is, organisations that completed the annual 
return for every year in the analysis period.20 Figures A5.1 to A5.6 in the appendices display the 
results of a sequence analysis for each exception group. To make the sequences clearer, charities that 
never trigger these exception groups are excluded. The X axis represents charities’ exception 
sequences and the Y axis lists the number of charities that have triggered this exception. It is clear that 
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a small proportion of charities repeatedly trigger these accountability concerns and that exception 
sequences are somewhat turbulent (i.e. repeatedly varying between states over time); however, this 
proportion varies across the exception groups, with a substantial number of charities repeatedly or 
constantly triggering exceptions linked to transactions with trustees relative to other groups. The 
presence of a minor yet significant degree of persistence is particularly troubling for accountability 
concerns relating to complying with the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005; for 
example, transactions with trustees constituting excess private benefit and thus jeopardising the 
organisation’s charity status. Examining the transition matrices for the exceptions groups also reveal 
an element of dependency in the triggering of an accountability concern (Table 5.6). The likeliest 
transition is dependent on a charity’s current exception status: if it has not triggered an exception at 
time t then it most likely will not experience the exception at time t+1 and vice versa. For example, 
there is a 61 percent chance that a charity, having triggered a concern relating to poor liquidity, low 
reserves and threats to viability at time t, will trigger the same exception at time t+1. This is true for 
all groups with the understandable exception of triggering concerns relating to sudden growth or 
contraction, where the likeliest transition is to not experiencing this exception. In conclusion, it 
appears that there is a degree of persistence among charities that trigger these accountability concerns. 
The posited determinants of triggering accountability concerns are modelled in the next section. 
Table 5.6. Probability of transitioning to triggering an exception 
 Probability of triggering exception at t+1
Triggered 
exception 
at t 
Large 
charity or 
major 
fundraiser 
Sudden 
growth or 
contraction 
Possible 
failure to 
apply funds 
for charitable 
purposes 
Poor 
liquidity, low 
reserves, 
threats to 
viability
Adequacy 
of 
governing 
board
Transactions 
with trustees
No .25 .15 .26 .25 .16 .23
Yes .89 .18 .55 .61 .63 .80
5.5.2. Modelling the risk of triggering accountability concerns 
Before turning to the multivariate results, Tables 5.7 and 5.8 below contain descriptive statistics for 
each of the dependent variables in the inferential analysis. For exceptions relating to the possible 
failure to apply funds for charitable purposes, the typical charity appears to be slightly bigger, 
younger, more likely to discharge grants, more likely to operate overseas and less likely to be a 
religious organisation. For exceptions relating to poor liquidity, low reserves and threats to viability, 
the typical charity appears to be slightly bigger, younger, and more likely to operate both overseas and 
locally.  Tables A5.3 and A5.4 in the appendices examine zero-order correlations between the 
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independent and dependent variables: there is no obvious concern about multicollinearity, which is 
confirmed by the mean VIF being less than 1.5 for both dependent variables.21 
Table 5.7. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of possible failure to apply funds for charitable 
purposes 
 Triggered 
(n=1,807) 
 Not triggered
(n=2,850)
Whole sample
(n=4,657)
Variables Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD
Size (log) 13.81 1.74  12.76 1.00 13.17 1.43
Age (log) 3.07 .88  3.19 .79 3.14 .83
Concentration .29 .22  .31 .22 .30 .22
Grant .40 .49  .27 .44 .32 .47
Company (%) 52 -  55 - 54 -
Trust (%) 19 -  12 - 15 -
Unincorporated association (%) 17 -  26 - 22 -
Operate widely (%) 16 -  26 - 22 -
Operate locally (%) 23 -  26 - 25 -
Operate overseas (%) 23 -  13 - 17 -
Social services (%) 13 -  24 - 20 -
Religion (%) 19 -  22 - 21 -
Culture & recreation (%) 18 -  14 - 15 -
Education & research (%) 17 -  7 - 11 -
Development & housing (%) 14 -  11 - 12 -
Health (%) 4 -  7 - 6 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. The sample size is smaller compared to that 
reported in Table 5.1 as it only includes observations for which there are no missing values for any of 
the independent variables, and the use of our dependent variables rather than those used in the 
descriptive analyses. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the purpose 
of brevity.
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Table 5.8. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
 Triggered 
(n=1,408) 
 Not triggered
(n=1,632)
Whole sample
(n=3,040)
Variables M SD  M SD M SD
Size 13.54 1.51  12.89 1.05 13.19 1.32
Age 3.01 .83  3.09 .77 3.05 .80
Revenue concentration .28 .22  .28 .23 .28 .22
Grant .39 .49  .37 .48 .38 .48
Company (%) 58 -  62 - 60 -
Trust (%) 20 -  19 - 19 -
Unincorporated association (%) 14 -  13 - 14 -
Operate widely (%) 19 -  26 - 23 -
Operate locally (%) 21 -  17 - 19 -
Operate overseas (%) 21 -  13 - 16 -
Social services (%) 13 -  17 - 15 -
Religion (%) 15 -  14 - 14 -
Culture and recreation (%) 22 -  20 - 21 -
Education & research (%) 16 -  15 - 15 -
Development & housing (%) 16 -  10 - 13 -
Health (%) 3 -  4 - 4 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. The sample size is smaller compared to that 
reported in Table 5.1 as it only includes observations for which there are no missing values for any of 
the independent variables, and the use of our dependent variables rather than those used in the 
descriptive analyses. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the purpose 
of brevity. 
The results of the random effects models are presented in Table 5.9. Note that the coefficients in a 
random effects regression have a more nuanced interpretation than a regular regression model: X1 
represents the average change in Y when X1 changes across time and between cases (Torres, 2007). 
We report the odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) rather than the log odds as they approximate the 
relative risk of triggering each exception. We examine the financial independent variable first. For 
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both dependent variables, the odds of triggering an exception decrease for organisations with greater 
revenue diversity, though the effect is only statistically significant in the first model. The effect of age 
is similar across both models: as charities get older their odds of triggering these exceptions reduce 
significantly. This may suggest some form of organisational learning whereby charities develop better 
practices over time across a range of domains (e.g. reporting and accounting). The effect of size is 
also consistent across both models: an increase in annual gross income is associated with a significant 
increase in the odds of triggering concerns. This stands in contrast to the interpretation of the effect of 
age: charities develop over time but they may become exposed to different pressures and situations 
that relate to exceptions as they grow. It also appears that the other independent variables matter, 
though their effect and significance varies across the models. For example, grant-making charities 
have higher odds of triggering exceptions relating to the use of charitable assets but lower odds for 
those relating to financial vulnerability. Finally, the rho statistic reveals that a large proportion of the 
variance of the error term in the models is accounted for by unobserved differences between charities. 
This suggests that the idiosyncrasies of these organisations contribute to their likelihood of triggering 
exceptions. 
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Table 5.9. Results of Logistic Random Effects Regression on each outcome 
 Possible failure to apply 
funds for charitable purposes
Poor liquidity, low reserves, 
threats to viability
 Odds ratio SE Odds ratio SE
Financial  
     Concentration .30*** .09 .79 .28
Organisational  
     Size 2.94*** .22 2.34*** .19
     Age .61*** .07 .62*** .08
     Grant 1.87** .36 .86 .18
     Form (base = Company)  
          Trust 2.14** .53 1.93* .52
          Unincorporated 1.10 .27 2.63** .87
     Geography (base = Wide)  
          Operate locally 1.91** .45 2.75*** .76
          Operate overseas 2.04* .59 5.77*** 1.88
     ICNPO (base = Social)  
          Religion 3.45*** 1.03 1.60 .58
          Culture & recreation 3.87*** 1.07 1.38 .41
          Education & research 3.27*** 1.07 .92 .31
          Development & housing 3.53*** 1.04 3.43*** 1.15
          Health .77 .29 .39 .20
Observations 4,522 2,949
Log-likelihood -2301.03 -1672.65
LR test (X2) 302.47*** 161.14***
rho .65 .59
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. The reference groups are the largest categories for each 
independent variable. Only selected categories from the nominal variables are included for the 
purpose of brevity. Constant is omitted. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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5.5.3. Outcomes of financial exceptions 
The analysis concludes with an assessment of the association between the exception groups and a 
suite of negative outcomes in the sector: late submission of annual returns and accounts; complaint 
about the conduct of an organisation; regulatory intervention arising as a result of a complaint; and 
removal from the Charity Register. Table 5.10 below presents the higher-order correlations between 
each exception group and the four outcomes, controlling for the independent variables utilised in the 
regression models. The results show that the exception groups are very weakly associated with any of 
the outcomes (Pearson’s r <= 0.1); the fact that the associations, weak as they are, achieve statistical 
significance is due to the size of the sample (n = 20,179) and not the size of the correlation. The lack 
of association is especially surprising for exceptions relating to sudden growth/contraction or threats 
to viability, as it is plausible that they should be associated with organisational demise, echoing the 
findings of the previous chapter.  In sum, though accountability concerns may be important to monitor 
in their own right, in general they do not seem to lead to other, arguably more serious organisational 
outcomes. The implications of this finding are considered in more detail in the discussion and 
conclusion section of this chapter and also in Chapter Eight, where we compare and contrast with 
similar results from the financial vulnerability analyses. 
Table 5.10. Correlation between accountability concerns and negative outcomes 
Exception group 
Late 
submission Complaint
Regulatory 
intervention
Removal from 
Scottish Charity 
Register
Large charity or major fundraiser .03*** .05*** .03*** .06***
Sudden growth or contraction .02** -.01 .01 -.02***
Possible failure to apply funds for 
charitable purposes 
.04*** -.01 .01 -.03***
Poor liquidity, low reserves, 
threats to viability 
.05*** -.01 .00 .02**
Adequacy of governing board .01* -.00 .01 .01
Transactions with trustees .04*** .00 .03*** .04***
Note: Pearson’s r correlations are reported as they allow for the control of the independent variables 
from Table 5.9 when calculating correlation coefficients; similarly low coefficients are produced 
using alternative techniques such as Cramer’s V and phi. Figures rounded to two decimal places. 
Based on 20,179 observations for each correlation. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
Commented [A1]: Need to get n for each of the cells. 
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5.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
OSCR’s aim of encouraging good practice is laudable and clearly grounded in the belief that 
“accountability as a marker sets the stage for accountability as a modifier” (Acar et al., 2008, p. 13). 
However, the absence of any statistical association between the accountability concerns measured by 
OSCR and tangible outcomes such as dissolution and regulatory intervention raises questions about 
the effectiveness of this monitoring programme. In essence, the programme’s normative aims appear 
to lead to symbolic or negligible impact on charity behaviour. 
This study contributes to the burgeoning charity accountability literature in a number of important 
ways. First, by describing patterns in the occurrence and persistence of accountability concerns the 
study makes a contribution to the evidence base from the under-researched UK perspective (Clifford 
& Mohan, 2016). The proportion of charities triggering financial exceptions is consistent across the 
study period and there is evidence of repetition and state dependency also. However, there is still a 
degree of variability in the triggering of exceptions and it does not appear that the same charities 
triggering exceptions fully accounts for the consistent proportions over time. This suggests that the 
accountability concerns monitored by OSCR are somewhat an inherent feature of the sector, at least 
for the sample of large charities in this study. The multivariate work highlights the salience of core 
institutional factors in understanding the locus of accountability concerns in the charity sector. The 
finding that older charities are less likely to trigger accountability concerns while larger organisations 
are more likely, may be indicative of a tension in the development cycle of charities: age brings 
experience and learning but size engenders new and significant challenges with respect to financial 
reporting and performance. Finally, the descriptive and multivariate work combined offer an 
alternative perspective to the extant literature by focusing on involuntary, performance-related 
information disclosures rather than voluntary disclosure of (primarily) financial information 
(Connolly & Hyndman, 2013a; Connolly et al., 2013; Hyndman, 1990, 1991; Gandia, 2011; Gordon, 
Fischer, Malone & Tower, 2002; Saxton & Guo, 2011; Saxton et al., 2012). 
The results of this analysis also have considerable practical implications for OSCR and other 
institutions operating under the rubric of risk-based regulation. In light of the evidence provided in 
this study OSCR may need to reflect on the utility of its accountability programme. It could be argued 
that the exceptions monitoring programme is retrospective, tangentially linked to public confidence, 
and focused on technical compliance with accounting requirements and not enough on core concerns 
such as fundraising, governance and sound financial practices. The issue of regulatory burden should 
also be a consideration for OSCR: the absence of a link between the financial exceptions and negative 
organisational outcomes calls into question whether the costs imposed on charities by the need to 
respond to the triggering of concerns are justified. We should not rush to discount the possibility that 
the absence of significant correlations is due to OSCR’s effectiveness in dealing with triggered 
exceptions; however, anecdotal conversations with relevant individuals at the regulator suggest that 
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this explanation is not likely to apply to the majority of exceptions. In any case, a useful exercise for 
OSCR would be to re-evaluate its own interest, intensity and investment in this programme. 
Improvements to the monitoring programme could be made by adopting simpler, alternative measures 
of accountability: ones that are at least moderately linked with demise and misconduct (Breen, 2013), 
and whose effect on public confidence is more plausible (e.g. senior management pay, extent of direct 
marketing, number of trustee meetings). If the focus is entirely on accountability concerns that may 
impact public confidence, many of these measures could be derived from the multitude of surveys 
exploring public trust in, and issues with, charities (see National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 
2015 for an overview). Finally, OSCR could collaborate with charities themselves to better 
understand and measure the operational concerns of these organisations. 
The counter argument is that the effect of the mere existence of this programme – whatever its 
capacity to affect behaviour change and prevent negative outcomes – on public confidence in the 
sector should not be discounted; donors, beneficiaries, funders and the public may derive reassurance 
from the activities of OSCR to monitor vulnerabilities and dissuade undesirable behaviours. It is 
plausible that certain exception codes do relate to public confidence and thus are worth monitoring: 
for example, transactions with trustees could constitute excess private benefit which would contravene 
elements of the Charity Test. It would also be remiss to suggest that charities do not derive any utility 
from the triggering of exceptions. It is plausible that some organisations improve their accounting, 
reporting and financial practices in response to an exception being triggered. Finally, this research 
only examines one interorganisational relation – that of the regulator and charity – and does not 
capture the valid accountability concerns of other stakeholders. As Ebrahim (2005, p. 82) cautions: 
Policy discussions about improving accountability through increased oversight may be 
myopic if they rely on and privilege upward, rather than downward and internal, means and 
actors. This is not to say that upward accountability or oversight is unnecessary – certainly it 
plays a crucial and legitimate role, for example, in preventing fraudulent use of funds by 
organizations – but it is only one dimension of multiple accountability relationships.  
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Chapter Six – Financial Vulnerability 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter revealed stable patterns in the occurrences of vulnerabilities in charities’ 
financial, fundraising and governance behaviour. We continue this line of inquiry by moving away 
from OSCR’s conceptualisation of financial vulnerability, and instead examining academic 
perspectives on this topic. This divergence is particularly welcome given the absence of association 
between OSCR’s measures and negative organisational outcomes. The rest of the introduction 
outlines the context and structure of this chapter. 
In the UK there has been dramatic growth in the charity sector in the past 20 years. The election to 
power of the Labour government in 1997 led to a more prominent role for charities and third sector 
organisations (TSOs) more generally in the provision of public services, as well commitments to 
building the capacity of the sector in general (Chew & Osborne, 2009; Rutherford, 2015). The 
operating environment of charities during the Labour government’s time in power can be 
characterised as “an arguably enabling policy context that further promoted voluntary action and 
raised the profile of the voluntary sector in public policy development and service delivery.” (Chew & 
Osborne, 2009, p. 91) On the other hand, charities face significant operating challenges, especially in 
relation to their economic, social and technological environments (Chew & Osborne, 2009). The 
advent of the global financial crisis in 2007, coupled with an arguably less favourable policy 
environment under subsequent governments and high-profile cases of financial mismanagement (e.g. 
Kids Company), have exacerbated these challenges and placed the spotlight firmly on the financial 
sustainability of the sector (Bingham & Walters, 2013; Shea & Hamilton, 2015). 
Though a popular topic of research in nonprofit/charity/third sector studies, there is much we do not 
know about the extent, persistence, risk factors and outcomes of financial vulnerability. This chapter 
explores the aforementioned aspects of financial vulnerability in the context of the Scottish charity 
sector. The chapter is structured as follows. First, an exposition on the theoretical perspective 
informing this research is provided, followed by a description of the research questions, data and 
methods. The empirical findings are then presented and discussed with reference to the theoretical 
framework and the chapter concludes with a consideration of the limitations of the data and findings. 
6.2. Literature 
Research on the financial vulnerability of charities gathered pace in the 1990s and 2000s. The 
increasing economic heft of the sector globally (and in the US in particular), combined with the 
impact of global economic fluctuations on these organisations, spurred academics to develop the 
literature on this topic (de Andrés-Alonso, Garcia-Rodriguez & Romero-Merino, 2015). 
Consequently, much of the extant research is focused on the US nonprofit sector, though there have 
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been studies of other national charity sectors including the UK and New Zealand. Current 
conceptualisations of charity financial vulnerability have their roots in the for-profit literature, in 
particular studies that primarily dealt with explaining and predicting corporate bankruptcy (see 
Altman, 1968; Ohlson, 1980). Early research in the charity field adopted similar approaches to the 
for-profit studies, with minor alterations to the definition and operationalisation of financial 
vulnerability. In a seminal study Tuckman and Chang (1991) defined financial vulnerability as the 
likelihood of an organisation reducing services immediately in the event of a financial shock. They 
created four accounting measures that they posited are indicators of financial vulnerability: inadequate 
equity balances – equity divided by total revenue; revenue concentration – the number of revenue 
sources and the extent of their dispersion; low administrative costs – administrative costs divided by 
total costs; and low or negative operating margins – revenue less expenditure divided by expenditure. 
Tuckman and Chang then divided each ratio into quintiles and classified charities in the lowest 
quintile as at risk; an organisation was considered at severe risk if it scored in the lowest quintile of all 
four ratios. Though their work was a logical and important contribution to a nascent literature, there 
were some limitations. Perhaps most significantly financial vulnerability was treated as a relative 
concept, whereas others argue that it might be better to adopt a stable threshold indicating financially 
distressed organisations (Dayson, 2013). The predictive power of the measures was also not tested in 
their sample. When their approach is considered in more general terms however, it is reasonable to 
conclude that revenue concentration, low or negative operating margins, and the level of debt are 
issues worth considering when assessing the financial vulnerability of a charitable organisation 
(Dayson, 2013). 
Greenlee and Trussel (2000) contributed the next significant piece of research in this field, applying 
Tuckman and Chang’s accounting ratios to a modified conceptualisation of financial vulnerability. 
They defined a charity as being financially vulnerable if it reduced program expenditures (as a 
proportion of total revenues) in each of three consecutive years. The results of their study found 
statistically significant associations between financial vulnerability and lower operating margins, 
higher revenue concentration and higher debt. Over the next few years the same authors expanded on 
this piece of work, adjusting the financial vulnerability indicators and including additional controls in 
their model; of particular relevance was the inclusion of organisation sector and size (operationalised 
as the natural log of net assets), both of which made a statistically significant contribution to the 
model (Trussel & Greenlee, 2004; Trussel, 2002). The work of Hager (2001) was also important in 
testing and refining Tuckman and Chang’s four ratios, relating financial vulnerability to the 
organisational demise of US nonprofits working in the arts sector. He found that the predictive ability 
of the Tuckman and Chang indicators varied within this sector, with some of the measures accurately 
predicting the closure of some of the arts organisations. However, there are methodological 
limitations in his approach, in particular the conceptualisation of vulnerability. Arts organisations 
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were considered financially vulnerable if they were deemed to have ceased operations, which was 
measured as not submitting a Form 990 (the equivalent of the annual return required by OSCR) over a 
number of consecutive years. Not only does this imply that financial vulnerability is synonymous with 
organisational demise (and the associated cause and effect ambiguity this entails), Hager was also 
unable to confirm whether these organisations had truly failed or were better classed as non-reporting 
charities and thus should be treated as missing observations. 
Building on these previous studies Keating, Fischer, Gordon and Greenlee (2005) developed new 
measures of financial vulnerability that accounted for limitations in the time period covered by their 
data. They operationalised financial vulnerability as four dichotomous measures, which capture 
“dramatic adverse shifts in financial health, all of which relate to the ability of a nonprofit 
organization to carry out its mission.” (Keating et al., 2005, p. 11) The measures are as follows: 
 Insolvency risk – A nonprofit is at risk of insolvency when its total liabilities exceed total 
assets. 
 Financial disruption – A financially-disrupted nonprofit is defined as having experienced a 25 
percent or greater decline in net assets during a 12-month period. 
 Funding disruption – A nonprofit is defined as having its funding disrupted if it experiences a 
25 percent or greater decline in total revenues during a 12-month period. 
 Programme disruption – A programmatically-disrupted nonprofit is one that reduces 
programme expenditure by 25 percent or more during a 12-month period. 
Using discrete hazard logistic regression – a form of event history analysis – they tested the predictive 
power of a range of financial vulnerability indicators including those implemented by Tuckman and 
Chang, Ohlson and Altman models. The authors found that neither model was particularly effective at 
predicting any of the financial vulnerability outcomes, though the Ohlson model consistently 
outperformed the others. As a response to the inadequacy of these models, Keating et al. developed an 
expanded model that incorporated additional explanatory variables such as commercial revenues and 
endowment sufficiency; this model improved the relative explanatory power for each measure. 
Describing the contribution of Tuckman and Chang (1991), Trussel (2002) and Keating et al. (2005), 
Dayson (2013, p. 25) posits that the findings of these studies “suggest that financial vulnerability 
particularly affects small organisations, those reliant on few sources of income and those that struggle 
to generate financial surpluses sufficient to designate unspent funds as unrestricted reserves.” 
In perhaps the most complete study in this field Gordon, Fischer, Greenlee and Keating (2013) built 
on their 2005 research by testing a raft of new financial vulnerability indicators, including financial 
ratios that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers important for evaluating nonprofit 
effectiveness and efficiency. The study revealed substantial levels of financial vulnerability in the US 
nonprofit sector (relative to the for-profit and public sectors), though again each of the models tested 
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was inadequate for predicting financial distress in the coming year. To compensate, a new, 
parsimonious model was created containing just three indicators: two or more sequential years when 
expenses exceed revenues; high leverage (i.e. low levels of net assets relative to total assets); and low 
turnover of net assets (i.e. few net assets relative to total revenues). While not the most powerful 
model in predictive terms, it outperformed all bar one of the more detailed models. 
Cordery, Sim and Baskerville (2013) examined the financial vulnerability of amateur sports clubs in 
New Zealand. The authors make several interesting contributions to this area of study, most notably 
their alteration of existing definitions of financial vulnerability. They developed predictive models for 
three measures of financial vulnerability: reduction in program expenditure during a four-year period; 
reduction in net assets during a four-year period; and reduction in net earnings/income during a four-
year period. The predictive power of their fifteen explanatory factors (which included common 
measures such as revenue concentration, margin, total debt and also variables specific to their study) 
varied across each of the three models, as well as between different types of sports clubs (i.e. golf 
clubs and football clubs). Reflecting on future research in this area, Cordery et al. stressed the need to 
relate financial vulnerability measures and indicators to the outcome of organisational failure, in 
particular dissolution.  A methodological issue with their study is the use of stepwise regression, a 
technique that includes explanatory variables based on their statistical significance level (often set at 
the p<.05 threshold); this approach resulted in some of the models having all of the explanatory 
variables removed by the algorithm as none were statistically significant. The selection of four-year 
time periods in which to measure the presence of financial vulnerability is also questionable, as such a 
long period of time may obscure financial difficulties that occur at shorter intervals. In one of the 
most recent examinations of the topic, de Andrés-Alonso et al. (2015) adopted a critical outlook of 
traditional measures and indicators of financial vulnerability in their study of UK non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). In particular they highlight some significant measurement issues that should be 
accounted for or considered when examining this topic. For instance, the classification of a charity’s 
revenue sources can alter the estimation of regression coefficients derived from income data, having 
implications also for substantive interpretation of the findings. The authors also note that much 
substantive detail and nuance is lost when applying and interpreting broad indicators, and researchers 
should seek to bring as much information to bear on the modelling process as possible. For example, 
not all donations are of the same type, frequency or scale. 
There are also a number of studies that, while not directly addressing financial vulnerability, provide 
insight into key financial topics in the charity and voluntary sectors in the UK. Backus and Clifford 
(2013) examined the claim that large UK charities were becoming more dominant in terms of 
attracting a greater share of the distribution of income in the sector; that is, these organisations were 
growing at a faster pace than their smaller counterparts and securing a greater share of income growth 
over the period in question (1997-2008). Utilising a panel of charity data derived from administrative 
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records held by the Charity Commission for England & Wales (CCEW), Backus and Clifford 
approached the topic from a cross-sectional and longitudinal perspective. The former analysis 
revealed that large charities did not increase their share of the income distribution of the sector over 
the period, with stable or slightly declining levels of concentration instead. However, the longitudinal 
perspective (i.e. tracking same organisations over time) found that median relative growth rates for 
larger charities were higher than for smaller ones. A 2015 review by the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) examined the impact of the global economic crisis on the financial 
sustainability of voluntary sector organisations in England. Covering the period 2007-2013, the 
review combined data from the NCVO Civil Society Almanac 2015 and a survey of 106 voluntary 
organisations. The review found that the sector’s income stagnated over much of this period, with 
smaller organisations particularly vulnerable to reductions in their income; government funding in the 
form of grants was at an all-time low; and donations had recovered to their pre-recession levels. The 
state of the sector’s expenditure and assets was also analysed: demand for services increased year-on-
year, prompting organisations to reduce spending on administrative functions and training for staff; 
there is little recovery in the value of net assets compared to pre-recession levels; and, perhaps most 
troubling, organisations face considerable difficulties in rebuilding their reserves, having leveraged 
this resource to cover operational expenditure during periods of financial volatility. 
UK charity regulators are also increasingly interested in broader financial risks in the sector, outside 
traditional concerns such as fraud. CCEW recently concluded a proactive examination of charities at 
risk of financial distress (CCEW, 2016). Combining annual return data and information gleaned from 
site visits to charities, the regulator identified ten organisations which showed signs that they may be 
at risk of financial distress. These organisations displayed one or more of the following risk factors: a 
concern was raised by an auditor; insolvency; inadequate levels of financial reserves; recent staff 
redundancies; downsizing premises; and negative pension funds. Though limited in scope (i.e. those 
organisations with annual gross income of £1m or more), the Commission’s review unearthed a 
number of factors that they believe contributed to the financial issues in questions: a lack of financial 
information being provided to the trustees by staff and a failure by the trustees to obtain this 
information; failure to maintain adequate accounting records; trustees not meeting on a regular basis 
to take decisions collectively; a lack of financial planning; and a failure to critically review income 
generation methods. In Scotland, OSCR considers a wider set of risk factors it believes are associated 
with financial vulnerability. The regulator implements a financial exceptions monitoring regime, 
where the focus is on establishing standards and identifying vulnerabilities (e.g. errors, transgressions 
and risks) in a charity’s financial profile; this regime was analysed in Chapter Five. 
This study seeks to address some of the gaps in the charity financial vulnerability literature and in 
doing so the chapter makes three key contributions. First, using novel data, we expand the statistical 
evidence base by providing rich, longitudinal description of the extent and persistence of financial 
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vulnerability. These aspects have been overlooked in the literature, either in an understandable rush to 
develop explanatory models or due to limitations in the data. Second, we develop one of the first 
large-scale analyses of this topic in the UK context, echoing Dayson’s (2013) call to produce 
statistical models that are both context specific and build on previous research (see also Clifford & 
Mohan, 2016, for the need to address the paucity of evidence on the financial profile of the UK 
charity sector). Extant research is often characterised by a focus on subsectors, prompting calls for 
wider applications of financial vulnerability measures (Tevel, Katz, & Brock, 2015). As Hager (2001, 
p. 390) attests when reflecting on his work on the arts sector: 
Application of the measures to arts organizations uncovered variability in how well they 
predict organizational demise. Future research should expand the application to human 
service, health, educational, and other types of nonprofit organizations to determine the 
usefulness of the measures in other nonprofit industries. 
Third, this study assesses the utility of financial vulnerability measures to predict negative outcomes 
in the charity sector such as organisational demise, public complaints and regulatory action. It is 
plausible that financially vulnerable charities are more likely to experience negative organisational 
outcomes, in particular dissolution, but there is a lack of empirical evidence underpinning this 
assumption. For instance, many of the studies in this field employ financial vulnerability or stability 
measures as dependent variables but neglect to assess more important outcomes as a function of 
financial indicators (Kim, 2016). 
6.3. Method 
This study overcomes many of the limitations outlined previously by linking two of our 
administrative data resources to provide a panel dataset of 21,642 observations on 5,714 charities over 
the period 2007-2013: Annual Returns data and Investigations data. Some additional data 
management work was conducted to ensure these linked data were suitable for analysing the topic at 
hand. For instance, a limitation of the Annual Returns data is that detailed financial breakdowns are 
only available for a subset of the sector: therefore, we only include charities that are required to 
complete the supplemental monitoring form and have an annual gross income of £250,000 (£100,000 
prior to 2012). Table 6.1 summarises the sample selection process. 
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Table 6.1. Charity financial vulnerability dataset: sample selection process 
Sample selection Observations
Initial sample (Annual Returns data) 155,416 (28,093 charities)
   Removal of observations that did not provide a 
detailed financial breakdown in the supplementary 
monitoring form in a particular year – those with 
annual gross income less than £250,000 (£100,000 
prior to 2012) 
129,708
   Removal of observations not included in analysis 
period 
4,066
Final sample 21,642 (5,714 charities)
Note: the final sample size presented in this table is used for the descriptive analyses; the inferential 
analyses necessitate further reductions in the sample size due to the removal of observations which 
have missing values for any of the independent variables included in the statistical models. 
Contributing to the literature on charity financial vulnerability we address three research questions: 
1. What is the nature and extent of financial vulnerability in the Scottish charity sector? 
2. What factors are associated with being financially vulnerable? 
3. Is financial vulnerability linked to other key outcomes in the sector such as organisational 
demise or regulatory investigation? 
Table 6.2 provides descriptive statistics on detailed financial (i.e. information collected in the detailed 
financial breakdown section of the annual return) and demographic measures for our sample. These 
figures reveal that the sample is highly skewed: it appears that a small number of charities have a 
disproportionate influence on the calculation of the mean. The median organisation does not receive 
any income from government funding or trading activities, spends £242,352 on conducting its 
charitable activities and £4,314 on governance costs, has £137,913 in unrestricted funds (reserves), 
and has been in existence for 19 years. In contrast the mean charity receives £1,067,387 and £140,436 
in income from government funding and trading activities respectively, spends £2,128,081 on 
conducting its charitable activities and £17,593 on governance costs, has £2,133,731 in unrestricted 
funds (reserves), and has been in existence for 28 years. 
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Table 6.2. Charity financial vulnerability dataset: sample characteristics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Median
5th 
Percentile
95th 
Percentile
donations income 17,337 303,330 1,758,403 51,162 0 905,000
interest and investment 
income 
17,337 84,913 1,017,957 1,521 0 219,067
government income 17,337 1,067,387 8,627,845 0 0 2,305,431
trading income 17,337 140,436 937,928 0 0 487,074
charitable activity 
income 
17,337 892,386 7,447,578 14,815 0 2,605,605
other income 17,337 123,510 1,738,476 0 0 173,607
total income 17,335 2,609,402 17,970,109 335,360 111,004 9,397,239
total income(log) 17,335 13 1 13 12 16
voluntary funds costs 17,337 39,646 297,892 0 0 136,263
other funds costs 17,337 37,830 728,479 0 0 29,000
trading costs 17,337 124,864 1,313,264 0 0 354,199
charitable activity costs 17,337 2,128,081 16,612,051 242,352 0 6,824,000
grants and donations 
costs 
17,337 117,496 1,197,853 0 0 273,918
governance costs 17,337 17,593 73,997 4,314 0 63,105
other costs 17,337 34,493 760,043 0 0 25,778
total costs 17,350 2,497,510 17,446,362 312,036 89,412 8,944,092
total costs(log) 17,350 13 1 13 11 16
net current assets 17,352 636,401 6,034,842 109,679 (39,838) 2,257,393
unrestricted funds 17,355 2,133,731 18,443,350 137,913 0 6,966,242
charity age 21,641 28 27 19 5 95
 
The sample generated for this research has some limitations. Observations only apply to charities that 
meet a specified income threshold and thus some occurrences of financial vulnerability are not 
included in the analysis: for example, it is highly likely that some smaller charities are experiencing 
one or more of our measures of financial vulnerability. However, we can only calculate one of these 
measures (i.e. funding disruption) for charities with annual gross income less than £250,000 due to 
limitations in the data. As is clear from Table 6.2, missing data are an issue with this dataset. There 
are circa 4000 observations with missing values for the majority of our financial variables and these 
are distributed evenly across the time period: there are about 700 charities per year with missing data, 
of which slightly over 50 percent are missing data for every year. It appears that this property of the 
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data is accounted for by the type of charity: organisations listed as Cross Border or Registered Social 
Landlords have missing values for the detailed financial measures presented in Table 6.2. This is due 
to efforts by OSCR to reduce the regulatory burden of these charities; for instance, Cross Border 
charities do not complete the supplementary monitoring return and instead submit an information 
return. Despite the lack of detailed financial information for these organisations, it is still possible to 
capture whether they are financially vulnerable using some of our measures (i.e. reduction in annual 
gross income) and thus they are included in the sample. 
6.3.1. Dependent and independent variables 
Financial vulnerability is operationalised in the same manner as Keating et al. (2005) and Gordon et 
al. (2013); this is theorised as being the most appropriate for the UK context (Dayson, 2013). 
Adopting these measures also provides the platform for replication studies to confirm the external 
validity of previous findings (Helmig, Spraul & Tremp, 2012). We derive an additional dependent 
variable in the form of a binary indicator that takes the value one when a charity experiences any of 
the four financial vulnerabilities and zero otherwise (see Table 6.3 below). 
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Table 6.3. Financial Vulnerability: dependent variables 
Factor Variable Operationalisation 
Financial vulnerability Funding risk A charity is defined as having its funding disrupted if it 
experiences a 25 percent or greater decline in total 
revenues during a 12-month period. 
1 = Charity experienced reduction in funding 
0 = Charity did not experience reduction in funding 
 Financial risk A financially-disrupted charity is defined as having 
experienced a 25 percent or greater decline in net 
assets during a 12-month period. 
1 = Charity experienced reduction in net assets 
0 = Charity did not experience reduction in net assets 
 Programme risk A programmatically-disrupted charity is one that 
reduces charitable activity expenditure by 25 percent or 
more during a 12-month period. 
1 = Charity experienced reduction in charitable activity 
expenditure 
0 = Charity did not experience reduction in charitable 
activity expenditure 
 Insolvency risk A charity is at risk of insolvency when its total 
liabilities exceed total assets. 
1 = Charity has negative net assets 
0 = Charity has net assets of zero or more 
 Financial 
vulnerability 
A charity is defined as financially vulnerable if 
experiences any of the other vulnerabilities. 
1 = Charity experienced any of the four vulnerabilities 
0 = Charity did not experience any of the four 
vulnerabilities 
 
For the statistical modelling conducted in section 6.4.2. Modelling the risk of financial vulnerability 
we utilise a subset of the sample, including only a cross section of observations for the most recent 
year in the time period (2013). Though it is possible to apply other modelling approaches that 
leverage the longitudinal nature of the dataset (e.g. random or fixed effects logistic models), focusing 
on predicting financial vulnerability for one year reduces the amount of missing data in the model and 
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allows for easier interpretation of some of the explanatory factors (e.g. lagged variables). We still 
include data from previous years in our analysis through the use of lagged financial variables (see 
Table 6.5). Table 6.4 outlines the sample selection process. 
Table 6.4. Charity financial vulnerability modelling dataset: sample selection process 
Sample selection Observations
Initial sample 21,642 (5,714 charities)
   Removal of observations not included in analysis 
period 
18,989
   Removal of observations with missing or invalid 
values for the independent variables (e.g. charities 
with a ratio of net assets to total assets greater than 
one) 
1,371
Final sample 1,282 (1,282 charities)
 
In line with the work of Dayson (2013) and Cordery et al. (2013), some of the independent variables, 
particularly the organisational characteristics, will be specific to the Scottish charity sector; that is, 
those contained in the administrative data (e.g. the control variables utilised in the previous chapter). 
The selection of a small number of financial indicators of vulnerability is consistent with the empirical 
conclusions of the work of Keating et al. (2005) and Gordon et al. (2013). The latter suggest three 
simple indicators for predicting insolvency: two or more sequential years of making a loss; high 
leverage (i.e. low levels of net assets relative to total assets); and low turnover of net assets (i.e. few 
net assets relative to total income). Drawing on the reviewed literature, we operationalise eleven 
independent variables for the statistical models: five organisational and six financial (see Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.5. Financial vulnerability: conceptual framework 
Factor Variable Operationalisation 
Financial Concentration Revenue concentration of a charity. Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI) on a scale of 0 – 1; 0 is more 
concentrated, 1 is less. It is calculated by squaring the sum 
of the number of revenue sources of a charity. 
 Leverage Ratio of net assets to total assets. 
 Turnover Ratio of net assets to annual gross income. 
 Loss 1 = Charity generated a loss in 2011 and 2012 
0 = Charity did not generate a loss in 2011 and 2012 
 Unrestricted funds Natural log of the amount of unrestricted funds (i.e. 
reserves) held by a charity. 
 Lagged financial 
vulnerability 
1 = Charity experienced financial vulnerability in 2012 
(i.e. the previous year) 
0 = Charity did not experience financial vulnerability in 
2012 
   
Organisational Size Natural log of annual gross income. 
 Age Natural log of the number of years a charity has existed as 
an organisation. 
 Field International Classification of Non-profit Organisations 
(e.g. Social Services). 
Nominal variable with twelve categories 
 Geography Geographical scope of a charity’s operations (e.g. Local). 
Nominal variable with eight categories. 
 Form Constitutional form of a charity (e.g. Trust). 
Nominal variable with nine categories. 
 
6.4. Results 
Over 76 percent of charities (39 percent of observations of charities) in the sample experienced at 
least one of the four financial vulnerability measures over the period 2008-2013; this tentatively 
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suggests that vulnerability is common in the sector though not a frequent occurrence for the majority 
of charities, hence the disparity in the percentages. For organisations that experience vulnerability, it 
is likely that they will trigger more than one over the whole period: the mean number is 4 (SD=2.31) 
and the median is 3. However, charities that do experience financial vulnerability tend to trigger only 
a small number per annum: the mean number of vulnerabilities is 1 (SD=.57) and the median is 1. 
6.4.1. Trends over time 
Figure 6.1 displays the distribution of the proportion of charities that experienced each type of 
financial vulnerability over the study period; observations with missing values for each of the 
variables are excluded and thus the true percentage of charities that are financially vulnerable is likely 
different to those reported here.22 Vulnerabilities are fairly common for any year and the period as a 
whole, with almost forty percent of charities experiencing some sort of financial vulnerability in any 
particular year. In terms of the specific risks, a decrease in net assets is the most common, followed by 
instances of insolvency. The proportion of charities experiencing each type of vulnerability does not 
vary substantially over time or from the average for the whole period (gamma <= .10, p<.001). 
Exploring variation over time is somewhat hampered by the extent of missing data for each variable – 
see Table A6.1 in the appendices for the extent of missing observations for each of these variables 
over time. 
Figure 6.1. Distribution of financial vulnerability 2008-2013 
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Note: Figures above exclude observations with missing values for each of the variables in question.  
We now focus on investigating the recurrence and persistence of financial vulnerabilities over time. 
Table 6.6 presents the distribution of the number of times a charity experienced each financial 
vulnerability, only for those organisations that experienced the respective outcome at least once. The 
results suggest that there is some degree of repetition. Examining our overall measure of financial 
vulnerability we see that a majority of charities experience this outcome two or more times in the time 
period. This finding may be ascribed to a similar pattern in the prevalence of insolvency risk, where 
25 percent of charities experience this outcome four or more times. Financial disruption to annual 
gross income and expenditure on charitable activities is likely to occur only once in the time period. 
Table 6.6. Distribution of the number of instances of financial vulnerability 
 % of charities
Number of 
instances Funding risk Financial risk Programme risk Insolvency risk
Any financial 
vulnerability
1 77 59 78 42 41
2 21 30 19 20 28
3 2 9 3 12 16
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4 0 2 0 10 8
5 - 0 - 6 4
6 - - - 9 3
7 - - - - -
Total 100 
(n=6,133) 
100 
(n= 9,383) 
100
(n= 5,398)
100
(n=3,771)
100
(n= 13,851)
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest integer and thus columns may not sum to 100. N varies 
across the variables due to differences in the number of observations experiencing each vulnerability. 
The perspective offered by repeated cross-sectional analysis is limited however as it does not enable 
us to track changes in specific vulnerabilities or the number of vulnerabilities for individual charities 
over time. In order to examine persistence and transitions we examine only those charities that 
submitted an annual return for each year (n=1,598, 28 percent of all charities in the sample).23 Figure 
6.2 below displays the results of a sequence analysis for our overall measure of financial vulnerability 
(see Figures A6.1 – A6.4 in the appendices for similar plots for the specific types of financial 
vulnerability). To make the sequences clearer, we include only charities that have experienced this 
outcome at least once (roughly 38 percent of the sample). The figure shows that a very small 
proportion of charities repeatedly experience financial vulnerability (about one percent of the 
balanced sample) – as evidenced by a continuous red/dark line across every time period – and 
sequences are somewhat turbulent (i.e. varying between states over time). 
Figure 6.1. Sequence index plot of financial vulnerability 
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Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 1,203 charities that experienced financial 
vulnerability at least once and is ordered by vulnerability status in 2008. 
Examining the transition matrices for these exception groups also reveals a lack of dependency in 
experiencing most types of financial vulnerabilities. As Table 6.7 demonstrates, charities are most 
likely to transition to not experiencing funding, financial and programme disruption in the next 
financial year, regardless of whether they are currently experiencing these outcomes. However, 
insolvency risk and financial vulnerability overall are likely to persist into the next time period. In 
conclusion, it appears that a very small minority of charities repeatedly experience financial 
vulnerability and there is little evidence of path dependency, with the exception of insolvency risk. 
The posited determinants of triggering accountability concerns are modelled in the next section. 
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Table 6.7. Probability of transitioning to experiencing financial vulnerability 
 Probability of experiencing vulnerability at t+1 (%)
Experienced 
vulnerability at t Funding risk Financial risk Programme risk Insolvency risk
Any financial 
vulnerability
   
No .27 .29 .26 .26 .35
Yes .10 .25 .11 .69 .51
Note: Probabilities rounded to two significant figures; rows and columns are not meant to sum to 1. 
Only charities that experienced each financial vulnerability at least once are included in the table. 
6.4.2. Modelling the risk of financial vulnerability 
Our attention now focuses on modelling the risk of being financially vulnerable in 2013 using all five 
of our measures. Table 6.8 below presents the incidences of financial vulnerability in our modelling 
dataset. Calculating Pearson’s r correlations for the different types of financial vulnerability reveals 
that funding risk is associated with programme risk (Pearson’s r=.2102, p<.001) and financial risk 
(Pearson’s r=.1861, p<.001). 
Table 6.8. Distribution of financial vulnerability in 2013 dataset 
 % of charities
Vulnerability  2013
Funding 6
Financial 15
Programme 7
Insolvency 7
Any vulnerability 29
More than one vulnerability 6
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Based on 1,282 charities for the year 2013 
for which we have no missing data for any of the independent variables utilised in the statistical 
models. 
Before discussing the results of the multivariate analysis, Table 6.9 contains descriptive statistics for 
the independent variables included in our main model – experiencing any financial vulnerability 
(Tables A6.2 – A6.5 in the appendices contain descriptive statistics for the other four dependent 
variables). The typical vulnerable charity appears to be slightly younger and smaller, have lower 
levels of net assets relative to total assets, fewer reserves, more likely to have made a loss in the 
previous two financial years, and considerably more likely to have experienced financial vulnerability 
in the preceding year. The presence of multicollinearity among the independent variables was 
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examined for each model by calculating the variance inflation factors (VIF). For all five models, the 
VIF for each independent variable is less than 1.5 and the mean VIF is less than 1.2, below the 
thresholds at which Allison (1999) suggests multicollinearity is problematic. 
Table 6.9. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of financial vulnerability 
 Not vulnerable 
(n=908)  
Vulnerable
(n=374)
Whole sample
(n=1,282)
Variable M SD  M SD M SD
Age (log) 3.24 .68  3.13 .66 3.21 .67
Size (log) 13.85 1.30  13.72 1.11 13.81 1.25
Concentration .30 .22  .30 .22 .30 .22
Leverage .59 .36  .51 .39 .57 .37
Turnover .48 .61  .46 1.01 .47 .75
Unrestricted funds 13.10 1.94  12.75 2.10 13.00 2.00
Loss .17 .38  .21 .41 .19 .39
Lagged financial vulnerability .23 .42  .48 .50 .30 .46
Operate locally or overseas 
(%) 14 -  16 - 15 -
Social services (%) 31 -  22 - 28 -
Company (%) 70 -  68 - 69 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Leverage, Turnover and Unrestricted funds 
are ratios. Only selected categories from the control variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
We model the probability of financial vulnerability using binary logistic regression as a function of 
organisation size, age, revenue concentration, net asset leverage and turnover, level of reserves, 
whether the charity made a loss in each of the previous two years (2011 and 2012), previous financial 
vulnerability status, institutional form, field of operations and geographical base. We report log odds 
and robust standard errors for each of the models, plus confidence intervals and a range of model fit 
statistics for our main model in Table A6.6 as per the guidance of Connolly et al. (2016).24 The 
category with the most observations is chosen as the base category for each control variable. Table 6.9 
below presents the results of the statistical modelling. 
We first examine the effects of organisation age and size on the outcomes. The coefficient for age is 
consistent across the five outcomes (with the exception of programme risk): a one-unit increase in the 
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log of age results in a decrease in the logs odds of being financially vulnerable. However the effect is 
only statistically significant for financial risk and insolvency risk. The effect of size varies in 
magnitude, sign and significance across the different outcomes. Large charities have higher, 
statistically significant log odds of experiencing insolvency while the opposite is the case for 
experiencing a decrease in annual gross income. 
Next we examine the effects of the remaining independent variables. With the exception of funding 
disruption, it appears that charities with more diverse sources of revenue have lower odds of being 
financially vulnerable; however, none of the coefficients are statistically significant, even in the 
insolvency risk model where all of the other main effects are. For three of our models, the effect of 
leverage is consistent with the claim of Gordon et al. (2013): charities with low leverage (i.e. high 
levels of net assets relative to total assets) have decreased log odds of experiencing financial 
vulnerability. Perhaps curiously, the opposite is the case for insolvency risk, where charities with low 
leverage are more likely to experience this type of vulnerability. The effect of turnover is more 
predictable with respect to this outcome. Charities with low turnover (i.e. low levels of net assets 
relative to annual gross income) are posited as being more likely to experience insolvency. The 
coefficient is consistent with this claim, with higher levels of turnover associated with lower, 
statistically significant log odds of experiencing insolvency. 
Higher levels of reserves are associated with decreased log odds of experiencing financial 
vulnerability, financial risk and insolvency risk; the opposite is the case for funding risk and 
programme risk. There is a similar degree of variability in the effect of loss across the models. 
Charities with two sequential years when expenditure exceeded income have lower odds of 
experiencing insolvency (statistically significant), decreases in funding or net assets; however, they 
have higher odds for vulnerability in general and reducing spending on charitable activities. Finally, 
with the exception of financial risk, the effect of experiencing vulnerability in the preceding year is 
consistent; these charities have higher odds of being financially vulnerable.25   
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Table 6.9. Results of Logistic Regression on Financial Vulnerability Outcomes 
 Financial 
Vulnerability 
(main)  Funding Risk  
Financial 
Risk
Programme 
Risk
Insolvency 
Risk
 Log odds 
(robust SE)  
Log odds 
(robust SE)  
Log odds 
(robust SE)
Log odds 
(robust SE)
Log odds 
(robust SE)
Age -.20 (.11)  -.03 (.19)  -.33 (.14)* .13 (.20) -.62 (.30)*
Size .01 (.08)  -.37 (.18)*  -.16 (.11) -.30 (.16) .54 (.16)**
Concentration -.17 (.32)  1.14 (.63)  -.01 (.40) -.98 (.58) -.10 (.71)
Leverage -1.12 (.24)***  -1.11 (.53)*  -2.06 
(.31)***
.03 (.44) 3.23 
(.56)***
Turnover .10 (.09)  .91 (.30)**  -.29 (.48) .08 (.12) -9.55 
(2.34)***
Unrestricted 
funds 
-.16 (.06)**  .07 (.12)  -.14 (.08) .17 (.11) -.32 (.10)**
Loss .03 (.17)  -.57 (.38)  -.06 (.21) .40 (.26) -.98 (.45)*
Lagged 
financial 
vulnerability 
.97 (.14)***  .39 (.29)  -.00 (.19) 1.15 
(.24)***
1.68 
(.38)***
     
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,282  1,117  1,282 1,274 1,193
Cragg and 
Uhler’s R2 
.14  .23  .14 .14 .55
Log-
likelihood 
-705.70  -234.08  -495.11 -299.84 -163.35
LR test (X2) 136.47***  107.80***  106.37*** 76.29*** 301.45***
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Constant is omitted. Additional independent variables 
included in the models but not reported above include Field, Form and Geography. Sample sizes are 
uneven across the models due to the effect of including controls for certain outcomes; there is perfect 
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prediction of the outcome for certain categories of these variables e.g. no Education Endowment 
charities experienced the funding risk outcome. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
6.4.3. Regression diagnostics and goodness of fit 
The main model is subjected to a number of diagnostic and goodness-of-fit tests in order to examine 
their degree of fit with the data. We examine the influence of outliers on the estimation of the 
regression coefficients in Figures A6.5 and A6.6 in the appendices. The plots show there are very few 
instances where predicted and observed outcomes differ substantially, and that there are no cases 
having an undue influence on the estimation of model coefficients. Therefore we can conclude that 
outliers, although existing in the data, do not need to be removed from the statistical models. 
We now turn our attention to the various tests that can help us determine whether our models are a 
good fit for the data. Depending on the model fit summary statistic chosen, the proportion of variance 
explained by the model ranges from .04 to .14; this indicates that there is a substantial proportion of 
the variance unaccounted for by the model and unlikely to be the result of stochastic influences. The 
simplest test of model fit is to compare the difference in the mean predicted probability of 
experiencing financial vulnerability or not. There is a moderate difference in the mean and median 
predicted probabilities for these outcomes: charities that experienced vulnerability had higher 
probabilities of 10 percentage points for each measure. Next, we conduct the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness-of-fit test (see equivalent section in Chapter Four for a description of this test). The results 
of this test indicate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Hosmer-Lemeshow X2=15.22, p>.05) 
and that the model is a good fit for the data. The model tends to slightly overestimate the number of 
expected cases for all but the lowest and highest groups (see Table 6.10 below). Readers should note 
that the use of deciles – though standard for this test – is arbitrary and model fit could vary depending 
on changes to the number of quantiles chosen. 
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Table 6.10. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit table for being investigated 
  Financially vulnerable  Not financially vulnerable
Decile Probability Actual Expected  Actual Expected Total
1 .1381 5 15.4  124 113.6 129
2 .1617 21 19.2  107 108.8 128
3 .1912 23 22.6  105 105.4 128
4 .2196 30 26.4  98 101.6 128
5 .2481 34 29.9  94 98.1 128
6 .2868 31 34.2  98 94.8 129
7 .3420 48 40.0  80 88.0 128
8 .4154 54 48.1  74 79.9 128
9 .5251 53 59.8  75 68.2 128
10 .8767 75 78.5  53 49.5 128
 
6.4.4. Predicted probabilities 
The mean predicted probability – expressed in percentage form – of being financially vulnerable is 29 
percent and the median 25 percent, closely matching the true proportion of vulnerable charities (31 
percent); the minimum and maximum values are eight percent and 88 percent respectively. Figures 
6.2 and 6.3 display the distribution of predicted probabilities across two independent variables: charity 
size and age. There appears to be a slight linear association between each of these variables and the 
predicted probability of being vulnerable: older, bigger charities are less likely to experience this 
outcome than their younger, smaller peers. 
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Figure 6.2. Distribution of predicted probabilities for being financially vulnerable, by charity size 
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Figure 6.3. Distribution of predicted probabilities for being financially vulnerable, by charity age
 
6.4.5. Outcomes of financial vulnerability 
The analysis concludes with an assessment of the association between financial vulnerability and a 
suite of negative outcomes in the sector: late submission of annual returns and accounts; complaint 
about the conduct of an organisation; regulatory action arising as a result of a complaint; and removal 
from the Charity Register.26 Utilising the full sample (not the modelling dataset), Table 6.11 below 
presents the higher-order correlations between each measure of vulnerability and the four outcomes 
described above, controlling for the independent variables utilised in the regression models.27 The 
results show that financial vulnerability is not associated with any of the outcomes, with the 
correlations below the threshold at which they are typically considered weak (Pearson’s r <= 0.1). 
This is especially surprising for charities that experience insolvency, as it is plausible that this is 
associated with organisational demise. In sum, though financial vulnerability is an undesirable state, 
in general it does not seem to lead to other, arguably more serious organisational outcomes.  
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Table 6.11. Correlation between vulnerabilities and negative outcomes 
Vulnerability Late submission Complaint
Regulatory 
action
Removal from 
Scottish Charity 
Register
Funding disruption .03* -.01 .01 .03*
Financial disruption .05*  .01 .01 .05* 
Programme disruption .04***  -.01 .01 .04* 
Insolvency .06*  .02* .00 .07* 
Any financial vulnerability .08* .01 .02* .06*
Note: Pearson’s r correlations are reported as they allow for the control of other variables in 
calculating correlation coefficients; similarly low coefficients are produced using alternative 
techniques such as Cramer’s V and phi. Figures rounded to two decimal places. *p < .05. **p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
6.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the nature, extent, risk factors and outcomes of financial vulnerability in 
the Scottish charity sector. The financial health of a charity is an issue that is foremost in the minds of 
the public when determining their confidence in the organisation and the sector as a whole. The ability 
to identify which charities “may become financially vulnerable is also important to government 
regulatory agencies when setting accountability and disclosure policies, external accountants when 
determining the risk inherent in an audit, foundations when distributing and monitoring grants, and 
management during the strategic planning process.” (Keating et al., 2005, p. 2) However, the absence 
of any statistical association between our measures of financial vulnerability and tangible outcomes 
such as dissolution and regulatory action raises questions about the intense focus on this issue and 
whether we are measuring vulnerability correctly. 
This research contributes to the burgeoning charity financial vulnerability literature, and the wider 
study of financial issues in the sector, in a number of important ways. First, by describing patterns in 
the occurrence and persistence of different types of vulnerability the study makes a contribution to the 
evidence base from the under-researched UK perspective. The proportion of charities experiencing 
financial vulnerability is consistent across the study period and a significant minority of organisations 
experience this outcome more than once. However, the longitudinal perspective reveals that only a 
very small proportion of charities consistently experience vulnerability and that, for most of our 
measures, organisations are most likely to transition to not experiencing financial vulnerability in the 
next financial year. This suggests that the financial vulnerability – at least as defined by our measures 
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– is an inherent feature of the sector, where it most likely occurs once but fails to persist over time for 
individual organisations (at least for the sample of large charities in this study). The multivariate 
statistical modelling highlights the salience of core institutional factors in understanding the locus of 
financial vulnerability in the charity sector. It appears that the likelihood of experiencing vulnerability 
decreases with organisation age and increases if a charity experiences any type of financial 
vulnerability in the previous year. However, the magnitude, direction and statistical significance of 
the effects are contingent on the measure of financial vulnerability that is being modelled. For 
example, size is not associated with experiencing our overall measure of financial vulnerability but 
larger organisations are significantly more likely to experience insolvency and less likely to 
experience a drop in funding. Examining our findings in the context of Dayson’s (2013) analysis of 
the literature – that financial vulnerability particularly affects small organisations, those reliant on few 
sources of income and those that struggle to generate financial surpluses sufficient to designate 
unspent funds as unrestricted reserves – we see no statistically significant effect of the benefits of 
revenue diversification and unrestricted reserves (with the exception of insolvency risk), and some 
confirmation for the role of size, though this is dependent on the measure of vulnerability.  
Perhaps more so than other analyses in this thesis, methodological and data limitations must be 
acknowledged. First, the choice of dependent variables, though grounded in the literature, raises 
questions about measurement validity. For instance, is it reasonable or correct to say that a 25 percent 
reduction in annual gross income constitutes being vulnerable? It is plausible that this outcome is of 
genuine concern to a charity in one year and not in another, raising the issue of uncontextualised and 
absolute measures that bear no relation to the material impact of said vulnerability. This a salient issue 
in light of the absence of an association between vulnerability and other outcomes. Perhaps the 
measures employed in this analysis are better served as independent variables in a statistical model 
predicting a more empirically valid measure of financial vulnerability (e.g. ratio of reserves to annual 
expenditure). Second, the administrative data utilised in this research contains structural issues that 
impact the generalisability of the findings, in particular the extent of and invalid missing values for 
some of our independent variables (e.g. observations with negative net assets or the lack of detailed 
financial information for certain types of charities). Third, data on the financial profile of charities is 
collected at fixed intervals, potentially masking the development and specific occurrences of 
vulnerability that occur throughout a financial year. Part of this issue is the fixed intervals at which 
charities report this information, masking fluctuations in the financial stability of the organisation. For 
example, a charity may be in a precarious financial position for most of its financial year, only 
securing funding at the eleventh hour; however, their record in the administrative data will not capture 
this uncertainty and instability. Finally, the statistical models examined our measures of financial 
vulnerability for one calendar year; that is, all charities with an accounting year-end date that fell in 
2013. Other modelling approaches that leverage the longitudinal nature of the data have been 
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employed, most notably by Keating et al. (2005) and Gordon et al. (2013). In the context of the data 
issues discussed throughout this chapter, we felt it unwise to employ random effects, fixed effects or 
discrete hazard modelling approaches as these would compound said issues. 
Financial vulnerability is a common, persistent feature of the Scottish charity sector and one deserving 
of academic, regulatory and public scrutiny. This research shows that predicting vulnerability using 
administrative data is a difficult task, with the relevance of indicators contingent on the type of 
financial vulnerability measure. Though it would be churlish to say that the occurrence of any type of 
financial vulnerability is not a cause for concern, especially without greater context or information on 
the organisation in question, it is clear that most charities are resilient in the face of this issue, as 
evidenced by an absence of association between experiencing vulnerability and negative 
organisational outcomes like dissolution. 
Chapter Four elucidated the concerns and regulatory responses arising from OSCR’s reactive 
programme of monitoring and intervention. Chapter Five switched focus to the regulator’s proactive 
attempts to identify and manage financial exceptions. This chapter extended the examination of 
financial concerns by demonstrating the limited potential of adopting standard measures (as defined in 
the academic literature) to study financial vulnerability. Though comprehensive in its coverage, 
employing administrative data offers only a partial account of the nature and prevalence of risk in the 
charity sector. The next chapter outlines what can be learned about this topic from speaking to the 
charities themselves. 
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Chapter Seven – Understanding of Risk by Charities 
7.1. Introduction 
In relation to the contextual framework guiding this study (see Figure 2.1), we continue to focus on 
the Organisation level, but now examine charities’ own conceptualisation and identification of risk. 
Among other topics, we explore the prevalence of the use of risk management frameworks by 
charities, in particular whether they add value at a strategic level and/or help demonstrate 
accountability to a variety of stakeholders (Herman et al., 2004; Young, 2009); the findings from this 
analysis will help us understand the ‘boundary work’ of charities with respect to risk (Gieryn, 1999). 
We also analyse specific significant risks, as defined by charities themselves, and whether they 
overlap with the types of issues uncovered in the previous empirical chapters. Finally, through the 
case studies we consider macro-level issues that are germane to studying risk in the sector, in 
particular accountability and regulation. The rest of the introduction establishes the context of the 
empirical work contained in this chapter. 
The MHA report 10 Current Issues facing the Charity and Not for Profit Sector contends that 2015 
was a year of significant failures in terms of fundraising and governance, and argues that the sector 
needs to “work hard to regain public confidence and demonstrate that stand alone [sic] high profile 
cases are not the standard, and that overall the sector is significantly achieving its aims and objectives, 
despite the financial challenges most face.” (MHA, 2016, p. 1) The report highlights risk management 
best practice as one of the ten issues facing UK charities. The Charities Statement of Recommended 
Practice (SORP) – the reporting requirements that guide and govern UK and Irish charities’ 
preparation of annual accounts – recommends that larger charities should provide “a description of the 
principal risks and uncertainties facing the charity and its subsidiary undertakings, as identified by the 
charity trustees, together with a summary of their plans and strategies for managing those risks.” 
(Charity Commission and Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, n.d.). 
Research on the conceptualisation and behaviour of charities with respect to risk is scarce and tends to 
be conducted by non-academic organisations such as insurers and infrastructure bodies; these studies 
are invariably focused on financial risk though coverage does extend to other types. A 2015 study by 
Zurich explored attitudes and approaches to risk in the UK voluntary (charity) sector. The survey 
sample consisted of 142 responses from senior decision-makers from mainly large organisations 
(annual gross income greater than £500,000) across a range of fields. The findings were broadly 
consistent across the different types of risks examined: with the exception of cyber fraud and 
reputational risks, a majority of charities felt confident in their ability to deal with risk and did not 
consider any of the risks to be significant to their organisation.28 A slight majority of respondents 
indicated that they did not alter their risk management behaviour from the previous year; when asked 
to consider the challenges associated with risk management, over 60 percent highlighted time as a 
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significant barrier. A conceptual paper by Charity Finance Group (CFG) and Sayer Vincent LLP 
implores charities to view risk management as an integral component of management, and to realise 
that risk management “is not about avoiding risk – it is about taking risks, but in a managed way. It is 
the duty of charity trustees and staff to make sure that they do this effectively and in the best interests 
of their beneficiaries”, a theme echoed by the Zurich research also (CFG & Sayer Vincent LLP, 2016, 
p. 59).  
This chapter provides a contrast to the previous empirical work in this thesis by shifting the focus to 
charities’ own understanding and identification of significant risks; in doing so we provide a much 
needed up-to-date and empirically robust account of this phenomenon. The chapter is structured as 
follows. We present the results of the survey analysis, followed by a deeper exploration of three 
survey respondents through analysis of semi-structured interviews and other sources of data. We 
conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings, and how they relate both to other 
studies and the empirical analyses in this thesis. 
7.2. Survey Results 
As outlined in Chapter Three, the survey sample consists of 420 responses from Scottish charities, a 
response rate of 10.2 percent of the sampling frame; this accounts for roughly 1.8 percent of the 
population of active Scottish charities at the time. Most respondents stated that their role in the charity 
was as a trustee (55 percent), with a further 32 percent identifying as members of senior management. 
Other roles identified by respondents include finance convenor, treasurer, chairman, freelancer, 
committee member, deacon, support freelancer and secretary. The distribution of income is positively 
skewed: 76 percent of organisations have annual gross income of less than £500,000, a pattern 
broadly in line with the population of Scottish charities.29 The distribution of constitutional form is 
also as expected, with most charities constituted as companies (39 percent) or unincorporated 
associations (22 percent). There is greater variation in the industrial classification of respondent’s 
charities, though this is also largely representative of the ICNPO categorisation of the population of 
Scottish charities. See the appendices for more details on the demographics of the survey respondents. 
7.2.1. Understanding of risk 
The first section of the survey sought to elicit a charity’s understanding of the term ‘risk’ and the 
language it uses to describe the topic. Respondents were asked to rank the relevance of common risk 
terms on an ordinal scale: not relevant, slightly relevant, moderately relevant, highly relevant, don’t 
know/no opinion. Notable results are shown in Figure 7.1 below (full results can be found in Table 
A7.5 in the appendices). 
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Figure 7.1. Proportion of responses that selected ‘Highly relevant’ for each of the terms in Table A7.5 
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Charity size labels: 2 ‘£1 - 24,999’ 3 
‘£25,000 - 99,999’ 4 ‘£100,000 - 499,999’ 5 ‘£500,000 - 999,999’ 6 ‘£1 - 10million’ 7 ‘£10million +’. 
With the exception of ‘scary’, there is a slight association between charity size and the relevance of 
the descriptors; this could indicate greater awareness among larger organisations of the relevance of 
risk to their operations. For certain terms there is clear agreement on their relevance for describing 
risk. Respondents highlighted the relevance of the terms ‘challenge’ and ‘opportunity’ for describing 
risk in their organisation. The manner in which organisations assess risk is highlighted frequently in 
the literature and it is interesting to observe that responses for the terms ‘quantitative’ and 
‘qualitative’ share a similar pattern, though a majority of respondents state that ‘qualitative’ is highly 
relevant. For most of these terms there is no association between the pattern of responses and the role 
of the respondent; where there is an association (gamma>.2, p<.001), there is no consistent pattern or 
substantive insight to be gleaned. 
7.2.2. Value of risk management 
This section of the survey was interested in a charity’s perception of the value and utility of risk 
management. Respondents were asked to state whether their organisation has a formal risk 
management framework in place, and to indicate their level of agreement with five statements on the 
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following ordinal scale: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree, don’t know/no opinion. The 
results are shown in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.2 below. 
Table 7.1. Has your charity got a formal risk management framework in place? 
 % of respondents  
 Risk management framework  
Annual gross income Yes No Total
£1 - £24,999 42 58 100 (n=125)
£25,000 - £99,999 42 58 100 (n=77)
£100,000 - £499,999 66 34 100 (n=98)
£500,000 - £999,999 84 16 100 (n=32)
£1,000,000 - £9,999,999 91 9 100 (n=54)
£10,000,000 + 100 0 100 (n=12)
Total 60 (n=237) 40 (n=161) 100 (n=398)
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Observations with missing data or responded 
‘don’t know/no opinion’ are excluded. Charities with annual gross income of £0 were excluded (n=2).  
A majority of respondents indicated that their charity has a formal risk management framework in 
place (60 percent). There is a strong, statistically significant association between annual gross income 
and having a formal risk management framework (gamma=-.5567, p<.001). Higher income charities 
are more likely to formalise their engagement with risk through a risk management framework.  
Figure 7.2 (see also Table A7.6 in the appendices) reveals a consensus on the relevance of risk 
management for each of the five statements. Once again charity size is an important factor in 
accounting for the variation in responses. There is a statistically significant association (gamma>.2, 
p<.05) between size and the responses to each of the five statements, with particularly notable 
associations for the role of risk management in supporting strategic planning (gamma=.4397, p<.001) 
and day-to-day activities (gamma=.3255, p<.01). It appears that higher income charities are more 
likely to recognise and incorporate risk management approaches to support their strategic, operational 
and accountability concerns. In light of the finding from Chapter Five that larger charities are more 
likely to trigger accountability concerns with OSCR, it would be interesting to know the specific ways 
and to what extent risk management “helps us be accountable to our funders”; especially given that 
Chapter Five further shows that the accountability concerns defined by OSCR are uncorrelated with 
negative organisational outcomes. 
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Figure 7.2. Proportion of responses that selected ‘Strongly agree’ for each of the statements in Table 
A7.6 
Note: Charity size labels: 2 ‘£1 - 24,999’ 3 ‘£25,000 - 99,999’ 4 ‘£100,000 - 499,999’                   5 
‘£500,000 - 999,999’ 6 ‘£1 - 10million’ 7 ‘£10million +’.  
7.2.3. Risk behaviour 
This section of the survey examined the actions a charity takes with respect to risk. Respondents were 
asked a number of questions relating to the frequency of risk assessment, strategies for dealing with 
risks, the degree of responsibility internal stakeholders have for managing risk, and the specific 
controls in place for dealing with risk. We start by examining the third concept: risk management 
responsibility. Respondents were asked the following question: Who has responsibility for managing 
risk in your charity? Responses were measured on an ordinal scale: no responsibility, some 
responsibility, a lot of responsibility, and don’t know/no opinion. The results are shown in the Table 
7.2. 
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Table 7.2. Who has responsibility for managing risk in your charity? 
  %
Stakeholder N No responsibility Some responsibility A lot of responsibility
Trustees 408 1 23 76
Senior Management 289 9 11 80
Employees 283 17 57 27
Volunteers 331 27 56 16
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus rows may not sum to 100. 
Observations with missing data or responded ‘don’t know/no opinion’ are excluded. 
The pattern in the table above is unsurprising: a majority of respondents expressed that all four 
internal stakeholders had at least some responsibility for managing risk in their organisation. They 
also felt that trustees and senior management had the most responsibility. A more nuanced picture is 
provided by linking the role of the respondent to their response to this question (Table 7.3). We see an 
association between a respondent’s role in the organisation and the extent to which they feel that role 
has a lot of responsibility for managing risk. While a majority of respondents across all four roles felt 
that trustees had a lot of responsibility for managing risk, this was most pronounced for respondents 
who identified themselves as trustees (87 percent). This suggests that internal stakeholders feel a 
strong sense of personal responsibility for managing risk. 
Table 7.3. Proportion of responses that selected ‘A lot of responsibility’ for each of the stakeholders 
in Table 7.2 
 %
Stakeholder Trustees
Senior 
Management Employees Volunteers Total
Trustees 87 63 22 22 76
Senior Management 61 93 26 4 80
Employees 58 84 43 13 27
Volunteers 75 100 43 64 16
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Notable findings are shaded. 
For the question pertaining to risk controls, participants were asked to select none, some or all 
controls that their charity had in place for dealing with risk. The results are shown in the Table 7.4 
below. 
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Table 7.4. What risk controls does your charity have in place? Tick all that apply. 
Risk control Responses % of responses % of respondents
Risk policy 157 23 46
Risk register 179 26 52
Mitigation strategy 140 21 41
Business continuity plan 204 30 59
Total 680 
(n=343) 100
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 100. 
Observations with missing data or responded ‘don’t know/no opinion’ are excluded. As respondents 
could, and did, select more than one option, there are more responses to this question than 
respondents.  
A majority of respondents at least have a risk register or business continuity plan. It is perhaps 
surprising that there are not a higher percentage of respondents with any or all of these standard risk 
controls, suggesting that some charities are unable or unwilling to engage in more formal approaches 
to risk management. Only 46 percent of respondents indicated that their charity had (arguably) the 
most basic and universal risk control in place: a risk policy i.e. a statement on the types of risk the 
charity is willing to take in pursuant of its objectives. The relatively low percentages across all four 
controls, despite being greater than those reported by the 2015 Zurich study, mirror the responses to 
the risk framework question i.e. charities that engage formally with risk are more likely to be higher 
income charities. We see this pattern again when exploring variation in the selection of risk controls 
across categories of charity size. Table 7.5 explores the extent to which the types and levels of risk 
controls might be related to charity size. The results demonstrate that the same risk controls are 
present in each income category. However, there are statistically significant differences in the extent 
to which these controls are present. Higher income charities are considerably more likely to have 
three of the four risk controls than lower income organisations, especially with regard to having a 
business continuity plan and a risk policy.
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Table 7.5. Multiple response tabulation of risk controls by charity size  
 % of respondents
Risk control £1-£24,999
£25,000-
£99,999 
£100,000-
£499,999
£500,000-
£999,999
£1,000,000-
£9,999,999 £10,000,000+ Total
Significance 
test
Risk policy 28 32 53 55 59 100 46 37.329***
Risk register 43 42 48 61 72 92 52 23.780**
Mitigation 
strategy 31 37 39 48 52 75 41 13.134
Business 
continuity plan 42 42 63 74 85 100 59 45.822***
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Chi-squared tests were conducted and Bonferroni-adjusted p-values were utilised to determine 
whether there were statistically significant differences in the extent to which risk controls were present across categories of charity. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** 
p<0.001. 
 133 
 
7.2.4. Significant risks 
This section of the survey sought to understand the type and range of risks that charities identify as 
being particularly relevant or concerning to their operations over the next 12 months. Respondents 
were asked a number of questions relating to the relevance of broad risk categories to their 
organisations, their charity’s level of concern regarding common risks inherent to the charity sector, 
and to specify the three most significant risks facing their charity. The results for responses relating to 
the relevance of broad risk categories are shown in Figure 7.3 below and Table A7.7 in the 
appendices. 
Figure 7.3. Proportion of responses that selected ‘Highly relevant’ for each of the categories in Table 
A7.7
 
Note: Charity size labels: 2 ‘£1 - 24,999’ 3 ‘£25,000 - 99,999’ 4 ‘£100,000 - 499,999’                   5 
‘£500,000 - 999,999’ 6 ‘£1 - 10million’ 7 ‘£10million +’. 
The risk categories are derived from the Charity Commission’s guidance on risk management for 
trustees (outlined in Table 2.1 in Chapter Two) and serve as a useful heuristic device for delineating 
different types of risks. Charities consider each of these risk categories to be at least somewhat 
relevant to their operations, though there is an understandable emphasis on financial risks. There is a 
statistically significant association between charity size and perceived relevance of financial risks 
(gamma=.4778, p<.001), operational risks (gamma=.2410, p<.01), and external risks (gamma=.4351, 
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p<.001). It is interesting to note that there is no association with governance and compliance risks, as 
it could be argued that larger charities are subject to greater scrutiny and reporting requirements from 
OSCR and other regulators (and thus would need trustees with appropriate competencies). Though a 
majority of charities of all sizes reported financial risks as being highly relevant, large charities are 
more likely to respond in this way. It would be interesting to explore why this is the case: are larger 
charities’ finances less stable than smaller organisations i.e. the probability/impact of the risk 
occurring is greater? Or are larger charities in financially stable positions but subject to greater 
scrutiny in how they manage their finances? The greater focus on external risks is probably a function 
of a number of competing factors: highly visible public profiles (plausibly one of the main factors 
associated with their greater likelihood of being investigated, as discussed in Chapter Four), greater 
engagement with local and national government, and large numbers of donors. We found no 
associations between the legal form or ICNPO category of the charity and perceived relevance of each 
of these risks (gamma<.2, p<.001), suggesting that charities operating across different industries (e.g. 
health or social services) share similar perceptions of the relevance of different risks. 
The relevance of a risk does not tells us much about the degree of concern a charity has about it; a risk 
may be highly relevant but easily manageable and not significant in the short-term. To address this, 
respondents were asked to state the degree of concern they felt regarding common risks experienced 
by the sector. Notable results are shown in the Figure 7.4 below (full results available in Table A7.8 in 
the appendices). There are some unsurprising findings: over 50 percent of charities are at least 
moderately concerned by many of the financial risks, in particular a reduction in annual gross income. 
This is in contrast to the low percentage of charities that experienced this risk over the period 2008-
2013 (see Figure 6.1 in Chapter Six). In light of some of the scandals that have been unearthed in the 
charity sector in 2015 (e.g. Kids Company, the death of Olive Cook, media reports of spending on 
chief executive pay and ‘good’ causes), it is surprising (and perhaps a bit troubling from a regulatory 
perspective) that so few charities are concerned with poor public perception and reputation; only 24 
percent report being at least moderately concerned with this risk, with 50 percent reporting they are 
not concerned at all. From an individual charity’s perspective this makes sense: the average charity is 
highly unlikely to infringe the Charities Act, be investigated for alleged misconduct by OSCR or be 
the subject of media scrutiny. However, all charities draw from the same well of public confidence 
and trust, and the actions of a minority can have a substantial impact on public (and political) 
perception of the sector, as evidenced by the renewed focus on fundraising practices, the 
establishment of a new fundraising regulator and the recently concluded parliamentary inquiry into 
the UK charity sector.  
We now turn our attention to the role of charity characteristics in accounting for the variation in the 
degree of concern with each of these risks. 
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Figure 7.4. Proportion of responses that selected ‘Very concerned’ for each of the risks in Table A7.8
 
Note: Thicker lines highlight associations discussed in the main text. Charity size labels: 2 ‘£1 - 
24,999’ 3 ‘£25,000 - 99,999’ 4 ‘£100,000 - 499,999’ 5 ‘£500,000 - 999,999’ 6 ‘£1 - 10million’ 7 
‘£10million +’. 
There is a statistically significant association between charity size and the degree of concern for 
certain risks. An above-average proportion of smaller charities report being very concerned with 
complying with charity regulation; as organisations get larger they are less likely to be very concerned 
about this risk (gamma=-.2527, p<.001). Larger organisations are more likely to be very concerned 
with changing government policy (gamma=.3003, p<.001). Finally, attracting sufficient numbers of 
trustees is moderately associated with income: smaller organisations are more likely to report being 
very concerned about this issue (gamma=-.2070, p<.01). Though for many of the risks there is a clear 
pattern of association (i.e. an increase in size is associated with an increase/decrease in degree of 
concern), it is interesting to note the above-average rates of concern for these risks in the £500,000-
£999,999 income category. For many of these risks charities in this category have the highest 
proportion responding ‘very concerned’. It is difficult to ascertain from the survey exactly why this 
would be the case and we do not speculate further at this point. There is no association between a 
charity’s legal form and degree of concern with any of the risks outlined above, with the exception of 
concerns regarding the inability to cope with increased demand for services (gamma=.2069, p<.01): 
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companies and SCIOs are more likely to report above-average rates of being very concerned. 
However this pattern is probably explained by the high degree of association between legal form and 
charity size: charities registered as SCIOs or companies are highly likely to be high-income 
organisations (gamma=.455, p<.001). A charity’s ICNPO category is not associated with the degree 
of concern for any of these risks (gamma<.2, p<.05). 
Finally, respondents were asked to state, via a textbox, the three most significant risks currently facing 
their charities. 354 of 420 respondents provided information for this question; the vast majority 
provided three significant risks, with 17 percent listing one or two. In total, respondents described 966 
risks that they felt were the most significant facing their charities at the time of completing the survey. 
Table 7.6 below shows the results of the risk categorisation process (see section 3.5.3 for details of the 
classification process). 
Table 7.6. Distribution of most significant risks facing respondents 
Risk category Responses % of responses % of respondents
Compliance 34 5 10
External 112 15 32
Financial 264 36 75
Governance 130 18 37
Operational 201 27 57
Total 741 
(n=354) 100 209
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 100. As 
respondents could, and did, select more than one option, there are more responses to this question than 
respondents. 
A majority of respondents’ most significant risks can be categorised as financial or operational. There 
is no association between the degree to which these risk categories are present and any of the 
organisational characteristics measured in the survey. 
7.2.5. Linking survey and administrative data 
Survey respondents were asked to provide their organisation’s Scottish Charity Number; this enabled 
survey responses to be linked to data utilised elsewhere in this thesis, specifically the dataset in 
Chapter Four. Over 80 percent (339) of the 420 responses were linked in this manner, providing 
additional variables that may shed light on some of the patterns uncovered throughout this chapter. Of 
particular interest are whether a respondent’s charity has been investigated (and if so, how many 
times), if OSCR has taken regulatory action against the organisation, and whether a charity has ever 
made a late submission of its annual return and accounts to OSCR. 47 of the charities that responded 
 137 
 
to this survey have been the subject of an investigation by OSCR; of these, three have had regulatory 
action taken against them and the maximum number of investigations per charity is four. In terms of 
late submissions, 57 charities did so at least once since 2006. 
7.3. Case Study Results 
This section presents the findings from the qualitative research phase, in the form of three brief case 
studies (see section 3.5.3 for details of the case selection process). Each case is presented in turn using 
the headings in the topic guide to structure the findings; the common themes that emerge from all 
three cases, as well as topics on which the responses diverge, are considered in the summary of this 
section. 
7.3.1. Case study one: cancer support charity 
The focus of this case study is a small cancer support organisation based in one Scottish local 
authority area. The charity provides a wide-range of support to sufferers, and their family members 
and carers, of a particular cancer: assistance in claiming welfare, organising trips, monthly support 
group meetings, and signposting to information. It engages occasionally in advocacy initiatives, 
including one notable instance of campaigning successfully for changes to the screening and payment 
of benefits for sufferers of this particular condition. The organisation has fewer than ten trustees (at 
time of interview) but the majority of work is carried out by two volunteers (our two interviewees): a 
long-time volunteer of over fifteen years and the treasurer. The organisation was registered as a 
charity during OSCR’s era of regulation and has experienced fluctuating financial performance over 
the past number of years, including a substantial decline in annual gross income for its most recent 
financial year. The two most recent Trustee Annual Reports (TARs) of this charity were procured in 
electronic format (PDF) – documents for previous years were submitted in hardcopy to OSCR and 
thus we are unable to access them – and examination of their contents reveal that the issue of risk was 
not discussed and there were no concerns raised by the independent examiner regarding the accounts. 
Significant risks 
The interviewees identified three interlinked risks that present significant threats to the viability of the 
charity. The most fundamental is the difficulty accessing and securing funds; at the time of the 
interview the organisation has operated for over a year without core funding – “We haven’t got any 
funds. We’re fundraising ourselves every month; we run raffles, we’ve got a raffle on the go. Neither 
of us gets paid for the work that we do.” (CS1-Par-01) The volunteers felt that they have a multitude 
of ideas for better or new services but are unable to implement them due to the organisation’s 
pervasive financial issues. They expressed frustration with the process of applying for funds. They felt 
that it is almost not worth applying for funding due to the effort required, the small amount of money 
available and the fact the funding would not cover administrative or staff expenses: “And even the 
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reports [required] for a small funder, the reporting mechanism they put in place; I took one look at it 
and phoned a friend and said ‘help’.” (CS1-Par-01) Her companion elaborated on this issue by 
highlighting further difficulties with the fundraising process: following an underspend of some 
funding they secured recently, CS1-Par-02 expressed relief that she’d “never been so glad to give 
money back; it was a nightmare [trying to spend it according to the funder’s requirements].” Both 
interviewees expressed frustration with their efforts to meet the needs of the charity’s beneficiaries, 
describing the group in the following terms: “They’re quite selfish, that’s the word I would 
use…They’re very vocal if they don’t like something.” (CS1-Par-01) Perhaps reflecting the impact of 
financial pressures on the organisation, one of the participants revealed that a lack of appreciation of 
the effort of its core volunteers on the part of the beneficiaries has a detrimental effect on funding: 
If I’m being totally honest, I could probably pick up some funding from the council or NHS 
here and there; not that I’m looking for a gold medal or anything like that but it would be nice 
if somebody [members] just said ‘appreciated you did that.’ (CS1-Par-02) 
Finally, the challenge of producing and executing a succession strategy weighed heavily on the minds 
of the interviewees. They made reference to their personal health and what would happen in the event 
of their inability to continue volunteering in the organisation. Both participants agreed that in this 
scenario, the organisation would cease to be a charity but probably continue as a self-help group on a 
smaller scale. However, CS1-Par-02 remained resolute in the face of these challenges: “It’s a constant 
battle but we get there don’t we?” 
Despite a lack of resources, the charity does have a number of mitigation strategies in place for 
dealing with some of these risks. The organisation protects against fraud and financial impropriety by 
requiring all outgoing cheques to be signed by two individuals; furthermore, volunteers and staff 
cannot sign off on their own expenses – “It’s got to be done right. [We] don’t want anybody coming 
back on us and saying ‘Oh she signed her own cheque’.” (CS1-Par-02) These measures were taken in 
response to previous instances of suspected fraud by a former treasurer; there was also a separate 
occasion when the charity reported two individuals suspected of financial impropriety to OSCR. The 
charity has insurance, a health and safety policy, and Protecting Vulnerable Groups (PVG) disclosure 
for volunteers and staff. As well as having clear operational benefit, both participants stress that 
funders want to know that these types of controls are in place.  
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Accountability 
Neither participant had much to say about the issue of accountability. They felt that the charity is most 
accountable to its beneficiaries and members (e.g. family members of beneficiaries that participate in 
sponsored walks). They discharge accountability to these stakeholders through monthly reports 
containing information on financial performance and the latest activities of the charity; CS1-Par-01 
suspects that these individuals do not understand the information they are given. The production and 
dissemination of these reports is driven by the volunteers and not requested (in the main) by 
beneficiaries and members: “As I say, I’m volunteering, I don’t have to be there; and I don’t have to 
give them the accounts the way they are but I do.” (CS1-Par-02) 
In terms of wider accountability, both interviewees were adamant that OSCR was particularly easy to 
deal with on matters of reporting, and made reference to the simplified annual return form that was 
implemented in April 2016. They feel that the charity is too small to trouble OSCR. On occasion the 
charity has found reporting to OSCR burdensome but fully understands the need to do so. CS1-Par-02 
compared OSCR’s regime with the previous system of regulation lead by UK Inland Revenue that 
was characterised, in her opinion, by a lack of accountability and greater scope for misconduct by 
charities. 
Regulation 
Expanding on their discussion of the charity’s accountability to the regulator, both interviewees 
reiterated that reporting was burdensome in the first couple of years of being a charity, partly due to 
the poor accounting practices of the previous treasurer, and the lack of clarity and guidance around 
online filing of accounts to OSCR. They expressed satisfaction with the simplified and reduced 
reporting requirements for small charities. They have no complaints in general about OSCR’s work, 
but recognise that larger charities probably face a (justified) greater burden. In terms of their own 
organisation and its regulatory requirements, CS1-Par-02 feels that they should get more support from 
local infrastructure bodies, such as their TSI, noting that larger charities are able to access assistance. 
In terms of some negative aspects to OSCR’s regulatory approach, CS1-Par-02 raised the issue that 
OSCR displays late submission information on its website; while she understands that there may be 
legitimate reasons for this, it should be accompanied by an explanation for why these accounts were 
submitted late. She also had some concerns regarding the availability of annual accounts information 
through OSCR’s website but did not really articulate quite why this is an issue (just a general sense of 
unease even though anybody can request the same accounts from the charity for a small 
administrative fee). 
When asked whether they were a risky charity from OSCR’s perspective, the interviewees were in 
agreement: “No, I don’t think so. Although we’re a registered charity we are mainly a self-help group 
and if we run out of money then we run out of money…OSCR have nothing to worry about.” (CS1-
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Par-02) Overall, the interviewees felt that the organisation’s charity status, and the accompanying 
monitoring regime by OSCR, can be used as a defence against claims of impropriety or misconduct. 
7.3.2. Case study two: TSI 
The focus of this case study is a Third Sector Interface (TSI) based in the central belt of Scotland. 
Itself a charity, the TSI nominally represents and supports all third sector organisations (TSOs) in its 
local authority area, and has four core functions: growing and developing social enterprises; providing 
organisational support for TSOs (e.g. information, training and assistance); acting as the centre of 
volunteering in the local authority; and representing its local third sector in national policy initiatives 
(e.g. at Community Planning Partnership). The TSI (previously known as a Council for Voluntary 
Service) has been a charity for over 30 years and has generated a small surplus in each financial year, 
though annual gross income has declined each period since 2013. The TARs for 2012-2016 make 
explicit, and at times specific, reference to risk. For instance, the 2013 report describes the 
implementation of a revenue diversification strategy to combat overreliance on a small number of 
funders, and internal control risks “are minimised by the design and implementation of robust 
procedures for authorisation of all transactions.”  Every TAR outlines the organisation’s policy of 
holding reserves sufficient for three months’ operating expenses and that a risk matrix is presented to 
trustees at each board meeting. There were no concerns raised by the independent examiner regarding 
the charity’s accounts. TARs prior to 2012 were unobtainable as they are in hardcopy format.  
Significant risks 
Unsurprisingly the organisation reports being under considerable financial pressure: the TSI now has 
two additional functions since 2012 – developing social enterprises and representing the third sector 
in Community Planning Partnership initiatives – without an associated increase in funding. TSIs 
receive the same level of core funding from the Scottish Government as they did eleven years ago and 
this charity in particular is the only one to have been subject to a cut in its funding, according to the 
interviewee (Managing Director). CS2-Par-01 lamented: 
We’re still doing what we do with the money and it’s all about the staff, but at the end of the 
day we’re not doing [anything new]…we’re very reactive. I have no time to be proactive 
because I can’t fill all the requested demands, let alone do anything that would be useful, to 
go out and drum up business. 
The charity has an issue with staff leaving due to the cultural shift brought about by increasing 
demands for its services. For example, TSOs are encouraged to consult the guidance and support 
provided on the organisation’s website rather than arrange a meeting with a member of staff to discuss 
the matter. The charity is increasingly moving away from case work, resulting in an exodus of staff 
members that prefer to work in a more ‘hands on’ manner with TSOs. 
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The TSI is also acutely aware of the risks facing the organisations it supports, particularly the 
significant decrease in local authority funding for TSO projects, and succession issues. These issues 
are linked in the opinion of CS2-Par-01: “We’re increasingly getting involved in organisations that 
are in crisis…And increasingly it’s a lot to do with age-related [issues] where the people that set it up 
with good intentions in their fifties and [are now too old to continue].” 
Finally, the interviewee was concerned about the sustainability of the TSI itself. In tandem with the 
risks discussed above, the charity struggles to address the tension between the need for good 
governance and deploying its limited resources efficiently and effectively; specific mention was made 
to the difficulty of implementing the reserves policy. The organisation also faces an existential threat 
in the form of a potential reduction in the number of local authorities in Scotland (and thus a 
proportional decrease in TSIs). When asked if this was being discussed amongst the TSIs, CS2-Par-01 
replied: “No, there’s no discussion within the TSI network about that. There’s nothing we can do 
about that, so we’ll just deal with it when it comes. We’ve already been through one major change 
five years ago, what’s another one?” 
The interviewee has sought to mitigate some of the above risks by investing in the charity’s human 
and technological resources. As we saw in the first case study, mitigation strategies can uncover or 
exacerbate existing risks; in this instance, the exodus of staff was directly linked to the increased use 
of technology to deliver services and provide information. Though not mentioned during our 
discussion of significant risks, the interviewee described her pride in ameliorating reputational issues 
present when she first arrived at the organisation. Some of the mitigating actions taken included 
publicising the work of the charity more effectively, and achieving a number of accolades in the area 
of staff development (e.g. securing an Investors in Young People award). The importance of adhering 
to the reserves policy was also strongly referenced during our interview: “Again, perhaps because my 
background is an accountant and I am risk-averse, but I would no sooner go under my three-month 
reserves than fly to the moon.” (CS2-Par-01) 
Accountability 
The charity considers itself accountable to a wide range of stakeholders, the most prominent of which 
are its local third sector and the Community Planning Partnership network: “There isn’t a formal 
accountability process. We are accountable to them [beneficiaries] and community planning 
[partnerships]. We can only exist as a TSI if we are recognised by the Community Planning 
Partnership and the local third sector.” (CS2-Par-01) To meet this need to be accountable, the 
organisation is a firm proponent of being transparent with respect to its activities and outcomes: 
We are very open and transparent. Everything we do is online. Everything I publish: my 
accounts, my monthly work plan I do for the Scottish Government…Everyone can see, all the 
time, what we are doing. I hugely believe in complete transparency. (CS2-Par-01) 
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Accountability is also discharged through the implementation of an internal complaints policy 
(available on the organisation’s website). Staff are instructed to record all complaints, whether they 
have been lodged formally or not. The policy was put in place two years ago and the charity has so far 
received 10 complaints: in each case the MD feels that the issues detailed in the complaints were 
outwith the remit of the organisation. Finally, the charity produces annual standardised reports for the 
Scottish Government and adopts the same template for its monthly reports to the board. Reflecting on 
the efforts of the charity to demonstrate accountability, the interviewee described what she sees as a 
significant barrier facing the sector: 
In terms of holding to account, don’t think that people know how much charities do in their 
lives. I don’t think that the public sector have [sic] any clue about how much charities do. 
They know about the charities that they touch, what they’re doing, but they don’t know how 
much it brings to [local authority] as an area. (CS2-Par-01) 
Regulation 
The interviewee was effusive in her praise of OSCR’s regulatory approach, although she does 
recognise that other charities may feel differently: 
I think that OSCR’s website is great now [in terms of the availability of information about 
charities]; it’s getting far more transparent, although I’ve started to hear complaints [from 
charities] that OSCR are putting things on the website and saying ‘if you want more 
information you can go and ask the charity’. And people are coming to me and saying, ‘OSCR 
shouldn’t do that’ and I’m saying, ‘yes they should’. You’ve got public money, account for 
it…The sector is still hugely reluctant to discuss finances. (CS2-Par-01) 
In contrast to the other cases – and presumably to the vast majority of charities in general – in this 
chapter, the organisation has a close working relationship with the regulator. For example, both 
parties worked together on a pilot project looking at third sector organisations that fail to submit 
annual returns and accounts to OSCR. The interviewee stressed that this project came about due to the 
comprehensive, tacit knowledge her organisation possesses regarding the reasons for non-submission 
by charities in its local authority. Perhaps influenced by this positive experience, the charity does not 
feel burdened by regulation, with the interviewee praising the light-touch yet clear approach adopted 
by OSCR (in contrast to the Charity Commission’s regime in England and Wales). When asked to 
suggest an area of improvement for charity regulation in Scotland, the interviewee felt that there is 
scope for more OSCR-accredited training, having been impressed with previous offerings. Lamenting 
the poor attendance of her own charity’s training, CS2-Par-01 stated that, “if I was running OSCR-
badged training courses I know people would turn up because people respect OSCR; that brand has a 
value.” Finally, when asked whether OSCR would consider her organisation as risky, CS2-Par-01 
replied, “No, I would hope not.” 
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7.3.3. Case study three: housing support charity 
The focus of this case study is a medium-size (annual gross income greater than £100,000) housing 
support organisation that provides services across Scotland. The charity provides brokerage services 
to beneficiaries with housing needs that currently are not being met (e.g. individuals with disabilities). 
The organisation was registered as a charity during the 1990s and has experienced consistent financial 
performance over the past number of years: the charity made a slight loss every year though its annual 
gross income has doubled since 2012. The 2016, 2013 and 2012 TARs do not mention risk and there 
were no concerns raised by the independent examiner regarding the accounts; the organisation does 
have a policy of holding reserves sufficient for three months’ operating expenses. In 2015 and 2014 
the charity made explicit yet vague reference to risk: “The trustees have a duty to identify and review 
the risks to which the charity is exposed and to ensure appropriate controls are in place to provide 
reasonable assurance against fraud and error.” TARs previous to 2012 were unobtainable as they are 
in hardcopy format.  
Significant risks 
Much like the first case study, financial issues pose a persistent risk to the organisation. The charity 
felt that it does not have much in the way of financial resources, given that is also does not possess 
any housing stock or other physical assets. As CS3-Par-01, the Managing Director, attested: 
Our biggest strength and our biggest weakness is that we don’t have any money, we don’t 
have any housing, we don’t have a magic wand [therefore] everything we do in terms of a 
solution has to be based on what’s achievable, what’s possible. 
Funding concerns impact the organisation’s ability to plan for the long term; they have only one major 
funder – the Scottish Government provides 95 percent of core funding – and receive this money on an 
annual basis. CS3-Par-02 – a member of staff – acknowledged that three-to-five year funding cycles 
are increasingly uncommon and that they know their area of work is not a ‘sob story’; the organisation 
realises it is not able “to win the fundraising battle” (CS3-PAR-02) with animal welfare or children’s 
charities. Continuing with this thread, CS3-Par-03 – trustee, current chairperson and former 
beneficiary – highlighted the difficulties of meeting funders’ application and reporting requirements, 
regardless of the amount of funding available: 
And the same with other, smaller funders. You tend to find the level of detail they are looking 
for is often more than [that required by] OSCR. Even [laughter] for tiny bits of money, you’re 
doing screeds and screeds of things and you’re just ‘uhh is it worth it?’ [group laughter] 
In contrast to the first case, the charity is acutely aware of reputational risks, particularly surrounding 
negative connotations of the word ‘charity’. The focus group ascribed this phenomenon to wider 
developments in the charity sector, such as concerns regarding executive pay and the use of third-
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party fundraisers. Finally, everyone in the group agreed that the work of the organisation posed risks, 
especially its engagement with vulnerable individuals. 
To counter the financial risks, CS3-Par-01 described how she drew on her previous corporate 
experience and implemented an operational strategy based on lean or agile principles, examples of 
which were the jettisoning of the charity’s fixed abode and delivering mobile services, and reducing 
staff salaries. CS3-Par-03 concurred with the necessity of this approach, stating that: 
You [Managing Director] use consultants very effectively as well… rather than employ 
people. You bring in specific people for their expertise and you use them to do the financial 
reports; again, that’s a really good use of the funding that doesn’t leave people hanging about 
and not doing a great deal. 
Unfortunately, the success of this mitigation strategy has uncovered a further risk to the viability of 
the organisation: in the event of further financial constraints, there is no more ‘fat’ to trim. With 
regards to working with vulnerable individuals, staff and volunteers are offered counselling services 
to mitigate the effect of the more stressful, draining elements of the charity’s work. 
Accountability 
Every participant agreed that the organisation is most accountable to its beneficiaries. This attitude 
appears to be driven by the experiences of some of the staff and volunteers working for other housing 
support organisations (mainly in the public and private sectors); they felt they were pressured to 
misrepresent clients’ chance of finding suitable housing for example, and discouraged from 
apologising to clients in the event of a delay, issue etc. In contrast, the charity is very honest with 
clients regarding the solutions the organisation can and cannot provide. CS3-Par-01 feels personally 
accountable to the funders of the charity: “If the funder says jump then [we say] how high.” This 
assessment is corroborated by CS3-Par-03 who states that they are close to the housing team and 
activities of the Scottish Government, and have a productive relationship with them (e.g. they engage 
in knowledge exchange with each other). There is also another benefit to the organisation’s 
relationship with the Scottish Government: the perceived reputational gains. As trustee CS3-Par-04 
opined, “Being [Scottish Government] funded, I think it also gives us integrity; we have been vetted.” 
The organisation discharges accountability in a number of ways to its beneficiaries, funders and the 
wider public. The group felt that the charity’s social media presence is an important medium for 
evidencing its activities in a transparent manner. The group appeared particularly proud of the 
organisation’s complaints handling procedure. All complaints are sent directly to the Managing 
Director, with the exception of issues that refer to their conduct, in which case they are transferred to 
the board of trustees. Most complaints are in relation to service quality and unsatisfactory client 
outcomes (e.g. an individual not securing their preferred housing option); interestingly, the 
organisation encourages clients and other stakeholders to report concerns, confident in the knowledge 
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that it has enough information at hand to properly assess the validity of the complaint. The charity 
engages proactively with clients regarding their satisfaction with its services: all clients are sent 
emails soliciting their feedback regarding their experience with the charity and occasionally conduct 
in-depth interviews with a sample of these individuals.  
Regulation 
Though no mention was made during the discussion of accountability, the group did identify a 
number of benefits of being subject to regulation by OSCR. There was strong agreement that 
reporting to OSCR kept the organisation on its toes with regards to financial and governance issues. 
The charity values the role of OSCR in protecting public confidence in the sector, particularly with 
respect to charitable donations and the assurance donors need that are giving to legitimate 
organisations. The group agreed that the current level of reporting requirements was sufficient, 
pointing to the fact the charity is already highly transparent and publishes lots of information via its 
website (e.g. case studies and statistics). If they have one suggestion for improving regulation, it is for 
OSCR to consider whether the term ‘charity’ continues to be helpful for describing the sector as a 
whole. As CS3-Par-01 cautioned: 
When I started with the organisation in 2008 it didn’t refer to itself as a charity at all and that 
was because, in those days, the word ‘charity’ was fairly pejorative [in our area of work]…It 
was a strategic decision to start calling ourselves a charity to promote our activities, and make 
people realise we’re not an arm of government and as a charity you are welcome to give 
money to us. 
7.4. Discussion and Conclusion 
There are a number of comparable and contrasting issues that emerge from the case studies. All three 
are understandably concerned with their financial position, though there is variation between their 
financial performances in recent years. A prominent theme is the frustration and burden associated 
with the reporting requirements imposed by funders; respondents seemed demoralised by the impact 
this had on their organisations, as it deters applications in the first place, and usurps scarce time and 
effort that could be spent on other activities. Each charity reported numerous transparency initiatives 
and activities, often exceeding the reporting requirements of their stakeholders. For example, case 
study two publishes its management reports online for anyone to view and case study three does 
likewise. Finally, all three charities seemed in agreement regarding the manner in which the sector is 
regulated by OSCR. There were few complaints about regulatory burden and praise for the positive 
impact of OSCR’s regime on the individual organisations (e.g. case study one considers their 
regulated status as a signal of good governance and trustworthiness). In terms of contrasting 
perspectives, it is interesting to note the different associations the organisations have with charity 
status and the word ‘charity’ more generally. The first case is sanguine about its charity status, 
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indicating that it has very little impact on the sustainability of the organisation and they are prepared 
to voluntarily discard this status if needs be. The third case is travelling in the opposite direction, 
having strategically decided on adopting charity status in an effort to attract more funding; though the 
organisation is concerned with the public’s conception of what the word ‘charity’ means. 
Examining the full set of results presented in this chapter, we can identify a number of important 
points that will be critiqued further in the concluding section of the thesis. Given the heavily 
scrutinised environment that charities currently operate in, it is surprising that charities are largely 
unconcerned with poor public perception and associated reputational risks. This finding emerges 
strongly in the survey, yet the case studies suggest that these organisations are very much aware of 
their operating environment, in particular the connotations surrounding charity status and the word 
‘charity’ itself. Perhaps charities are more concerned with their reputation and relationship with their 
funders, and are less concerned with the public’s perception of them (with the possible exception of 
case study three). Both the survey and the case studies suggest that charities are actively discharging 
accountability to a wide range of stakeholders, though it is clear that some are given more 
consideration than others (e.g. beneficiaries and funders). Drawing on Gieryn’s (1999) concept of 
‘boundary-work’, it appears that charities consider risk management to be broadly useful for a number 
of functions (e.g. helping demonstrate accountability to funders); charities should exercise caution 
however when making such judgements given the difficulties in measuring the effect of risk 
management practices (Mikes, 2011). In apportioning responsibility for managing risk in their 
organisations, stakeholders are likely to place the majority of the burden on themselves, though they 
recognise the importance of their colleagues in this regard also. This is interesting as risk could easily 
be considered somebody else’s problem in the organisation. Finally, around 50 percent of charities 
indicate that they have one or more of the following risk controls in place: risk policy; business 
continuity plan. However, the presence of these controls is strongly associated with organisation size, 
which has implications for the sustainability and resilience of smaller charities in the sector (i.e. the 
majority). Where controls are mentioned in the interviews and TARs, they tend to refer to financial 
risks and accompanying mitigating actions. 
This chapter concludes the reporting of our empirical findings. The final chapter summarises the key 
insights from these analyses and places them explicitly in the context of the contextual framework and 
wider literature. We also consider to what extent and in which ways the empirical evidence produces 
satisfactory answers to the project’s research questions. 
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Chapter Eight – Conclusion 
 
Source: xkcd. (n.d.). Correlation. Retrieved January 10, 2017, from https://xkcd.com/552/ 
8.1. Introduction 
The overall orientation of this thesis has been the empirical analysis of contemporary large-scale 
administrative social science datasets using established statistical methods, supported by modest use 
of primary social survey and qualitative data. From the outset, the goal was to develop an evidence 
base from which researchers, practitioners and policy makers could make informed judgements and 
decisions about the nature of risk in the charity sector. The thesis has therefore not engaged directly 
with ‘grand’ or ‘middle range’ sociological or organisational theories, seeking instead to produce new 
empirical knowledge grounded in an appropriate literature. A secondary aim of the research was to 
evaluate the suitability of administrative data for scholarship in this field. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the key findings from the empirical chapters are integrated in 
an effort to address the research questions stated in Chapter Three. This is followed by the proposal of 
a research agenda that builds new knowledge in each of the analytical topics explored in this study. 
The nature of the research process, specifically the collaborative structure of the project, is then 
reflected on. Finally, the ways and to what extent this thesis makes an original empirical contribution 
to scholarship in this area is clearly stated, accompanied by some concluding remarks. 
8.2. Key Findings 
The first research question is concerned with uncovering the risk factors that are associated with 
charities failing; a secondary issue is whether there are indicators that could be used by OSCR to 
identify risky charities. The detailed multivariate analysis in Chapter Four reveals clear patterns in the 
types of charities that are most at risk of investigation by the regulator, but the crucial insight is the 
disconnect between these and the factors that predict regulatory action. In essence, there is a large 
degree of ‘noise’ (complaints) obscuring the ‘signal’ (misconduct). The absence of clear indicators of 
misconduct reinforces the role of tacit knowledge and in-depth investigation on the part of OSCR in 
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dealing with this issue, as well as evidence of the limitations of these datasets for guiding regulatory 
actions. By revealing the disconnect between the level of complaints and concerns that require 
regulatory action, we argue there is much work to do for practitioners in the sector with regards to 
charity reputation and stakeholder communication. Charity boards are ultimately responsible for the 
governance of their organisation, and must ensure that adequate policies and procedures are in place. 
This includes reducing the risk of misconduct occurring, taking corrective action in response to 
guidance from the regulator, and developing the management and reporting functions required to deal 
with the consequences. Regulators and charity sector infrastructure bodies should consider developing 
guidance for charities of all sizes on how to cultivate and manage their reputations and 
communications with stakeholders. Recognition should also be given to the role that stakeholders 
such as funders, auditors and independent examiners must play in self-regulation of the sector, given 
their proximity to charities through their day-to-day activities. Overall, the results represent an 
original contribution to the charity failure literature through a comprehensive analysis of an important 
outcome using novel data. 
The combined findings of Chapter Five and Six provide tentative evidence that public concerns 
regarding the financial vulnerability of charities are valid, though only for a minority of organisations. 
Longitudinal analysis unveils stable patterns of occurrences of vulnerability and accountability 
concerns in the Scottish charity sector, while also demonstrating that these outcomes do not persist for 
individual charities throughout the study period. The salient finding from these analyses is that our 
suite of measures for vulnerability are uncorrelated with significant, negative events in the sector (e.g. 
being investigated or removed from the Scottish Charity Register). While this finding tempers 
concerns regarding the financial sustainability or conduct of charities, it should also be acknowledged 
that the absence of association may be due to measurement issues. Combining the findings of these 
three empirical chapters, we see the importance of having reactive and proactive regulatory 
mechanisms for identifying risk in the sector, to counter the partial account a single approach 
provides.  
The second research question is interested in charities own perception and identification of risk, and 
their attitudes and behaviours with respect to associated topics such as accountability and regulatory 
burden. The survey and case study results show that charities are not very concerned with regulatory 
or reputational risks, despite the oft-stated importance of public trust to the sector’s health. Key 
charity stakeholders – trustees, senior management, employees and volunteers – feel a strong sense of 
role-based responsibility for dealing with risk in their organisation. Finally, there is a persistent and 
strong association between the size of the charity and the degree of relevance and concern with 
significant risks facing these organisations. There is some degree of overlap between the measures of 
risk in the OSCR data and the significant risks reported by charities through the survey and case 
studies. Even accounting for the lack of association with negative outcomes, some of the 
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accountability indicators in Chapter Five capture financial risks experienced by charities (particularly 
sharp changes in annual gross income or expenditure), while the investigations data also record 
instances of fraud and financial misappropriation. In other areas, there is a clear divergence in the 
concerns of the regulator and charities when it comes to risk. For instance, governance and 
fundraising risks are difficult to measure using the administrative data (though OSCR did launch a 
consultation on the construction of a trustee database, but in light of feedback did not proceed with 
this initiative). 
Linking the key findings together, the thesis reveals much about the intersection of risk and regulation 
in the charity sector. First, many of the risks examined in this thesis, especially the definitions and 
measures, are based upon the regulatory priorities of OSCR, and it is clear that there are gaps in what 
these data can tell us about the totality of risk in the sector. OSCR should assess its risk measurement 
practices in the context of the core issues highlighted in section 2.2.2, especially the inadequacy of 
using a single measure of risk (e.g. financial vulnerability), and the importance of subjective 
judgement in analysing risk (e.g. identifying which charities are most likely at risk of regulatory 
action as a result of a complaint; see Taylor, 2012). Employing Gieryn’s (1999) ‘boundary-work’ 
concept again, we see that both the regulator and charities (especially large) define the domain of risk 
management in their organisation widely. While it is difficult to argue against greater awareness of 
risk and the principles and practices of its management, Mikes’ (2011) argument that organisations 
should resist overreaching in their application of risk management is a salient one, particularly to 
situations where risk is difficult to measure. Finally, while not able to address every element of the 
contextual framework in Figure 2.1, the empirical work demonstrates the value of linking the three 
levels in order to produce an original contribution to the charity risk and accountability literatures. For 
example, Chapter Five uncovers a range of vulnerabilities in the sector through the analysis of 
OSCR’s accountability monitoring scheme, where the administrative data necessary to examine this 
phenomenon is generated by mandatory reporting requirements. We advocate for greater use of such 
techniques in researching risk in the charity sector. 
To sum, the central thesis is the need for a comprehensive, multidimensional examination of risk in 
the charity sector that draws upon a variety of data resources. Charity regulators can be reactive 
and/or proactive in the identification, measurement and management of risk. The analysis of data 
relating to reactive regulatory initiatives – like the investigation of misconduct described in Chapter 
Four – uncovers a broad suite of concerns, and the types of charities that are most at risk of 
investigation; however, the data are limited in what they can reveal about actual misconduct. To 
address this deficiency, OSCR implemented a proactive monitoring scheme aimed at uncovering 
(mainly) financial vulnerabilities through the use of charities’ accounts information. These data 
uncover a largely different set of risks in the sector, although none are linked with negative 
organisational outcomes such as investigation, regulatory action or dissolution. This lack of predictive 
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power persists even when we adopt standard academic measures of vulnerability, which poses two 
challenge for the regulator: identifying a different set of relevant risks, such as those referenced by 
charities themselves; and developing better or alternative indicators of existing risks such as 
misconduct or financial vulnerability. As this research developed, OSCR made progress in addressing 
these challenges. It is in the process of rationalising the 32 financial exceptions analysed in Chapter 
Five, with the aim of producing a shortened list of exceptions that are checked pre and post-
submission of a charity’s accounts. Another way in which the regulator is addressing gaps in its 
identification of risks in the sector is the implementation of a new accountability mechanism for 
charities: the Notifiable Events scheme. From 01 April 2016, OSCR requests that charities report 
certain types of serious events to the regulator; these are incidents, ongoing and historical, that 
threaten to have a significant impact on the charity or its assets.  
More significantly, OSCR has developed an evolving set of risks that it focuses on as part of its risk-
based approach to regulation. The ten most concerning risks, according to a 2016 press release 
document, are as follows: (i) Persons acting as charity trustees while disqualified; (ii) A charity 
trustee acting improperly which adversely impacts on the charity’s assets and/or beneficiaries; (iii) A 
charity being used for or being the victim of criminal activity; (iv) A charity operating in a fragile 
territory; (v) Charities that repeatedly fail to meet their reporting requirements to the Regulator; (vi) 
Charities that take actions without seeking prior consent from the Regulator; (vii) Charities that do not 
provide public benefit; (viii) Individuals or organisations who are inappropriately benefiting from 
charitable status; (ix) Charities who are at the margins of the charity test or who have complex and/or 
novel structures; (x) Bodies or individuals who misrepresent themselves as charities (Office of the 
Scottish Charity Regulator, 2016b). Given the relative lack of overlap between the data analysed in 
this thesis and the nature of the ten risks in the framework, it is imperative that OSCR prioritises the 
collection of robust, accurate information about risk, and continues to increase the transparency of 
charity finances, activities and outcomes. In conclusion, data (especially administrative) give new 
insights but they do no tell the whole story. 
8.3. Research Agenda 
8.3.1. Charity misconduct 
Regulatory data relating to investigations is generated on a continuous basis, providing the foundation 
for longitudinal analysis of complaints and misconduct; this type of data would be amenable to 
studying the duration to the first investigation and between subsequent occurrences for example. 
Further work could be done to understand the antecedents and outcomes resulting from investigations, 
particularly from the perspective of the charities and the actors that raise concerns. For example, 
Rothschild’s (2013) findings suggest that the frequency of observed misconduct, the democratic 
tendencies of management, and the alignment of values between the organisation and whistle-blower 
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should all be considered when seeking to understand the drivers of complaints about charity conduct. 
Though not incorporated into this study, it could be possible to access detailed, qualitative data on the 
content of the advice provided by OSCR and any response to this contact by the charity. With regards 
to the posited explanatory factors (visibility and high stakes), additional data could be sought in order 
to test their effect; for example, annual UK charity brand surveys are available for purchase and 
OSCR possesses detailed financial information for a subset of larger charities in Scotland. Finally, the 
dependent variables in this study could be utilised as explanatory factors in a wider study of charity 
accountability internationally. By combining investigations data with concerns raised by charities 
themselves (collected by OSCR since April 2016) and matters of material significance reported by 
independent examiners and auditors, there is the potential to conduct a multidimensional examination 
of misconduct and accountability in the sector. 
8.3.2. Financial vulnerability 
Arguably, the most important focus is to explore alternative, potentially more valid definitions and 
measures of financial vulnerability (e.g. the use of different thresholds for determining whether a 
charity is vulnerable or not). This could be done by linking vulnerability directly to instances of 
organisational demise due to a wind up for example (Cordery et al., 2013). In the context of cross-
national studies and replication concerns, there is an argument for employing our measures to explore 
whether there are systematic differences in the nature and extent of vulnerability for charities in 
different jurisdictions and economies; this could be done by comparing countries with similar 
regulatory regimes or administrative data resources. Finally, there has been little attention paid to the 
behaviour of charities with respect to financial vulnerability; for example, how does the organisation 
react to a drop in funding? Are charities cognisant of financial vulnerability risks and if so what plans 
do they have in place to mitigate the impact of these risks? 
8.3.3. Accountability 
There is a dearth of evidence on charities’ understanding of and response to accountability concerns 
(Acar, Guo & Yang, 2012), which could be addressed by a programme of longitudinal, qualitative 
research. Research could also focus on regulatory regimes – charity or otherwise – that are successful 
in dissuading undesirable behaviours and preventing negative outcomes. Specific to OSCR’s 
accountability monitoring programme, it would be interesting to investigate prior knowledge of the 
exceptions, whether tactics are employed to avoid triggering these concerns, and the organisational 
learning or behavioural changes resulting from engagement with the monitoring programme. In the 
UK, the existence of three broadly similar regulatory regimes (Scotland, England and Wales, and 
Northern Ireland) offers the potential for detailed comparative work (e.g. natural experiments) to be 
conducted on the impact of different reporting thresholds and accountability demands. Finally, 
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alternative data sources – such as the Trustee Annual Report (TAR) – could be mined for a wider, 
more specific suite of independent variables and performance-related information. 
8.3.4. Understanding of risk 
Given the volume and detail of their application and reporting requirements (at least as described by 
the case study organisations), getting access to data held by funders would reveal much about charity 
effectiveness and risk management. An oversight in this survey, it would be instructive to know the 
strategies and mitigating actions charities take in response to the significant risks facing them. For 
both the survey and case studies, a longitudinal research design would capture the evolving nature of 
risk in terms of organisational concern, tolerance and impact. 
8.4. Reflection on the Collaborative Research Studentship 
This thesis derives from the work of a close collaboration between the doctoral student, supervisors 
and OSCR. Not only did this arrangement have administrative and contractual implications for the 
project, it also influenced (and in some cases determined) the focus of the academic inquiry. The 
greatest benefit of the collaboration was the access to rich administrative data about the charity sector. 
While some of this data has become publicly available since the project began in 2013, our 
relationship with OSCR ensured we had access to the regulator’s operational and management 
information i.e. investigations and financial exceptions records. The process of transforming the data 
for research purposes was improved by the contribution of a number of individuals at OSCR, whose 
guidance helped us understand technical, abstract definitions and measures in the data. Going one step 
further, these same individuals were a tremendous source of tacit knowledge about the sector, 
assisting us in the construction of appropriate independent and dependent variables (e.g. what does 
regulatory action mean?), and in the development and distribution of the survey. From the perspective 
of a budding early-career researcher, the collaboration offered many opportunities for developing 
crucial skills in relation to knowledge exchange (e.g. numerous field visits, presentations to staff and 
board members), building strategic networks (especially with a non-academic partner), and co-
producing research ideas. 
In terms of the impact of the research on OSCR, we leave it to the regulator itself to describe: 
At a time when OSCR has embarked on a new proactive and preventative approach, this 
detailed analysis has added considerable value to the administrative data generated by its 
processes. The insight from an academic perspective has helped the regulator reflect on the 
contribution that its interventions make to detecting and dealing with risk.  Such research can 
inform policy making in a practical regulatory environment and in this case, it will contribute 
to the development of an evolving risk-based process. (OSCR employee, date) 
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8.4.1. The use of administrative charity data for research. 
We hope the analyses presented in the thesis communicate the rich potential of administrative charity 
data for use in social research. The value of the data for studying particular topics (e.g. misconduct) is 
documented throughout this thesis; for now, we focus on the general advantages associated with using 
Scottish charity data. The OSCR data are generally of a good standard, particularly when compared 
with information collected by the Charity Commission for England and Wales. First, the definitions 
and measurements employed by OSCR have remained consistent over the study period (2006-2014), 
with the noted exception of the audit threshold, which was altered from £100,000 to £250,000 for 
annual returns from 2012 onwards. The most important implication of this fact is we can easily 
identify which organisations are Scottish charities, in contrast to England and Wales where charities 
below a certain income threshold do not need to be registered with the regulator. Second, changes to 
the status of a charity are recorded on existing observations, meaning there is no issue trying to link 
observations on the same organisation over time. For example, changes to a charity’s constitutional 
form are recorded in a separate field rather than creating a new charity number. Finally, the use of a 
persistent unique identifier, the Scottish Charity Number, across all of OSCR’s datasets (both publicly 
available and internal) makes the construction of linked, rich datasets a simple task. In the spirit and 
practice of transparency and reproducibility, the data underpinning this research are made available 
through an open access repository; see the appendices for links to the datasets. 
8.5. Concluding Remarks 
In summary, the purpose of this research was to produce detailed empirical analyses investigating 
original areas of inquiry in the fields of charity failure and accountability. In addition, the thesis also 
aimed to demonstrate the value of administrative social science data resources in producing original 
research outputs. The contextual framework in the second chapter highlighted the multitude of factors 
that should be taken into account when researching risk in the charity sector. The results of this thesis 
have demonstrated the pervasive but relatively minor nature (in terms of negative outcomes) of 
certain risks in the Scottish charity sector; however, this finding is tempered by concerns surrounding 
the validity of the measures we can construct using administrative data. The thesis has addressed gaps 
in the charity behaviour and accountability literature in a comprehensive manner, producing new 
empirical evidence on the nature, extent, risk factors and outcomes of organisational misconduct in 
particular. However, there is more work to do in fully addressing these gaps, especially in the context 
of OSCR’s evolving risk framework, a novel accountability mechanism (Notifiable Events), and the 
increasing availability, and associated linkage potential, of relevant social science datasets (e.g. 
government/funder open data initiatives like 360giving – http://www.threesixtygiving.org/). 
In terms of practical recommendations for better regulation of the sector, OSCR should publish more 
detailed, accessible information and guidance for reporting misconduct and other concerns to the 
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regulator; this will enable it to collect better, more accurate reports that support targeted interventions, 
thus addressing the disconnect issue uncovered in Chapter Four. OSCR could engage with charities on 
a systematic, regular basis to address issues surrounding misconduct, accountability and public trust. 
For example, it could develop guidance or case studies based on analysis of previous investigations 
that could be used by charities to be proactive and deal with complaints themselves; this applies to 
data relating to accountability concerns also. This would allow charities to adapt their governance and 
reporting practices in response to specific and sector-wide concerns, particularly important given that 
Chapter Seven highlighted the relative lack of concern charities have with risks relating to public 
perception or reputation. Finally, OSCR should continue down the path of greater transparency, 
particularly in relation to making greater amounts of data available to researchers and the wider 
public. 
This thesis makes an original contribution in the form of new empirical knowledge about the charity 
sector, in particular through the use of large-scale administrative social science data to ‘peer under the 
hood’ and shine a light on aspects of charity behaviour that are often overlooked or unobservable 
through other data collection methods. 
 155 
 
Appendices 
Chapter Three 
Ethics proposal submitted to University of Stirling – September 2014. 
The research will be conducted in compliance with the Economic and Social Research Council’s 
(ESRC) Framework for Research Ethics 2012. The framework provides researchers with a set of 
guiding principles for the conduct of ethical research in the social sciences. The following ethical 
issues, based on the ESRC’s principles, have been identified for this research project: 
Informed consent – all research participants will be fully informed about the purpose, methods and 
intended uses of the research. Consent for qualitative methods will be accepted through a written 
declaration prior to the conduct of any interviews and a disclaimer will accompany the online 
questionnaire, informing respondents of their right to give informed consent. 
Confidentiality and anonymity – risk could feasibly been seen as a sensitive topic by charities; the 
collaboration with OSCR during this research might also be seen as problematic when requesting 
information from charities regarding behaviour (issues that are relevant for getting consent as well). 
The survey and case study participants will be assured that their contributions will remain confidential 
and their identities anonymous throughout and beyond the duration of the research. 
Harm to the researcher – simple protocols will be put in place for any fieldwork to be conducted 
(such as semi-structured interviews). For instance, the researcher’s schedule will be reported to a third 
party prior to undertaking field work, a mobile phone will be carried at all times while in the field, and 
interview locations will be selected with safety concerns in mind.  
Harm to participants – the content and language of written materials will be sensitive to 
participant’s context. Participants will have the right to stop the interviews at any time. The data 
collection instruments will be unambiguous, the researcher will be honest about the requirements of 
the research, and a pilot phase will be part of the testing of any instruments. 
Harm to discipline – the research will prevent damaging the rigour and reputation of its discipline by 
ensuring that quality considerations are embedded in every stage of the research.  
Data storage, archiving and destruction – the research project’s data collection, analysis and 
dissemination processes will comply with the UK Data Protection Act 1998. Specific to this research: 
the research findings will only be used for their intended purpose; an anonymised dataset of the 
survey responses will be kept for up to a maximum of ten years from the conclusion of the data 
collection phase; and any electronic devices used to store research data, in particular confidential 
administrative data from OSCR, will be encrypted and password protected. 
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Motives –while it is difficult for researchers to remain completely objective in social research, care 
will be taken to ensure the researcher’s own motives and beliefs do not shape the conduct and findings 
of the study. 
Survey questionnaire 
Thank you very much for considering participating in this survey. By taking part, you will help us 
understand more about the nature of, and perceptions about, risk in the charity sector. 
This survey explores: 
 your charity's understanding of risk; 
 the risk management practices of your charity; 
 the risks your charity faces. 
The survey should take about 5-10 minutes to complete. If you contribute to the survey, we will 
ensure your anonymity and confidentiality is maintained throughout all phases of the research 
process. Thank you for your time. 
If you are unclear about the nature and purpose of this survey and would like further clarification, 
please contact Diarmuid McDonnell, School of Applied Social Science, University of Stirling 
(diarmuid.mcdonnell@stir.ac.uk) who is leading this research. 
Many thanks, 
Diarmuid McDonnell 
Doctoral Researcher, University of Stirling 
 
The survey questions can be viewed here: http://bit.ly/2psyArY 
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Interview topic guide 
The list of questions below is a guide to be used flexibly by the interviewer. In particular it will 
depend on the interviewee’s answers to the earlier, contextual questions as their responses will shape 
the order and nature of the questions which follow. Nevertheless, if time permits, an attempt will be 
made to cover all of these topics to some extent in each interview. The interviews are a way of 
bringing complexity to the findings of the survey. 
Use prompts and probes. 
Don’t mention investigations – some won’t know that they have been subject to one. 
Be as concrete (specific) as possible in my posing of the questions. The answer to a question should 
be an observable implication of the topic I’m interested, not necessarily the correct answer. 
Interviewees should not do the work for me. 
1. Context 
Tell me about your charity. 
What is your role in the organisation? 
How long have you been involved with this charity? 
2. Significant risks 
Tell me about some of your charity’s recent achievements. 
Could you tell me about some of the biggest challenges or risks facing your charity? 
What strategies do you employ to deal with the risks facing your charity? I need to get at the idea of 
risk as an organising principle. 
Do you feel that your charity has sufficient resources to tackle these risks? 
Charities have been subject to intense public, media and parliamentary scrutiny recently. Do you feel 
that instances of misconduct, perceived or otherwise, impacts your charity in any way? 
If someone had an issue with the conduct of your charity, do you have a procedure in place for 
dealing with complaints? Have you had to deal with any complaints about the charity’s conduct 
recently? [Potentially sensitive] 
3. Accountability 
Could you tell me about the ways in which your charity demonstrates accountability to its various 
stakeholders? If participants require elaboration then give examples of publishing accounts/reports 
online. 
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What about the demands for your charity to be accountable? Do you think managing the risks facing 
your charity helps you to be accountable? 
Do you think that your charity, and charities in general, are properly held accountable? 
4. Regulation 
Thinking about charity regulation, do you feel it has a positive impact on the governance of the 
charity? Do you feel that the level of regulation your charity is subjected to is overly burdensome? 
Thinking in terms of the risks facing your charity and the sector more broadly, is there anything 
OSCR does or could do to help manage these risks? 
Are there opportunities for OSCR to learn from charities in order to be a more effective regulator? 
What about opportunities for charities to learn from OSCR? If participants require elaboration then 
mention the data they have on public complaints and whether sharing this information would be 
useful to charities. 
Do you feel that you are a risky charity in the regulator’s eyes? If participants require a definition of 
risky: conducting itself in a way that could damage public confidence. 
5. Close 
Finally, is there anything else you’d like to say about what we’ve covered today? Or something that 
we haven’t covered? 
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Chapter Four 
Table A4.1. Distribution of annual gross income 
 Not investigated  Investigated Whole sample
Statistic income 
income 
(log)  income
income 
(log) income
income 
(log)
N 24,045 24,045  1,566 1,566 25,611 25,611
    
p5 80 4.3  908 6.8 90 4.5
    
p25 1,933 7.6  17,394 9.8 2,086 7.6
    
p50 10,799 9.3  89,394 11.4 12,243 9.4
    
p75 55,542 10.9  521,771 13.2 64,939 11.1
    
p95 793,103 13.6  18,268,000 16.7 303,861 13.9
    
mean 566,153 9.2  5,319,561 11.4 856,810 9.3
    
sd 8,726,481 2.8  33,942,019 3.0 11,967,041 2.8
    
skewness 54 -0.3  14 -0.1 40 -0.2
    
kurtosis 3,803 4.1  252 3.7 2,032 4.0
    
total 
13,613,147,077 221,150.5  
8,330,431,93
5 17,928.2 21,941,203,120 239,078.7
Note: All figures in £; figures for income (log) rounded to one decimal place. 
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Figure A4.1. Histogram of annual gross income (log), by investigation status 
 
 
Table A4.2. Distribution of categorical function form of annual gross income 
 Not investigated  Investigated Whole sample
Organisation size N %  N % N %
£1 - £24,999 15,201 63  483 31 15,684 61
£25,000 - £99,999 4,635 19  327 21 4,961 19
£100,000 - £499,999 2,683 11  356 23 3,039 12
£500,000 - £999,999 474 2  105 7 578 2
£1,000,000 - £9,999,999 810 3  183 12 992 4
£10m + 242 1  112 7 354 1
Total 24,045 100  1,566 100 25,611 100
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus columns may not sum to 100. 
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Figure A4.2. Distribution of charity age 
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Statistical modelling process 
Investigated 
Model 1 contains only the constant (i.e. the proportion of all charities that have been investigated). 
Model 2 includes only the independent variables relevant to the hypotheses being tested (the log 
metric functional form of organisation size). Model 3 is similar to Model 2 but replaces the metric 
form of Size with the categorical. Model 4 builds on Model 3 by including the remaining independent 
variables: Field, Form, Geography, Grant, and Parent. Finally, Model 5 replicates Model 4 but 
includes an interaction term for Size and Age.  
Models 2, 3 and 4 demonstrate that there is a statistically significant effect of organisation size on the 
likelihood of being investigated. Model 2 explores the main effect of the natural log of annual gross 
income. For a one unit increase in log income there is a 35 percent increase in the odds of being 
investigated. In terms of the original units, a 20 percent increase in annual gross income corresponds 
with an increase in the odds ratio of .25 (that is, a 25 percent increase in the odds of being investigated 
compared to an organisation with 20 percent less income). For the categorical measure of size there 
appears to be a clear income gradient, where the odds of being investigated are higher for all charity 
sizes compared to the reference category of £1-£24,999. Once other factors are controlled for (model 
4), the largest charities (£10m +)  have odds of being investigated that are between seven and thirteen 
times greater than the smallest organisations; while a seemingly large figure, this is an accurate 
approximation of the relative risk of being investigated. The proportion of charities investigated in 
each organisation size category corroborates the findings of the regression analysis: the relative risk 
ratio for the largest charities compared the smallest is approximately 10:1 (32 percent of larger 
charities investigated compared to three percent of the smallest). 
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Table A4.3. Results of Logistic Regression on outcome of being investigated – multiple models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Size (base = £1 - £24,999)  
     £25,000 - £99,999 2.27 (.18)*** 2.12 (.18)*** 1.51 (.38)
     £100,000 - £499,999 4.33 (.33)*** 3.12 (.28)*** 2.23 (.60)**
     £500,000 - £999,999 7.05 (.86)*** 4.36 (.59)*** 2.89 (1.26)*
     £1,000,000 - £9,999,999 7.27 (.70)*** 4.67 (.55)*** .37 (.13)**
     £10m + 14.03 (1.78)*** 10.29 (1.60)*** 1.23 (.51)
Size (log) 1.35 (.01)***  
Age .83 (.03)*** .82 (.03)*** .95 (.03) .76 (.04)***
Grant  .77 (.06)*** .81 (.06)**
Parent  .49 (.06)*** .52 (.06)***
Size*Age (base = £1 - £24,999)  
     £25,000 - £99,999  1.15 (.10)
     £100,000 - £499,999  1.15 (.11)
     £500,000 - £999,999  1.18 (.18)
     £1,000,000 - £9,999,999  2.51 (.29)***
     £10m +  2.28 (.33)***
Constant .07 (.00)*** .01 (00)*** .06 (.01)*** .03 (.00)*** .06 (.01)***
  
Observations 22,088 22,088 22,088 22,088 22,088
Log-likelihood -5334.42 -4879.61 -4883.02 -4738.40 -4695.11
BIC n/a -211152.40 -211105.56 -211124.72 -211161.30
 164 
 
Likelihood Ratio (previous model) n/a 909.62*** 902.79 1192.03*** 1278.62***
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Figures rounded to two decimal places. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
 165 
 
Regulatory action 
Model 1 contains only the constant (that is, the proportion of all charities that have had regulatory 
action taken against them). Model 2 includes only the independent variables relevant to the 
hypotheses being tested (the log metric functional form of organisation size). Model 3 is similar to 
Model 2 but replaces the metric form of Size with the categorical. Model 4 builds on Model 3 by 
including the remaining independent variables: Field, Form, Geography, Grant, Parent, Public and 
Misconduct. As regulatory action is dependent on whether an investigation has occurred, the sample 
is restricted to those charities that have been investigated and have no missing data for all of the 
independent variables. The sample size is not constant across the four models however, as some 
categories of the independent variables perfectly predict the outcome. 
The regression results suggest that predicting regulatory action is opaque compared to being 
investigated. In Model 3 and 4, there is no evidence of an income gradient although it does appear that 
the largest charities have lower odds of having regulatory action taken against them. The metric form 
of organisation size in Model 2 confirms that there is a small reduction in the odds of the outcome 
occurring as the size of a charity increases; statistical significance is present only in the absence of 
controls and disappears once these are included. There is no effect of age on the outcome once other 
factors are accounted for (Model 4). Perhaps of most interest are the additional independent variables 
in the final model. If the investigation is triggered by a complaint from a member of the public, the 
odds of regulatory action being taken against a charity are lower by sixteen percent. This suggests 
that, while most likely to complain about the conduct of an organisation, members of the public are 
worse at spotting actions by a charity that merit regulatory intervention compared to other parties. In 
terms of the reasons driving investigations, complaints based on concerns about organisational 
misconduct have higher odds of triggering regulatory action than other concerns (e.g. criminal, 
governance). 
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Table A4.4. Results of Logistic Regression on outcome of regulatory action – multiple models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Size (base = £1 - £24,999) 
     £25,000 - £99,999 1.54 (.39) 1.50 (.39)
     £100,000 - £499,999 .78 (.21) .84 (.25)
     £500,000 - £999,999 1.21 (.43) 1.37 (.54)
     £1,000,000 - £9,999,999 .36 (.15)* .38 (.18)*
     £10m + .50 (.23) .82 (.42)
Size (log) .91 (.03)**
Age 1.06 (.12) 1.05 (.12) 1.02 (.13)
Grant 1.20 (.28)
Parent .51 (.24)
Public .83 (.17)
Misconduct 1.36 (.43)
Constant 
.12 (.01)*** .31 (.14)**
.11 
(.04)***
.15 
(.07)***
 
Observations 1,238 1,238 1,238 1,173
Log-likelihood -411.60 -407.39 -401.49 -384.10
BIC n/a -7979.97 -7963.28 -7288.54
Likelihood Ratio (previous model) n/a 8.429* 20.22* 40.41
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Figures rounded to two decimal places. Model 4 has fewer 
observations as certain categories of Form were omitted from the estimation of the model as they 
perfectly predicted the outcome. Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.  
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Figure A4.3. Logistic Regression on the outcome of being investigated – model residuals and 
deviance 
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Figure A4.4. Logistic Regression on the outcome of regulatory action – model residuals and deviance 
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Figure A4.5. Logistic Regression on the outcome of being investigated – influence of observations on 
model estimation 
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Figure A4.6. Logistic Regression on the outcome of regulatory action – influence of observations on 
model estimation 
 
  
 171 
 
Chapter Five 
Table A5.1. Financial Exception codes 
Exception code Description 
Large charity or major fundraiser 
1 Total incoming resources are over £10M. 
2 Total donations gifts and legacies received over £1M. 
Sudden growth or contraction 
3 Total incoming resources are over £250,000 and over five times the previous 
year’s. 
4 Total incoming resources previous year were over £250,000 and this year’s are 
under one fifth. 
Possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
5 Cost of generating voluntary funds is over 50% of donations plus legacies. 
6 Cost of trading in order to raise funds exceeds income from trading in order to 
raise funds. 
8 Total resources expended are under 67% of total incoming resources. 
9 Governance costs are over 25% of total resources expended. 
10 “Other” is more than 50% of resources expended. 
Poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
11 Total resources expended are over 150% of total incoming resources. 
12 Negative total net assets. 
13 Debtors more than 30% of total incoming resources. 
14 Creditors payable within one year more than 50% of total resources expended. 
15 Negative net current assets (ie net current liabilities) more than 20% of total 
incoming resources. 
16 Unrestricted fund negative and more than 1% of total incoming resources. 
Fundraising issues (also 5 and 6) 
17 Unauthorised fundraising answered yes. 
Adequacy of governing board 
18 Two or fewer trustees and either total incoming resources over £1M or total 
net assets over £1M. 
19 No trustees normally residing in Scotland. 
Transactions with trustees 
20 Payments to trustees settling outlays greater than £50,000. 
21 Payments to Trustees for professional services to the charity greater than 
£50,000. 
22 Payments to Trustees for professional services greater than 30% of total 
resources expended. 
23 Payments to Trustees for any other work done for the charity is greater than 
£50,000. 
24 Payments to Trustees for any other work done for the charity is over 30% of 
total resources expended. 
25 Payment to Trustees for any other reason over £50,000. 
26 Payments to Trustees for any other reason over 30% of total resources 
expended. 
27 Payments to trustees for professional services, work done or “other”, and no 
specific authority in constitution. 
28 Money owed by Trustee at any time greater than £5,000. 
29 Sales of properties to Trustees greater than £50,000. 
30 Property gifted to trustee(s) value over £500. 
31 Purchase of properties from Trustees greater than £50,000. 
32 Charity occupied property belonging to a trustee and paid more than £20,000. 
33 Services made available to one or more trustees. 
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Table A5.2. Financial Exception groups 
Exception group Description 
1 Large charity or major fundraiser 
2 Sudden growth or contraction 
3 Possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
4 Poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
5 Adequacy of governing board 
6 Transactions with trustees 
 
Figure A5.1. Sequence index plot of large charity or major fundraiser 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 268 charities that triggered this exception 
at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Figure A5.2. Sequence index plot of sudden growth or contraction 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 48 charities that triggered this exception 
at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Figure A5.3. Sequence index plot of the possible failure to apply funds for charitable purposes 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 722 charities that triggered this exception 
at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Figure A5.4. Sequence index plot of poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 498 charities that triggered this exception 
at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Figure A5.5. Sequence index plot of adequacy of governing board 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 53 charities that triggered this exception 
at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Figure A5.6. Sequence index plot of transactions with trustees 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 343 charities that triggered this exception 
at least once and is ordered by exception status in 2007. 
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Table A5.3. Collinearity of independent variables for possible failure to apply funds for charitable 
purposes 
 Size Age Concentration Grant Form Geography Field
Size 1   
Age .03 1  
Concentration .13* .10* 1 
Grant .06* -.02 -.16* 1
Form .41*** .39*** .19*** .39*** 1
Geography .32*** .15*** .12*** .35*** .17*** 1
Field .37*** .38*** .21*** .31*** .29*** .28*** 1
Note: Pearson correlation statistic is reported for associations between metric variables; Eta statistic for 
associations between metric and categorical; and Cramer’s V statistics for associations between 
categorical variables. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
 
Table A5.4. Collinearity of independent variables for poor liquidity, low reserves, threats to viability 
 Size Age Concentration Grant Form Geography Field
Size 1   
Age .00 1  
Concentration .03 .09* 1 
Grant .04* .08* -.16* 1
Form .27*** .43*** .10*** .45*** 1
Geography .21*** .19*** .15*** .34*** .14*** 1
Field .27*** .38*** .25*** .34*** .29*** .26*** 1
Note: Pearson correlation statistic is reported for associations between metric variables; Eta statistic 
for associations between metric and categorical; and Cramer’s V statistic for associations between 
categorical variables. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Chapter Six 
Table A6.1. Missing data for each of the dependent variables 2008-2013 
 % of charities
Vulnerability  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Overall
Funding 17 22 13 13 5 12 14
Financial 22 28 28 30 32 39 29
Programme 22 28 28 30 32 39 29
Insolvency 9 18 20 20 28 28 20
Any financial 
vulnerability 
20 26 26 27 30 35 27
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest integer and thus may not sum to 100. With the exception of 
funding risk, data for each of the vulnerabilities is more likely to be missing for the most recent years 
in the panel: this is probably accounted for by the fact that very few Cross Border or Registered Social 
Landlords were dropped from the dataset in 2012 or 2013 when the annual gross income threshold 
was altered. 
Table A6.2. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of funding risk 
 Not vulnerable 
(n=1,202) 
 Vulnerable
(n=80)
Whole sample
(n=1,282)
Variable M SD  M SD M SD
Age (log) 3.21 .67  3.21 .70 3.21 .67
Size (log) 13.83 1.26  13.52 .99 13.81 1.25
Concentration .30 .22  .34 .24 .30 .22
Leverage .58 .37  .45 .39 .57 .37
Turnover .42 .56  1.09 1.96 .47 .75
Unrestricted funds 12.97 1.99  13.46 1.97 13.00 2.00
Loss .19 .39  .14 .35 .19 .39
Lagged financial vulnerability .29 .46  .44 .50 .30 .46
Operate locally and overseas 
(%) 
14 -  23 - 15 -
Social services (%) 30 -  11 - 28 -
Company (%) 70 -  60 - 69 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Only selected categories from the control 
variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
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Table A6.3. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of financial risk 
 Not vulnerable 
(n=1,086) 
 Vulnerable
(n=196)
Whole sample
(n=1,282)
Variable M SD  M SD M SD
Age (log) 3.22 .68  3.16 .66 3.21 .67
Size (log) 13.84 1.27  13.65 1.14 13.81 1.25
Concentration .30 .22  .31 .23 .30 .22
Leverage .59 .36  .42 .38 .57 .37
Turnover .49 .75  .35 .75 .47 .75
Unrestricted funds 13.04 1.95  12.77 2.21 13.00 2.00
Loss .18 .39  .21 .41 .19 .39
Lagged financial vulnerability .29 .46  .35 .48 .30 .46
Operate locally and overseas 
(%) 
14 -  18 - 15 -
Social services (%) 29 -  27 - 28 -
Company (%) 70 -  64 - 69 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Only selected categories from the control 
variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
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Table A6.4. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of programme risk 
 Not vulnerable 
(n=1,187) 
 Vulnerable
(n=95)
Whole sample
(n=1,282)
Variable M SD  M SD M SD
Age (log) 3.21 .68  3.25 .66 3.21 .67
Size (log) 13.83 1.27  13.54 .91 13.81 1.25
Concentration .30 .22  .27 .22 .30 .22
Leverage .57 .37  .53 .38 .57 .37
Turnover .46 .75  .58 .75 .47 .75
Unrestricted funds 13.00 2.00  12.99 1.96 13.00 2.00
Loss .18 .38  .25 .44 .19 .39
Lagged financial vulnerability .28 .45  .53 .50 .30 .46
Operate locally and overseas 
(%) 
15 -  13 - 15 -
Social services (%) 30 -  12 - 28 -
Company (%) 70 -  60 - 69 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Only selected categories from the control 
variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
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Table A6.5. Descriptive statistics for the outcome of insolvency risk 
 Not vulnerable 
(n=1,194) 
 Vulnerable
(n=88)
Whole sample
(n=1,282)
Variable M SD  M SD M SD
Age (log) 3.24 .68  2.78 .46 3.21 .67
Size (log) 13.80 1.26  13.94 1.09 13.81 1.25
Concentration .30 .22  .28 .21 .30 .22
Leverage .55 .37  .80 .25 .57 .37
Turnover .49 .77  .13 .13 .47 .75
Unrestricted funds 13.11 1.97  11.41 1.68 13.00 2.00
Loss .19 .39  .18 .39 .19 .39
Lagged financial vulnerability .27 .44  .77 .42 .30 .46
Operate locally and overseas 
(%) 
15 -  14 - 15 -
Social services (%) 29 -  24 - 28 -
Company (%) 68 -  89 - 69 -
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. Only selected categories from the control 
variables are included for the purpose of brevity. 
  
 183 
 
Table A6.6. Results of Logistic Regression for Outcome of Financial Vulnerability 
 Log odds SE (robust) 95% CI
  Lower Upper
Age -.20 .11 -.42 .01
Size .01 .08 -.15 .17
Concentration -.17 .32 -.80 .47
Leverage -1.12*** .24 -1.60 -.65
Turnover .10 .09 -.08 .28
Unrestricted funds -.16** .06 -.28 -.04
Loss .03 .17 -.30 .35
Lagged financial vulnerability .97*** .14 .70 1.25
Controls Yes
 
Observations 1,282
McFadden’s adjusted R2 .04
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 .14
Cragg and Uhler’s R2 .14
BIC full model -7519.51
Note: Figures rounded to two decimal places. Constant is omitted. CI: confidence interval; BIC: 
Information Criterion. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Figure A6.1. Sequence index plot of funding disruption 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 491 charities that experienced this 
vulnerability at least once and is ordered by vulnerability status in 2008. 
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Figure A6.2. Sequence index plot of financial disruption 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 893 charities that experienced this 
vulnerability at least once and is ordered by vulnerability status in 2008. 
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Figure A6.3. Sequence index plot of programme disruption 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 480 charities that experienced this 
vulnerability at least once and is ordered by vulnerability status in 2008. 
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Figure A6.4. Sequence index plot of insolvency 
Note: The Y axis represents the individual sequences of the 360 charities that experienced this 
vulnerability at least once and is ordered by vulnerability status in 2008. 
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Figure A6.5. Regression model residuals and deviance 
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Figure A6.6. Influence of observations on model estimation 
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Chapter Seven 
Table A7.1. Distribution of respondent roles in charity 
Role N % Cumulative %
Trustee 233 55.48 55.48
Senior Management 134 31.90 87.38
Employee 31 7.38 94.76
Volunteer 14 3.33 98.10
Other 8 1.90 100.00
Total 420 100.00
 
Table A7.2. Distribution of charity size 
Annual gross income N % Cumulative %
£0 2 0.48 0.48
£1 - £24,999 129 30.71 31.19
£25,000 - £99,999 84 20.00 51.19
£100,000 - £499,999 106 25.24 76.43
£500,000 - £999,999 32 7.62 84.05
£1,000,000 - £9,999,999 55 13.10 97.14
£10,000,000 + 12 2.86 100.00
Total 420 100.00
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Table A7.3. Distribution of ICNPO 
ICNPO group N % Cumulative %
Culture and recreation 75 17.86 17.86
Not elsewhere classified 69 16.43 34.29
Social services 63 15.00 49.29
Religion 55 13.10 62.38
Health 49 11.67 74.05
Education and research 48 11.43 85.48
Environment 15 3.57 89.05
Development and housing 15 3.57 92.62
International 14 3.33 95.95
Philanthropic intermediaries 
and voluntarism promotion 
12 2.86 98.81
Law, advocacy and politics 4 0.95 99.76
Business and professional 
associations, unions 
1 0.24 100.00
Total 420 100.00
 
Table A7.4. Distribution of charity constitutional form 
Constitutional form N % Cumulative %
Company 163 38.81 38.81
Unincorporated Association 93 22.14 60.95
Trust 55 13.10 74.05
SCIO 54 12.86 86.90
Other 45 10.71 97.62
Industrial and Provident 
Society 
8 1.90 99.52
Education Endowment 1 0.24 99.76
Statutory Corporation 1 0.24 100.00
Total 420 100.00
  
 192 
 
Table A7.5. When asked to describe risk, some charities mention the terms below. If your charity was 
asked to describe risk, how relevant are each of these terms? 
  %
Risk 
descriptor N Not relevant Slightly relevant Moderately relevant Highly relevant
Hazard 395 24 24 24 29
Threat 405 18 20 28 34
Challenge 409 5 14 34 46
Opportunity 398 10 14 32 44
Uncertainty 405 9 20 33 37
Exciting 381 30 22 25 22
Scary 383 46 25 21 8
Success 396 11 12 31 45
Failure 399 14 22 28 35
Quantitative 365 9 16 39 35
Qualitative 365 8 10 30 52
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus rows may not sum to 100. 
Observations with missing data or responded ‘don’t know’ are excluded. 
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Table A7.6. Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: 
 %
Risk management utility N
Strongly 
disagree Disagree Agree
Strongly 
agree
Risk management supports our 
strategic planning 390 4 9 49 38
  
Risk management supports our 
day-to-day activities 398 4 11 49 37
  
Risk management helps us be 
accountable to our funders 376 3 16 49 35
  
Risk management helps us be 
accountable to our regulator 378 2 9 52 37
  
Risk management helps us be 
accountable to our beneficiaries 381 3 11 48 39
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus rows may not sum to 100. 
 
Table A7.7. When asked to think broadly about the kind of problems facing charities today, some 
people mention the concerns below. For each one, please indicate how important you think each risk 
category is to your charity: 
  %
Risk category N Not relevant 
Slightly 
relevant Moderately relevant Highly relevant
Governance risks 417 4 17 36 43
Financial risks 419 1 8 19 72
Operational risks 415 4 18 34 44
Compliance risks 416 4 21 31 44
External risks 413 6 19 33 42
Note: Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number and thus rows may not sum to 100. 
Observations with missing data or responded ‘don’t know’ are excluded. 
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Table A7.8. Thinking about these risk categories in more detail, please indicate how concerned your 
charity is with regards to these risks over the next 12 months 
  %
Type of risk N 
Not 
concerned 
Slightly 
concerned
Moderately 
concerned
Very 
concerned
Inappropriate 
organisational structure 410 50 24 17 9
   
Insufficient number of 
trustees 419 49 23 17 11
   
Lack of relevant trustee 
skills and knowledge 417 33 35 22 10
   
Reduction in annual 
income 417 14 27 26 33
   
Increase in annual 
expenditure 414 20 30 31 19
   
Challenging fundraising 
environment 404 15 19 29 38
   
Inadequate reserves and 
cashflow 414 38 28 18 15
   
Inability to cope with 
increase in demand for 
services 410 36 30 20 14
   
Poor public perception 
and reputation 409 50 26 16 8
   
Changing government 
policy 407 26 27 27 20
   
Complying with charity 
regulation 418 41 33 18 8
Note: Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number and thus rows may not sum to 100. 
Observations with missing data or responded ‘don’t know’ are excluded.  
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1 Public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalry; that is, it is difficult to prevent consumers from 
benefiting from the good and individual consumption does not reduce the amount of the good 
available for other consumers respectively. 
2 Note that some of these failures are only so from an instrumental (i.e. economic) perspective. 
Particularism could be a success when viewed from an expressive or advocacy perspective for 
instance. 
3 http://www.thinkdata.org.uk/; http://tsrc-ncvo-csdp.com/. 
4 Readers will note that the analytical chapters do not examine an obvious risk in the sector: 
organisational demise. There are two reasons why we chose to focus on other outcomes. First, charity 
demise has been studied extensively in the literature on nonprofit success and failure (see Helmig, 
Ingurfurth & Pinz, 2014 for a comprehensive review of this work). Second, the administrative data 
utilised in this research does not offer the opportunity to study this outcome in a rigorous manner: 
though it is possible to identify organisations that are no longer charities, we are not able to 
distinguish between those that had to cease operations entirely, those that were removed by OSCR as 
a result of an investigation, and those that simply voluntarily renounced their charitable status and 
continued operating.  
5 A conversation with a member of the Compliance & Investigation team at OSCR revealed that 
invalid charity numbers are the result of data entry errors. For these observations, we attempted to link 
with the Scottish Charity Register using the legal name field; this proved unsuccessful for all but a 
few of the 279 observations. 
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6 It is not known whether duplicates are valid (i.e. as the result of a change in a charity’s accounting 
year end date) or data entry errors; the duplicates were dropped using the duplicates drop command in 
Stata. 
7 OSCR does possess email addresses for the principal contact of a charity but was unable to share 
due to data confidentiality issues. It was decided that the manual collection of email addresses for 
each charity was too onerous a task and thus an alternative sample-construction strategy was sought. 
8 A copy of the Scottish Charity Register was downloaded from OSCR’s website on 17 September 
2015 and used to compare to our sample. Though not perfectly overlapping, it is highly unlikely that 
the charities in our sample are not present on the Register a maximum of three months after 
completing the survey. 
9 It is unknown why 68 of these responses did not match but it is probable that the data management 
process applied to Chapter Four’s data was a significant factor. 
10 The ICNPO was developed as part of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project in 
the 1990s. It provides a means of categorising nonprofits according to their ‘economic activity’ (i.e. 
the types of goods and services they provide). 
11 It should be acknowledged that surveys, particularly those that are anonymous, could capture illicit 
activity that will not appear in other sources such as regulator data.  
12 Though providing advice may act as a deterrent or remedy against future misconduct, we feel that it 
is more closely aligned, conceptually, with alleged misconduct rather than actual. 
13 For investigated charities, annual gross income refers to the year the investigation was opened; 
however this only applies to 1,172 observations due to issues with the recording of the date of the 
investigation. For the remaining investigated charities, annual gross income refers to the 
organization’s size as recorded in its most recent annual return. Alternative measures of size, such as 
the natural log of net assets, have been utilised in other research streams (most notably in financial 
vulnerability research) but annual gross income is chosen here as this information is available for all 
charities in the sample. This is due to there being detailed financial information for only a subset of 
charities (i.e. those with annual gross income greater than or equal to £25,000). This fact also 
accounts for the inclusion of only one financial independent variable in the models. 
14 We do not have access to individual-level information on who makes a complaint, only their broad 
role as recorded by OSCR. 
15 These classifications are derived from unofficial interviews and conversations with members of the 
Compliance & Investigations team at OSCR. 
16 A similar association is found between the metric forms of annual gross income and investigation 
status. Two-tailed independent-group t tests and two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) 
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tests were conducted to compare differences in mean and median incomes between charities that have 
been investigated and those that have not. For both measures there are statistically significant 
differences in mean and median income: investigated charities have larger values for both measures of 
central tendency. 
17 The presence of multicollinearity among the independent variables was examined for each model 
by calculating the variance inflation factors (VIF). For both models, the VIF for each independent 
variable is less than 1.5 and the mean VIF is less than 1.2, below the thresholds at which Allison 
(1999) suggests multicollinearity is problematic. 
18 A bivariate probit approach that utilised the whole sample was tested to see whether the dependent 
variables should be predicted using a single model; the correlation coefficient of the error terms of the 
two outcomes was statistically insignificant, indicating that they should be modelled independently. 
19 Other possible model specifications include fixed effects and pooled logistic regression. A random 
effects model is chosen over pooled logit as the Hausman test is statistically significant (X2=69.59, 
p<.001) and due to the size of the rho coefficient; ignoring this level of unobserved heterogeneity 
would lead to incorrect interpretation of model coefficients. A fixed effects model is rejected as it 
excludes time-invariant independent variables that are of substantive interest; these variables are 
absorbed by the model’s intercept or constant. For example, ICNPO category does not vary over time 
and thus would be omitted in the estimation of a fixed effects model, despite our interest in exploring 
whether this variable affects the outcome. 
20 It should be noted that there could be self-selection issues with the balanced panel: that is, charities 
may not submit an annual return in a particular year due to triggering an exception. As the balanced 
panel is only subject to descriptive analysis techniques then this issue is not considered as problematic 
as conducting explanatory analyses that could produce biased effect estimations (magnitude and 
direction). Nevertheless it should be borne in mind. 
21 Cross-sectional dependence is not a concern in this analysis due to the data being a micro panel i.e. 
few years and many cases. Heteroscedasticity is accounted for by the estimation of robust standard 
errors in the model. 
22 We do not wish to speculate whether those with missing values are more or less likely to be 
financially vulnerable. As previously stated the vast majority of observations with missing values are 
listed as Cross Border or Registered Social Landlords and it is left to the reader to make their own 
judgement as to these organisation’s propensity to be financially vulnerable. 
23 It should be noted that there could be self-selection issues with the balanced panel: that is, charities 
may not submit an annual return in a particular year due to experiencing financial vulnerability. As 
the balanced panel is only subject to descriptive techniques then this issue is not considered as 
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problematic as when conducting explanatory analyses i.e. risk of biased coefficient estimates 
(magnitude and direction). Nevertheless it should be borne in mind. 
24 We could have reported the odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients) rather than the log odds: as the 
outcome is rare, one could argue that it would be more informative to know which charities are more 
likely to report incidents relative to their peers rather than the absolute effect of a change in log odds. 
We prefer to report the sign and significance of the log odds as there is a danger that the odds ratios 
would be inflated for a rare outcome and thus misrepresent the underlying probability of the outcome 
– see Cramer (2003) and Gayle and Lambert (2009) for further discussion and examples of this issue. 
25 Accounting for the effect of previously being financially vulnerable is important, as Figure 6.1 and 
Table 6.6 highlight an element of state dependency in this regard. 
26 55 percent of charities have submitted their annual accounts late at least once; fourteen percent have 
been subject to a complaint; two percent have been subject to regulatory action arising from a 
complaint; and seven percent have been removed from the Scottish Charity Register. 
27 Two of the independent variables are not controlled for: lagged financial vulnerability and 
sequential loss, as these variables are specific to the period 2011-2012. 
28 The broad types of risks examined in the study: Finance, Fraud, Technology, Regulation, People & 
Governance, and Assets. 
29 At time of writing it was not possible to check whether a charity accurately reported its annual gross 
income in the survey. While we do link survey data to administrative data using Scottish Charity 
Number as a unique identifier, there is a lag in the submission of annual returns e.g. charities will not 
submit their financial information for the period covered by the survey until mid-to-late 2016 at the 
earliest. 
